'[연구] Research'에 해당되는 글 49건

  1. 2014.11.19 [국제] PBS Frontline 2014 The Rise of ISIS
  2. 2014.11.05 [일본-노트] Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11 (David Arase)
  3. 2014.10.29 [일본-노트] 일본의 대외정책 - 외압(gaiatsu), 반응형 국가(reactive state)?
  4. 2014.10.18 Bill Gates on Piketty "Why Inequality Matters"
  5. 2014.10.01 [일본-노트] Electoral System (Reform 1993 and after)
  6. 2014.09.24 [일본-노트] 자민당 파벌 연구 (5개 주요 파벌) - LDP's Big Five Factions
  7. 2014.09.23 [일본-노트] Postwar Japan
  8. 2014.09.22 [IR-Theories-요약] (SCRAP) Stephen M. Walt (1990) The Origins of Alliances - by Branislav L. Slantchev
  9. 2014.09.17 [일본-노트] 교육법안비교 1890, 1947, 2007
  10. 2014.09.16 [국제안보의 이해] Defining Security

[국제] PBS Frontline 2014 The Rise of ISIS

[연구] Research 2014. 11. 19. 08:16

ISIS에 대한 수업자료


tags : frontline, ISIS, PBS
Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[일본-노트] Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11 (David Arase)

[연구] Research 2014. 11. 5. 10:57

Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11 (David Arase)
Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July/August 2007), pp. 560-583.

Summary & Note (Oct. 29, 2014) – Bee Yun Jo

 

Overview

David Arase begins the article with a quote from Ishihara Shintaro, who in 2005 projected that the increasing regional tensions and uncertainties can stimulate Japan to emerge from its “passivity” and become “a strong nation,” as well as foreseeing the possibility of Japan’s more upfront confrontation with China. As Arase states, the central irony or interesting puzzle here is that while Ishihara’s view represents the perspectives of those always held by the “extremes,” the recent developments in Japan’s security policy seem indeed to be assimilating towards the extremes. Overall, Arase’s conclusion is that this is not because Ishihara’s view has “mellowed but because Japan has changed.”

 

Main Question and Argument

Q1.      Why and how has Japan changed? (Japan’s increasing activism)

n  Mix of the internal and external factors that encouraged Japan to change = “a new alignment of factors at the levels of international structure, domestic institutions, and national identity”:

Three major factors in consideration

-     (External) Security environments

-     (Internal) Domestic institutional environments

-     (External-Internal) National identity (9/11)

 

Q2.           How is Japan’s change influencing its security policy now?  

n  Expanding the U.S.-Japan alliance (Japan as an active ally)

n  But also Japan’s increasing autonomy and assertiveness in the regional security policy.

 

Evidences

Q1.     Why and how has Japan changed? (Japan’s increasing activism)

 

1.       “Resistant Phase” (1951-1989): “modest, defensively configured military”

Fundamental Factors:

1)       (External) International structure:

-        U.S. Occupation and the resulting postwar Constitution (demilitarization) => “free ride”

-        U.S. did not need Japan to balance the Soviet Union

2)       (Internal) Institutional:

-        Befitting the “Yoshida Doctrine” (focus on the recovery)

3)       (External-internal) National identity:

-        Trauma of atomic bombing and defeat (=> Article 9)

ð  Configuration of structural, institutional and normative factors = obstruction on Japan’s rearmament and U.S. policy toward Japan (“one-sided burden” to U.S. and Japan’s “free-ride”)

 

Yet “Passive Resistance”

During this phase, the right wing view lacked support, yet remained where U.S. pressure factor played an important role (low-profile continuity in the efforts for Japan’s activism) – Hatoyama Ichiro => Kishi Nobusuke => Nakasone Yasuhiro => Abe Shinzo

-        Korean War => Self Defense Force (SDF) in 1954, yet senshu boei (exclusive defense) – the Basic Policy for National Defense

-        Vietnam War => “autonomous defense (jishu boei)” (Prime Minister Sato) => 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) – a compromise between jishu and senshu boei.

-        U.S.-Japan 1980s trade friction => Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and violation of the 1% GDP defense ceiling in 1987

ð  Overall, 1980s ended with “one-sided” burden on U.S., while Japan maintained its “passive resistance”

 

2.       “Reluctant Phase” (1989-2001): Reactive to U.S.’s “prod” for Japan’s “extra-territorial role”

Fundamental Factors:

1)      (External) International structure:

-        The post-Cold War international structure => Fall in the U.S.’s strategic interest in Japan

-        Japan’s threat of abandonment: dependence on U.S. (oil, security)

-        Japan’s checkbook diplomacy no longer suffices (exemplified by the U.S. reaction during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War)

-        1993 North Korea’s test of Nodong missile, withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)

2)      => (Internal) Institutional changes

-        International Peace Cooperation Law (1992), allowing SDF to join the PKO activities

-        1995 NDPO, authorizing the SDF to address “situations in the areas around Japan that have a direct effect on Japan’s security”

3)      => (External-internal) National identity:

-        “normative barrier” against overseas dispatch of SDF broken

 

Additional Internal Factors: Domestic Reforms since the 1990s

1)      The electoral reform in 1994 (SNTV + MMD -> SMD + PR): Weakened Factionalism

2)      Change in policy process – Administrative reform and centralization of power in the cabinet (1999 “Law to Amend the Cabinet Law” and “Law to Establish the Cabinet Office”)

 

ð  bureaucratic dominated => Prime minister, policy-oriented leadership

ð  A new alignment of structural (most important), institutional and normative factors = Japan’s “reluctant” move towards a more active security policy; “a redefined alliance”

 

 

Q2.     How is Japan’s change influencing its security policy now? 

 

3.       Japan as Active State? (2001-2006)

Fundamental Factors

1)      (External) 9/11 => SDF dispatch to Afghanistan and Iraq

-        (Koizumi) Anti Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001 (Afghanistan)

-        Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in 2003 (Iraq)

2)      (Internal) Generational change (Abe)

-        Rejection of the Yoshida doctrine (i.e. U.S.-Japan alliance, minimal security role, low profile, economy first)

-        Centralization of power under PM

-        Security and defense oriented Cabinet (security-oriented experts in the Cabinet, commission of defense experts, 2005 National Defense Program Guideline, the five year Mid-Term Defense Plan)

3)      National Identity: “reviving nationalist sentiment”

ð  The difference from previous years is that “key international, institutional, and normative factors that had inhibited a growing international security role for Japan… are today aligning in a mutually reinforcing way to facilitate a positive, forward-leaning toward security.”

 

Other Regional Factors that Convey Japan’s Increased Assertiveness
(autonomy from U.S.-Japan alliance)

1)      North Korea: “uncharacteristic activism” and “uncompromising line”

-        The launch of a Taepodong II missile on July 5, 2006 => “uncharacteristic activism” calling for a U.N. Security Council meeting (=> U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695)

-        Abduction issue => Abe’s “uncompromising line”

-        Participation in U.S.’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

2)      South Korea: Yasukuni Shrine visits and territorial issues

3)      China: arms-race, worsening public poll, territorial issues

4)      U.S.-Japan Alliance Transformation (Active SDF)

-        Inclusion of Taiwan strait issue as U.S.-Japan’s “common strategic objectives” in 2005

-        Towards a global scope bilateral cooperation (WMD, terrorism, energy)

-        New alliance that aims a close partnership between the SDF and U.S. (“U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” in 2005; “The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” in 2006).

 

To recap: By analyzing how the configuration of the structural (external), institutional (internal), and normative factors shifted in Japan, Arase provides a comprehensive overview on why and how Japan’s security posture transformed towards an increasingly active approach. In regards to the U.S.-Japan alliance, Arase provides the update on Japan’s regional policy and the impact of 9/11, and conveys that there are two sides to Japan’s increasing activism: 1) “the long-standing U.S. desire for a more active Japanese ally is being fulfilled”; while 2) the increased activism translates into Japan’s independent regional security policy (e.g. North Korean abduction issue, territorial and maritime disputes, and the normalization process with North Korea and Russia).

 

Conclusion & Comments

Arase’s Conclusion

Overall, based on the findings on how Japan’s activism transcends into Japan’s willingness to play the role of an active security ally to the U.S. (U.S.-Japan alliance strengthening) and an independent and assertive role in the region, Arase concludes with a caution that Japan’s remilitarization in the current environment – where Japan is becoming ever more “receptive” to U.S. pressure; Japan and the neighboring countries are interacting without a multilateral security regime or other collective framework to dissuade conflict – Japan’s new security role and assertiveness “may not turn out” as well as Ishihara, or the U.S. may have imagined.

 

Comments

*Comprehensive: Overview of both the domestic&international factors, mutually reinforcing.

*Going back to the debate on whether Japan is a reactive state, Arase’s paper provides a significant insight: Unlike the perspective that Japan’s post-war security policy is an example of Japan as a reactive state, responding to the U.S.’s gaiatsu, Arase’s paper implies that while the U.S.-led international structure or U.S.’s pressures served as important independent variable in determining Japan’s security policy, “reactive” may be a term too far-fetched or simplifying, for Japan has always maintained resistance (“passive resistance”) and strategically used U.S.’s pressure for Japan to “free-ride” and gradual remilitarization (right wing agenda). With 9/11 and previous domestic reforms, the 2000s marks the height of Japan’s relative activism which emerged from a continuity in the past.

*Implications on today: While published in 2007, Arase’s cautious remark on how Japan’s activism may endanger the complexity of the region still holds in today’s environment. Food for thought: U.S.’s pivot to Asia policy and Japan’s normal country agenda – As Arase comments, while U.S. may have wanted Japan’s increase in the security role in the region, current Abe’s agenda and Japan’s increasing autonomy in its regional policy may not be befitting to U.S.’s strategic interest.

Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[일본-노트] 일본의 대외정책 - 외압(gaiatsu), 반응형 국가(reactive state)?

[연구] Research 2014. 10. 29. 12:03

Gaiatsu and Japanese Foreign Policy

Is Japan a Reactive State?

   

Definition

 n  Gaiatsu: Literally “foreign pressure” – Emphasis on the reactive, responsive nature of Japanese foreign policy to external pressure/stimulus[1]

 n  Kent Calder’s conceptualization of Gaiatsu = Japan as a “reactive state” – Japanese foreign policy is reactive to external pressure, especially in response to the American requests[2]

n  While the term “reactive state” remains in the academic discourse, the term gaiatsu hardly appears in the discussion

 

The Debate: Is Japan a Reactive State?

 

1.       Japan as a reactive state (Calder, 1988) – Gaiatsu as its nature

 

1)       2 characteristics of “reactive state”

        the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so

        it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely

 

2)       Actual cases during the late 1970s and the early 1980s

-        access to the Japanese market for beef and oranges(1978)

-        macroeconomic stimulation(1978)

-        market access for American telecommunications equipment(1980)

-        restraints on automobile export to the United States(1981)

-        Yen-Dollar Agreement(1984)

-        pressures for policy change in Japan by G-5 Plaza(1985)

                    

“Responded positively to U.S. pressures for liberalization of outward capital flow”

 

3)       Explanations

       Considerations of state strategy

-        Dictated avoiding broad international commitments or a pro-active global role, so as to devote maximum attention to economic growth, allying with the US

       Domestic constraints on international initiatives

-        the fragmented character(nawabari) of state authority in Japan makes decisive action difficult, and creates “a hierarchy, or complex of overlapping hierarchies, without a top”

       Intermittent Japanese Flexibility

-        In the orange negotiations with the US, “while the Japanese political system was not prepared to fully liberalize, it was prepared to compensate”

-        “all relevant actors in the negotiation were given a lucrative piece of what they wanted(customers unrepresented in the arena failed to reap major benefits)”

       Sense of vulnerability – “hypersensitivity to any form of anti-Japanese sentiment abroad”[3]

 

2.       Japan as a proactive state – Gaiatsu as a strategy

 

1)       “The myth of Gaiatsu” argument (Cooney, 2006)[4]

-        Re-interpreting Gaiatsu as a strategic tool for normalizing Japan

“Japanese elites want Japan to be a normal nation… Article 9 prevents this outcome…Gaiatsu is a tool for normalizing Japan without risking public displeasure over the reaction of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Japanese elites are using foreign pressure to their own ends”

-        “a strong, face-saving device to which [domestic] vested interest groups were persuaded to give in” by a government pretending to be their champion; frustration with the “country’s dithering passivity on all but trade.”[5]

 

2)       Japan as an aggressive and mercantilist nation[6]

 

3)       And with the recent developments in Abe’s diplomacy: “Strategic Diplomacy, Value-Oriented Diplomacy, and Claiming Diplomacy”[7]

-       Prof. Park finds distinctive values in Abe’s diplomacy where it is much more strategic—he sets up certain set of national goals and according to the priorities of the goals, he acts accordingly. For example, for the first time in Japanese diplomatic history, they set up National Security Committee (NSC) like America and began to disclose their strategy which is unprecedented. The two main pillars of Japanese national security is the Peace Constitution and the other is US-Japan Alliance. Whenever Japan wants to change diplomatic stance, they upgrade US-Japan Alliance and on the basis of the upgraded alliance system, they try to revise the self-defense forces law and revise the US-Japan security guideline.

-       Value-oriented Diplomacy emphasizes the ‘universal values’ such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Abe believes that Japan should take more responsibility in the international society and is especially cautious of the public space and maritime security against Chinese expansion.

-       Claiming diplomacy is a counter-reaction against DPJ’s passive diplomacy. Abe strongly believes that claiming diplomacy on territorial dispute and history perspective is important in setting up Japan’s national identity and territorial sovereignty. 

 

Continued Debate: Other Explanations

 

1.       Reactive-Proactive Hybrid model

 

1)       From reactive to a proactive, “a rising state”[8]

-        “Japan’s recent diplomatic behavior reveals considerable reactivity and equivocation, but there are also concurrent indications of greater activism and even hints of leadership, especially since the last half of the 1980s.”[9]

 

2)       Japan towards a normal country

-        The early 1990s emergence of the normal country debate[10]

-        Ishihara’s The Japan That Can Say No (1989)[11]

 

3)       “Coping strategy” (Curtis 1993)[12]

-        Reading the trend of the times and responding strategically = “reactive” is only a partial description.

 

4)       The Goldilocks Strategy (Samuels 2007)[13]

 

2.       Reactive only to certain countries (United States)

 

3.       Other countries are also reactive = “reactive” nature is not unique to Japanese foreign policy

 

Robert Putnam’s two-level games

-        Domestic and international politics are unavoidably intertwined (hence two-level-games) in the decision making processes underlying international relations

-        The 1978 Bonn Summit and Japan: “without the external pressure, it is even more unlikely that the expansionists could have overridden the powerful MOF”

-        Examples of openness for foreign pressure in every country; Japan no more a reactive than most other states of similar size and power (e.g. U.S., Germany)[14]

 

Policy Examples

 

1.       Japan’s Defense Policy in 2000s - : “Coping” and increasing “proactive” than reactive

 1)       Major Findings based on a Survey of Japanese Defense White Papers (2005-2014)

n  Security discourse as a key example of gaiatsu as strategy (2005 War on Terror -> 2007 Chindia, regional environment, territorial issues 2013): increasing emphasis on SDF, from passive to proactive

n  Mid-late 2000s: More coping than reactive (U.S.’s QDR, increasingly to China’s rise since 2007 report, North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities)

n  Early 2010s: More proactive than coping

 

Key findings of a Survey on Japan’s Defense White Papers (2005-2014)[15]

 

n  Overall, Japan, like other countries cannot but be reactive to changes in the external environment, triggering its strategic coping measures as responses; and these decisions resonate in terms of other countries responses, interacting/mutually reinforcing Japan’s strategic environment (Reactive-Proactive); indeed the 2014 is markedly strong in terms of proactive approach to national security.

 

2.       Japan’s ODA Policy – Case of Gaiatsu?

 

1)       Earlier Criticisms on Japan’s ODA Policy

-        “predominantly regional orientation with its assistance”; “heavy skewing toward bilateral assistance”

-        Absence of principle-based guideline until 1992

2)       Reactive: “To redress criticisms, Japan wrote its first ODA Charter in 1992 and revised it in 2002.”[16]

3)       Nevertheless, while reactive in terms of criticisms, yet increasingly proactive in its policy direction (regional orientation)

-        While the first ODA charter addressed the need for Japan’s more global role, with the revision of 2002 ODA charter refocuses on Japan’s regional orientation (proactive)- “With Focus on Asia”(2002) based on the “new challenges of the era”

-        ODA Charter Revision – “not only as a contribution to the international community, but also as a help to promote security and prosperity of Japan”;

 

Survey of Japan’s ODA White Papers (1994-2014)[17]

Year

Findings

Main Characteristic

2013

“rapid change of the political and security environment surrounding Japan” => “it is important to support countries which share strategic interests and fundamental values”; “investment”

“Growth of Southeast Asia and the role of Japan”, “Dynamic Africa”

Focus on Asia,
Strategic ODA

2011

The Earthquake

2009

Global financial crisis

“East Asian Community” (Hatoyama)

2003-2002

ODA Charter Revision – “not only as a contribution to the international community, but also as a help to promote security and prosperity of Japan”; “With Focus on Asia”(2002)

“Meeting the Challenges of a New Era”

1997

ODA budget cuts, begins with “why is ODA necessary” (changed from “popular support”)

“Substantial Policy and Philosophy Shaping Period (Original ODA Charter Period)” (1992-2002)

1994

1989, 1991-1993: Largest donor country ($11,474 bil in 1993)

- End of the Cold War (ODA Charter in June 1992)

 


Conclusion

 

-        “Coping” and increasingly proactive than reactive

-        Abe (Feb 22, 2013): “Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am here to make. And I reiterate this by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be.”[18]



 

[Appendix 1] Survey of Japanese Defense White Papers (2005-2014)[19]

 

Year

Gaiatsu / External factors

Key Responses

Result

2014

-     U.S.’s 2014 QDR – Emphasis on the sequestration cuts in defense spending

-     North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities

-     China’s military modernization, naval forces, maritime interests, presence in the South China Sea (Southeast Asia)

-     Russia’s increased activities in the “vicinity of Japan”

-     Middle East and Africa = appropriate responses are needed as “international community”

-     2014 July 1: The Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People

-     2013 Dec: The National Security Council Created

-     2013 Dec: Japan’s first NSS – Japan’s stance as a “Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation” – “Japan will contribute more”

 

Gaiatsu
=> National security and defense policies to “protect Japan”

2013

-     Territorial rights, China’s military capacity, North Korea: “security environment in the vicinity of Japan has increasingly grown severe”

-     “the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in the Asia-Pacific region”

Peace, security, and independence cannot be ensured by aspirations alone”

2012

-     U.S.’s rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific, reduction in defense spending

-     North Korea

-     “China’s maritime activities in waters near Japan”

-     2010 NDPG (developing Dynamic Defense Force)

-     “For the Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance”

2011

-     Earthquake

-     U.S’s war on terror (Osama bin Laden killed)

-     North Korea, China, Russia

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe

-     New National Defense Program Guidelines for 2011 and Beyond (new NDPG) drafted

-     “Dynamic Defense Forces”

-     Reform, reorganization of SDF

2010

-     “Complicated and Uncertain International Security Environment”

-     Cheonan incident, WMD, China’s rise

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe (Same structure upto 2014)

-     Feb 2010 “Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era”

-     SDF, US-Japan Security Alliance

2009-2006

-     Terrorism, WMD, Iran, North Korea

-     “Changes to “traditional relationships”(Rise of China and India) – (2007)

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe, U.N.

-     Similar to 2005 response: SDF, U.S.-Japan security alliance, PKO activities

-     MoD Reform (2008)

2005

-     War on terror (Non-state actors) – “new threats”

-     Transfer and proliferation of WMDs

-     Situations in Iraq

-     (Korean peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, Malacca and Singapore)

*List of countries overviewed (defense policies): U.S., Russia, Europe, U.N.

- U.S.-Japan alliance

- Self-sufficient defense posture against the new threats (emphasis on the right of self-defense)

- 2004 New National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG)

- 2004 “Mid-Term Defense Program” (new MTDP) for FY 2005-2009 – “establishing multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces”

“New” threats => Self-defense, U.S.-Japan alliance for “maintenance of regional order” and “global cooperation”



[1] The New York Times, “The Great Game of ‘Gai-atsu’,” (May 1, 1991) Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/01/opinion/the-great-game-of-gai-atsu.html (Accessed Oct 26, 2014).

[2] Calder, Kent (1988) “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics, Vol. 40(1). PP. 517-541.

[3] Blacker, Michael “Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,” in Curtis, Gerald L., ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 1-42.; Pyle, Kenneth B. “The Burden of Japanese History and the Politics of Burden Sharing,” in Makin, John H. and David C. Hellmann, eds., Sharing World Leadership: A New Era for America and Japan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989).

[4] Cooney, Kevin (2007) Japan's Foreign Policy Since 1945. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[5] The New York Times, “The Great Game of ‘Gai-atsu’,” (May 1, 1991). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/01/opinion/the-great-game-of-gai-atsu.html (Accessed Oct 26, 2014).

[6] Hirata, Keiko (2001): “Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Indochina in Y. Sato and A. Miyashita (eds.), Japan’s Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration. London: St. Martin’s Press.

[7] Park, Cheol Hee, “Basic Directions of Abe’s External Strategy,” in Cheol Hee Park Ed. Power Shift in East Asia and Changes in Japan’s External Strategy (2014) (in Korean).

[8] Hirata (2001).

[9] Yasutomo, Dennis (1986) The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy. London: Lexington Books.

[10] Soeya, Yoshihide & Masayuki, Tadokoro, and David Welch (2011) Japan as a Normal Country?, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

[11] Ishihara, Shintaro and Morita, Akio (1989): The Japan that Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster

[12] Curtis, Gerald (1993): Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[13] Samuels, Richard (2007): Securing Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[14] Putnam, Robert D. (1988): Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. In: International Organization, 42(3). PP. 427-460. P. 429.

[15] Japan’s Annual White Paper (2005-2014), Ministry of Defense. Available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ (Accessed Oct 29, 2014).

[16] Otopalik, Cameron M. (2010) “Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance: Assessing Conformance with Shifting Priorities,” International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, Vol 1, No. 1.1.

[17] Japan’s ODA White Papers (1994-2014) are available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000017.html (Accessed Oct 29th, 2014).

[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan is Back” by Shinzo Abe (Feb 22, 2013), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html (Accessed Oct 29, 2014).

[19] Japan’s Annual White Paper (2005-2014), Ministry of Defense, available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ (Accessed Oct 29th, 2014)

Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


Bill Gates on Piketty "Why Inequality Matters"

[연구] Research 2014. 10. 18. 19:55

http://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review


Why Inequality Matters

A 700-page treatise on economics translated from French is not exactly a light summer read—even for someone with an admittedly high geek quotient. But this past July, I felt compelled to read Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century after reading several reviews and hearing about it from friends.

I’m glad I did. I encourage you to read it too, or at least a good summary, like this one from The Economist. Piketty was nice enough to talk with me about his work on a Skype call last month. As I told him, I agree with his most important conclusions, and I hope his work will draw more smart people into the study of wealth and income inequality—because the more we understand about the causes and cures, the better. I also said I have concerns about some elements of his analysis, which I’ll share below.

I very much agree with Piketty that:

  • High levels of inequality are a problem—messing up economic incentives, tilting democracies in favor of powerful interests, and undercutting the ideal that all people are created equal.
  • Capitalism does not self-correct toward greater equality—that is, excess wealth concentration can have a snowball effect if left unchecked.
  • Governments can play a constructive role in offsetting the snowballing tendencies if and when they choose to do so.

To be clear, when I say that high levels of inequality are a problem, I don’t want to imply that the world is getting worse. In fact, thanks to the rise of the middle class in countries like China, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Thailand, the world as a whole is actually becoming more egalitarian, and that positive global trend is likely to continue.

But extreme inequality should not be ignored—or worse, celebrated as a sign that we have a high-performing economy and healthy society. Yes, some level of inequality is built in to capitalism. As Piketty argues, it is inherent to the system. The question is, what level of inequality is acceptable? And when does inequality start doing more harm than good? That’s something we should have a public discussion about, and it’s great that Piketty helped advance that discussion in such a serious way.

However, Piketty’s book has some important flaws that I hope he and other economists will address in the coming years.

For all of Piketty’s data on historical trends, he does not give a full picture of how wealth is created and how it decays. At the core of his book is a simple equation: r > g, where r stands for the average rate of return on capital and g stands for the rate of growth of the economy. The idea is that when the returns on capital outpace the returns on labor, over time the wealth gap will widen between people who have a lot of capital and those who rely on their labor. The equation is so central to Piketty’s arguments that he says it represents “the fundamental force for divergence” and “sums up the overall logic of my conclusions.”

Other economists have assembled large historical datasets and cast doubt on the value of r > g for understanding whether inequality will widen or narrow. I’m not an expert on that question. What I do know is that Piketty’s r > g doesn’t adequately differentiate among different kinds of capital with different social utility.

Imagine three types of wealthy people. One guy is putting his capital into building his business. Then there’s a woman who’s giving most of her wealth to charity. A third person is mostly consuming, spending a lot of money on things like a yacht and plane. While it’s true that the wealth of all three people is contributing to inequality, I would argue that the first two are delivering more value to society than the third. I wish Piketty had made this distinction, because it has important policy implications, which I’ll get to below.

More important, I believe Piketty’s r > g analysis doesn’t account for powerful forces that counteract the accumulation of wealth from one generation to the next. I fully agree that we don’t want to live in an aristocratic society in which already-wealthy families get richer simply by sitting on their laurels and collecting what Piketty calls “rentier income”—that is, the returns people earn when they let others use their money, land, or other property. But I don’t think America is anything close to that.

Take a look at the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans. About half the people on the list are entrepreneurs whose companies did very well (thanks to hard work as well as a lot of luck). Contrary to Piketty’s rentier hypothesis, I don’t see anyone on the list whose ancestors bought a great parcel of land in 1780 and have been accumulating family wealth by collecting rents ever since. In America, that old money is long gone—through instability, inflation, taxes, philanthropy, and spending.

You can see one wealth-decaying dynamic in the history of successful industries. In the early part of the 20th century, Henry Ford and a small number of other entrepreneurs did very well in the automobile industry. They owned a huge amount of the stock of car companies that achieved a scale advantage and massive profitability. These successful entrepreneurs were the outliers. Far more people—including many rentiers who invested their family wealth in the auto industry—saw their investments go bust in the period from 1910 to 1940, when the American auto industry shrank from 224 manufacturers down to 21. So instead of a transfer of wealth toward rentiers and other passive investors, you often get the opposite. I have seen the same phenomenon at work in technology and other fields.

Piketty is right that there are forces that can lead to snowballing wealth (including the fact that the children of wealthy people often get access to networks that can help them land internships, jobs, etc.). However, there are also forces that contribute to the decay of wealth, and Capital doesn’t give enough weight to them.

I am also disappointed that Piketty focused heavily on data on wealth and income while neglecting consumption altogether. Consumption data represent the goods and services that people buy—including food, clothing, housing, education, and health—and can add a lot of depth to our understanding of how people actually live. Particularly in rich societies, the income lens really doesn’t give you the sense of what needs to be fixed.

There are many reasons why income data, in particular, can be misleading. For example, a medical student with no income and lots of student loans would look in the official statistics like she’s in a dire situation but may well have a very high income in the future. Or a more extreme example: Some very wealthy people who are not actively working show up below the poverty line in years when they don’t sell any stock or receive other forms of income.

It’s not that we should ignore the wealth and income data. But consumption data may be even more important for understanding human welfare. At a minimum, it shows a different—and generally rosier—picture from the one that Piketty paints. Ideally, I’d like to see studies that draw from wealth, income, and consumption data together.

Even if we don’t have a perfect picture today, we certainly know enough about the challenges that we can take action.

Piketty’s favorite solution is a progressive annual tax on capital, rather than income. He argues that this kind of tax “will make it possible to avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral while preserving competition and incentives for new instances of primitive accumulation.”

I agree that taxation should shift away from taxing labor. It doesn’t make any sense that labor in the United States is taxed so heavily relative to capital. It will make even less sense in the coming years, as robots and other forms of automation come to perform more and more of the skills that human laborers do today.

But rather than move to a progressive tax on capital, as Piketty would like, I think we’d be best off with a progressive tax on consumption. Think about the three wealthy people I described earlier: One investing in companies, one in philanthropy, and one in a lavish lifestyle. There’s nothing wrong with the last guy, but I think he should pay more taxes than the others. As Piketty pointed out when we spoke, it's hard to measure consumption (for example, should political donations count?). But then, almost every tax system—including a wealth tax—has similar challenges.

Like Piketty, I’m also a big believer in the estate tax. Letting inheritors consume or allocate capital disproportionately simply based on the lottery of birth is not a smart or fair way to allocate resources. As Warren Buffett likes to say, that’s like “choosing the 2020 Olympic team by picking the eldest sons of the gold-medal winners in the 2000 Olympics.” I believe we should maintain the estate tax and invest the proceeds in education and research—the best way to strengthen our country for the future.

Philanthropy also can be an important part of the solution set. It’s too bad that Piketty devotes so little space to it. A century and a quarter ago, Andrew Carnegie was a lonely voice encouraging his wealthy peers to give back substantial portions of their wealth. Today, a growing number of very wealthy people are pledging to do just that. Philanthropy done well not only produces direct benefits for society, it also reduces dynastic wealth. Melinda and I are strong believers that dynastic wealth is bad for both society and the children involved. We want our children to make their own way in the world. They’ll have all sorts of advantages, but it will be up to them to create their lives and careers.

The debate over wealth and inequality has generated a lot of partisan heat. I don’t have a magic solution for that. But I do know that, even with its flaws, Piketty’s work contributes at least as much light as heat. And now I’m eager to see research that brings more light to this important topic.


Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[일본-노트] Electoral System (Reform 1993 and after)

[연구] Research 2014. 10. 1. 11:24

Changes in Electoral System: Before 1993 and after 1994

 

1. Overview

 

Before 1993

After 1994

Major

Characteristics

Medium-size Election District

System (in effect since 1925)

Parallel system (winner-take-all)

Single Non-Transferable Vote

System (SNTV)

SNTV abolished

MMD System

Combination of SMD & PR System

Voting

Mechanism

1 vote per voter (1 candidate in the voter’s district)

2 votes per voter (1 for individual candidate from the district, 1 for party)

Changes in

numbers

- Lower house: 511 seats

·  1-6 seats per district, multi-member (130 districts)

- Lower house: 500 seats

·    300 seats from single member districts;

·    200 allocated (later reduced to 180) proportionally to parties in 11 regions (11 PR blocs)

Competition

-Intra-party Competition and Factionalism: Multiple candidates from single party competition (Multiple candidates can get into the parliament)

-Minority Party Representation despite small electorate support

 

-Single candidate from single party competition (only one candidate that attracts the largest share of vote in a district gets into the parliament)

-Main battlefield: SMDs > PR blocs

Effect

One-party dominant system

Candidate-centered election

Factionalism

Pork-barrel politics

Corruption

(*vote for party < individuals)

Two-party system (i.e. DPJ)

Party-centered election

Collapse of power-balance: Increase of Prime Minister’s authority

Focus on issues and party position

(*vote for big issues < local issues, subsidies, welfare)

 


 

2. Before 1993: Multimember District System (中選挙区制)

·   Multi-member District system was used to elect the members of the House of Representatives from 1925 to 1993.

·   The lower house had 511 seats which were filled with candidates from 130 districts.

·   Every voter had one vote he could give to one candidate in his district.

·   In every district, one to six seats were filled in an election. For these seats, a number of candidates ran. The candidates with the highest votes would fill these seats in descending order. It was common for multiple candidates from the same party to run for these seats.

·   A political party that wanted to win a majority of seats had to run more than one candidate, creating a particular kind of political competition. This generated intra-party competition.

·   This was unfavorable to the LDP, in which candidates competed with one another. Sometimes, this resulted in one candidate doing very well, leading to the defeat of another LDP candidate, even though the party was much more popular than any of the opposition parties that were running in the election.

·   The candidate-centered political style in Japan stemmed from this multi-member electoral system since multiple candidates from the LDP competed in each district, the LDP candidates had no choice but to differentiate themselves.

  

Consequences of Electoral System, Before 1993:

Positive Consequences

Negative Consequences

·   Minority Representation: Under this system, minor parties were able to survive even though they were not supported by a majority of the electorate. Therefore small party like the Komeito with approximately 10% of the popular vote could still win some seats.

 

·   Intra-party competition and Factionalism: Intra-party competition led to factionalism in the LDP. If there are multiple candidates running from the same party in the same district, each one of those candidates would look to a different faction leader for support.

·   Candidate-centered Election: Since multiple candidates from the LDP competed in each district, the LDP candidates could not simply rely on the party’s name for electoral victory but needed to differentiate themselves and maintain personal supporters.

·   Pork-barrel politics and Corruption: Multi-member District system created incentives for legislators to specialize in localized behavior, leading to political corruption and inefficient public spending.

 

 


 

3. Since 1994 after the reform


(Reference: Prefecture & PR map excerpted from http://www.highschooltimes.jp/news/cat24/000030.html)

 

Single Member District + Proportional Representation

·   Electoral-reform bill passed in the Diet in January 1994

·   Single-Member District (SMD) and proportional presentation (小選挙区比例代表並立制)

·   The lower house has 500 seats

1) 300 of them are filled with candidates from Single Member Districts (SMD)

2) The other 200 (later reduced to 180) allocated proportionally to the different parties in 11 regions.

=> Every voter therefore cast two votes - one for individual candidate and one for party

·   SMD: Japan is divided into 300 SMDs in which different candidates run against each other. In order to maximize their share of the vote, it makes sense for parties to have only one candidate running. The candidate that attracts that largest share of the vote in a district gets into the parliament.

·   PR Bloc: In the 11 regions each voter can give one vote to a party. The seats within the region – they vary from 7 to 33 – are then allocated to the parties proportionally based on the proportion of the vote they were able to attract.

 

Consequences & Effects 

1)    Weakening of Political Factions

It is no longer necessary for a candidate to get a faction’s support to help him/her fight against other candidates of the same party like in MMD system. And so from the point of view of the faction leaders, it's no longer necessary, or there's no longer an opportunity, to support a candidate who can run against a member of another faction that that leader is opposed to. So the whole rationale for factionalism is to some extent compromised by this new election system.

2)    The increase in the number of “floating voters”, who support different parties in succeeding elections.

 

3)    Threshold Effect (Hirano)


Reference: Shigeo Hirano (2006)

 

Before 1993 (MMD)

After 1994 (SMD+PR)

·          MMD electoral systems in which votes are cast for individual candidates provide strong incentives for candidates to cultivate narrow subconstituencies(cost & corruption).

·          Candidates have an incentive to choose positions dispersed along the policy space away from the median voter.

 

·          Under SMD, the incentives to cultivate broader cross sections of district constituencies

·          make incumbents less likely to choose policies that ignore the interests of particular geographic subconstituencies within their district, especially areas that are part of their party’s electoral base.

     = Weakening link between incumbents and geographically defined subconstituencies

 

4.) Failure to change the focus of election campaigns away from candidates to political issues and differences in basic party platforms.

After all, candidates who run in a local constituency are going to say the things that are important to the people who vote in that local constituency, and that tends to be issues that are of direct relevance to their daily life — whether they get more subsidies, if they're in a rural community or whether they get more daycare centers, if they're living in an urban community — and other issues that are very local and that don't relate to big issues of Japan's role in the world or issues of overriding national importance.

 

 

 

References:

  • 박철희 (2011) 자민당정권과 전후체제의 변용, 『아시아리뷰』, 1권 제2.
  • Raymond Christensen, Electoral Reform in Japan: How it was Enacted and Changes it May Bring (1994)
  • Shigeo Hirano (2002), Electoral Systems and Threshold Effects: Quantitative Evidence from the Japanese Experience in the 1990s, available at http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4754/hirano.pdf, accessed on September 29th, 2014
  • Shigeo Hirano (2006), Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities, World Politics, Volume 59, Number 1, October 2006, pp. 51-82

Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[일본-노트] 자민당 파벌 연구 (5개 주요 파벌) - LDP's Big Five Factions

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 24. 21:02

The LDP’s Factions

조비연 (2014.9.24)


1.    Overview


1)    What are factions?

Factionalism has been part of LDP’s makeup since its founding in 1955:

o Faction as a “primary unit,” the “central force,” and the “real actors in intraparty politics” within the party in postwar Japanese politics

 o LDP is described as a “federation of factions” (rather than a unified national party)[1] – “government by, for, and of the faction.”[2]


2)    The rise and fall of faction in LDP

o  Started from “Hachiko Shidan(Eight corps)” in 1956

 -  3 major functions[3]

(1) Electoral support, including earning party nominations for its members and the mobilization of support

(2) Cooperative political funds mobilization

(3) A means for collective negotiations over portfolio distribution in times a cabinet shuffle

-  “It used to be the case that a faction leader would provide most of the money that the members of his faction needed for that political life, and in return the faction member gave the leader his loyalty[4]


o Around mid-1970s, “Big Five” factions were constructed

-  Because of multimember district electoral system, allowing for election of 5 candidates from one district, thus “LDP factions was reduced to five to correspond with the maximum number of candidates that the party could field in any multimember district.”[5]


In 1994, political reform diminished the power of factions

-  “Factions were characterized as a source of political evil that were a by-product of the existing multimember district electoral system. The government introduced a new electoral system that combined single-member districts with proportional representation in an effort to eliminate factions within the parties and strengthen party leadership.[6]


o  Koizumi tried to collapse the factionalism strongly-rooted in LDP

-  “Factions within the LDP never disappeared. In contrast to the view that factions will eventually fade away, I have argued that they are likely to survive, albeit with different structures and functions to perform[7]

 


2. LDP’s Five Major Factions (Lineages)



1)  Major Factions and Their Lineages

Most importantly, there are 5 major factional “lineages” that extend from 1956 to the current factions in LDP in 2014: The five factions in 1956 are headed by Hayato Ikeda(1956); Eisaku Sato(1956); Ichiro Kono(1956); Nobusuke Kishi(1956); Takeo Miki(1956). Figure 1 below is my update on Koellner’s figure in his study on LDP factions.

Figure 1. Lineage of LDP Factions 1956-Present (in terms of faction leaders)

Source: Updated on Koellner’s Figure 1. The Development of LDP factions[8]

As shown, these 1956 factions – headed by Ikeda, Sato, Kono, Kishi, and Miki – have remained in LDP as major lineages while the power is handed down from one leader to another: The Ikeda faction transcends to the current Kishida faction and Aso faction, Sato faction to current Nukaga faction, Kishi faction to Machimura faction (currently the largest faction), Kono faction to Ibuki and Ishihara faction, and Miki faction to Oshima. One thing to note here is the Yoshida Shigeru and Hatoyama Ichiro roots to these major faction lineages. As shown in the left part of the Figure 1, Yoshida who claimed for the peace treaty transcended to Ikeda and Sato faction. Hatoyama on the other hand who at the beginning argued for rearmament, the US-Japan security treaty, transcended to Kishi and Kono factions. And the current largest Machimura faction (2014), originates from this Kishi faction, the Hatoyama line, to which Shinzo Abe also belonged to.

 

2) Lineages and Sizes of Major Factions in 2014 (as of May 2014)

To clarify, the table below is an update of 2014 LDP factions table appeared on the Japan Times. I have added the left column to trace the lineages of these current factions: Out of the 7 factions, 6 factions have their roots to the major 5 factions in 1956. Another small note is that the names of these factions go by the names of current leaders, instead of the official faction names (2nd column), which is why it is often difficult to follow all the names that change as the leadership transforms.


Table 1. LDP Factions and its Lineages (as of May 2014)

LDP Factions and its Lineages (as of May 2014)

Five Faction Lineage

Name of faction

Leader

Number of members (number of rookies)

Kishi

Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai

Nobutaka Machimura

82

Sato

Heisei Kenkyukai

Fukushiro Nukaga

51

Ikeda

Kochikai

Fumio Kishida

42

Ikeda (Kono)

Ikokai

Taro Aso

34

Other.

Shisuikai

Toshihiro Nikai

32

Kono (Yamasaki)

Kinmirai Seiji Kenkyukai

Nobuteru Ishihara

15

Miki

Bancho Seisaku Kenkyujo

Tadamori Oshima

11    

Source: Based on LDP factions table in The Japan Times[9] (Left Column Added)


Largest Faction (2014): The Modern Kishi Faction (Machimura faction)

-         (Kishi-Fukuda-Abe-Mitsuzuka-Mori-Machimura) Shinzo Abe belonged to this faction

-         2004: Overtaken the modern Sato faction in the Lower House, which has been the largest faction in LDP for most of the postwar years.

As Table 1 illustrates, the current largest faction is headed by the Modern Kishi faction – the Machimura faction (first line), with the size of 82 members. As already mentioned Shinzo Abe belonged to this faction, and this Modern Kishi faction- currently called the Machimura faction has replaced the modern Sato faction (currently the Nukaga faction) starting in the mid 2000s (with fluctuations), which had been the largest faction in LDP for most of the postwar years.

 

3)    Size Variations Over Time

Table 2. Number of Major Five Faction Members over Time

Source: Based on Park (2001)[10]

The specific size variations of these lineages can be better explained by looking at the modified chart from Prof Park’s paper in 2001, Table 2. The top column and arrows had been added to note that these factions in the table represent the five major faction lineages (1956). 

Most importantly, the size of each faction matters because it means power within the party, over the party president, and in times of LDP majority in Diet, it also secures power, leverage over the PM and the Diet. As Prof Park’s paper noted, “one faction is able to lead the nation if it can recruit about 1/4 of the lDP’s membership” – around 100 individuals.

With that in mind, some interesting implications can be found in Table 2 – I have marked the areas of focus as the three boxes on the table:

-         Box A: As the box outlines, the modern sato faction, Tanaka faction in this table and now the Nukaga faction, can be stated to have had the maneuver of the country during 1980s~1990 where its member size exceeded over 100 (A decisive role in the selection of party leader for more than 20 years).[11] In specific, the modern Sato faction has been the largest faction in LDP during 1972-1990, playing the “shadow shogun” according to Schlesinger.[12] Also note the size of the largest number, 140 (54) in year 1986, which coincides with the 1986 landslide victory for LDP that year.

-         Box B: In specific to Box B, what we can notice is the overall fall in the size of the factions. Between the modern Sato and Kishi factions, along with modern Ikeda faction, the numbers are in close competition. Also, the majority faction’s size falls below 100, during 1993~2000. We can think of LDP’s historic loss in 1993 election for a short period; the introduction of Political Funds Control Law in 1994, and change to SNTV from multimember district system in 1993 – the electoral changes.

-         Box C: Interesting part here is Box C, where we see the return of the modern Sato faction as the largest faction in LDP in early 2000s. Also note on the re-increase in the size over 100, and the gap also increased among the first and the rest factions.

Overall, such variations in size signal the presence of significant changes in LDP, where the overall size of factions have decreased and the long-time majority faction (the modern Sato faction-currently the Nukaga faction) has been replaced by the current Machimura faction as the new majority – the Modern Kishi faction.

 

3. Weakened Factionalism?

The next question is then, has factionalism weakened?

As noted above, 1993 LDP failure, Political Funds Control Law and SNTV after 1993, Koizumi’s 2004 agenda to uproot factionalism may be the grounds to argue that factionalism has waned. Definitely it seems that the factions are playing by a different logic, because most importantly 1) LDP has lost its Diet majority, along with 2) the electoral changes after the single-member SNTV system. In short, it has become less about the inter-faction competition, but more about the challenges from the opposition parties.

Nonetheless, the factions have more and large survived: According to Prof Park’s paper, factionalism remains because the factions are “creatively adjusting to the changed political institutions”; and factions still 1) satisfy the career incentives of individual politicians; 2) provide effective management of the party as an organization.[13]

 

4. Abe and Factionalism

And finally, what can factions explain about Abe and Japan in 2014?

o  First, the 2014 Reshuffle is reported to have shown how factionalism still matters to Abe and LDP. The article states that Abe’s reshuffle has been “a strategic maneuver to secure his position prior to party elections slated for the fall of 2015.” With the reschuffle he had two goals: first to deal with Ishiba Shigeru –who is 2nd in rank within the party, and second to rebuild connections among the interparty factions. 

o  Another important note is how Abe’s Active pacifism, normal country agenda can be linked to the current largest faction’s lineage. As Figure 1 illustrated, the current largest faction, Machimura faction, which Abe also belonged to, is the long branch off from Hatoyama Ichiro (Hatoyama – US-Japan Security Treaty – “conservative anti-mainstream” hoshu bōryū vs. Yoshida line - Peace Treaty – “conservative mainstream” hoshu honryū).[14] The majority by Machimura faction explains the overall right click of the LDP, especially after the split of Takeshita faction(the modern Sato faction) into Obuchi faction and Hata (Ozawa), which defected from the LDP and form DPJ, causing the LDP’s fall in 1993. As the modern Sato faction has always maintained its majority and its midway political stance between the left and right political-ideological spectrum within the LDP, the split of the faction in 1993 meant that the midway position that the postwar LDP maintained has also waned. Now that the modern Kishi faction (Kishi-Fukuda-Abe-Mitsuzuka-Mori-Machimura) plays the majority, which is on the righter side of the spectrum, current Japan’s direction can be explained.

 





References

Baerwald, Hans H. (1986) Party Politics in Japan, Worchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin.

Curtis, Gerald L. (2002), Policymaking in Japan : defining the role of politicians (Brookings Institution Press).

Iyasu Tadashi (1984) Jiminto: kono fushigi na seito [LDP: This counterintuitive party]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Johnson, Chalmers (1990) "The People Who Invented the Mechanical Nightingale." Daedalus 12:71–90.

Meiji, Kakizaki, “Abe Shores up Power with Cabinet Reshuffle,” Nippon.com (Sept 18, 2014), Available at http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00138/ (Accessed Sept. 23, 2014).

Newsweek, “Hatoyama’s Philosophy of Yuai,” (Nov. 5, 2009) Available at http://www.newsweek.com/hatoyamas-philosophy-yuai-76847 (Accessed Sept 24, 2014).

Park, Cheol Hee (2001) “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP since Political Reform,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, (May/June), pp. 428-461.

Patrick Köllner (2004) “Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the LDP and the DPJ differ?”, Japan Forum, 16:1.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Masumi Junnosuke (1962) Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schlesinger, Jacob (1997) Shadow Shoguns, Simon & Schuster.

Shinoda, Tomohito (2013) Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts, Columbia University Press.

The Japan Times, “As LDP rides high, are factions biding time?” (May 18, 2013), Available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/18/national/politics-diplomacy/as-ldp-rides-high-are-factions-biding-time/#.VB-WZVfzTPo (accessed Sept 22, 2014)

Ward, Robert E. (1967) Japan's Political System. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Watanabe Tsuneo, Habatsu[Factions] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1959), p.3.

Zakowski, Karol (2014) “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” Available at http://leamplus.edu/factional-dynamics-in-japans-liberal-democratic-party/.

 



[1] See works like Scalapino and Masumi (1962); Baerwald (1986, 46-47); Ward (1967, 65 and 68-69)

[2] Matsuyama Yukio, former editor of the Asahi Shinbun , told an audience at Harvard University in 1991

[3] Watanabe Tsuneo, Habatsu[Factions] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1959), p.3.

[4] Curtis, Gerald L. (2002), p. 45 Policymaking in Japan : defining the role of politicians (Brookings Institution Press.)

[5] Park, Cheol Hee (2001) “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP since Political Reform,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, (May/June), p. 431.

[6] Park (2001), p. 432

[7] Park (2001), p. 461.

[8] Patrick Köllner (2004) Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the LDP and the DPJ differ?, Japan Forum, 16:1, p. 91. Also refer to Park (2001), p. 434.

[9] The Japan Times, “As LDP rides high, are factions biding time?” (May 18, 2013), Available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/201 3/05/18/national/politics-diplomacy/as-ldp-rides-high-are-factions-biding-time/#.VB-WZVfzTPo (accessed Sept 22, 2014)

[10] Park (2001), p. 456.

[11] Shinoda, Tomohito (2013) Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts, Columbia University Press, p.78.; Park (2001), p. 447: “from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, … the numerical strength of the [Tanaka] faction allowed it to take a commanding position over the other factions.”

[12] Jacob Schlesinger, this faction as the so called “shadow shogun” of the party: Schlesinger, Jacob (1997) Shadow Shoguns, Simon & Schuster.

[13] Park (2001), p. 429.

[14] One related article: Newsweek, “Hatoyama’s Philosophy of Yuai,” (Nov. 5, 2009) Available at http://www.newsweek.com/hatoyamas-philosophy-yuai-76847 (Accessed Sept 24, 2014).

Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[일본-노트] Postwar Japan

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 23. 15:20

 Two Book Recommendations for studies on postwar Japanese regime:


Embracing Defeat

저자
Dower, John W. 지음
출판사
Norton | 1999-03-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
Chronicles the events that took pla...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  



Altered States : The United States and Japan Since the Occupation

저자
Schaller, Michael 지음
출판사
Oxford USA | 1997-09-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
The relationship between the United...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  

Notes:


Postwar Japan after Defeat

Readings Assigned:

John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of the World War II (New York: The New Press, 1999), Chapter 2.

Michael Shaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 1.

Rieko Kage, Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapters 2-3.

Recommended:

Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” in Andrew Gordon, ed. Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 64-98.

Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (New York: Free Press, 1987).

Mark Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita, Democracy in Occupied Japan (New York: Routeledge, 2007), Chapters 3 & 5.

***

 

John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of the World War II (New York: The New Press, 1999), Chapter 2.

Cartoonist Kato Etsuro’s war posters in the 1940s, 1942 – depicting Roosevelt and Churchill, later replaced by his illustrations of the first years after the defeat. Surrender… Turning to drawings about the vagaries and difficulties of ordinary life.


Revolution from Above

Victor’s revolution from above”

US depicted as the key to freedom, crushing the zaibatsu, “democratic revolution from above”

Until 1947, “leftists as well as liberals commonly regarded the overwhelmingly American occupation force as an army of liberation, and the notion of achieving a “democratic revolution””

Vs.

Precariousness of the new democratic revolution

Kawakami Tetsutaro – 1945 Oct described the U.S. policy as one of “rationed-out freedom”

“As timed passed, more than a few commentators called attention to the passivity and superficialty implicit in the very notion of a democratic revolution from above.” “Democracy came “too easily” in such a milieu and so failed to establish deep roots” only making people obey to the rules of the superior. 

Critic Kamei Katsuichiro: “the heralded revolution was more than a charade but less than a real struggle for democracy. Instead of revolutionizing consciousness,…, the occupation had tended to reinforce a “colonial mentality”

 

Demilitarization and Democratization

Misnomer #1: 1945 August~1952 April: “Allied occupation of Japan” = “misnomer” as “From start to finish, the United States alone determined basic policy…”

-       3 Basic documents drafted by U.S which established the initial objectives of the occupation:

1)       Potsdam Proclamation (US, GB, China announced the terms of surrender) – Japan placed under military occupation, trial of war criminals, “just reparations”, “completely disarmed”

2)       United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan (September announced)

3)       Comprehensive military directive, elaborating postsurrender policy (remained secret until Nov 1948)

-       Doughlas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander = “epitomized the American monopoly on policy and power”

Misnomer #2: International Military Tribunal for the Far East (for the top-level war-crimes trials) – it was “predominantly American show” where Americans dominated the “international prosecution section” that set the agenda for the tribunal.

Policy of reeducation: “Underlying this immodest objective [(of the documents]] was a growing sense of urgency that the country should not only be “democratized” to prevent the reemergence of militarism, but simultaneously immunized against a rising tide of communist influence.”

Extension of democratic ideals to the economic field: “the post-Potsdam formulations explicitly mandated the promotion of policies “which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.”” => “dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations” that emerged during the mobilization period for war + “promote labor unions and carry out a sweeping land-reform program”

The essence of the “Initial Postsurrender Policy”: to render Japan as a peaceful, democratic, law-abiding nation, eradicating the roots of militarism.

Exceptional aspects of this occupation:

-       “remaking the political, social, cultural, and economic fabric of a defeated nation, and in the process changing the very way of thinking of its” yet “they were still defining their grand mission as they went along.”

-       Notably different from Germany case after WWII, as the occupation then was by multiple countries (US GB FRA and Soviet Union)

-       “MacArthuresque” control – personality imprint on the policies (“messianic fervor” unseen in Germany)

-       Understanding militarism and ultranationalism as the sense of a feudalistic and Oriental culture, attempt to make Japan “law abiding” in the “Western mode”

 

Imposing Reform = “a signal expression of America’s commitment to a genuinely radical agenda of “democratization””

-       Abolishment of the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 (left wing critics arrested due to this law)

-       Return of freedom of speech and assembly

-       The Special Higher Police/”thought police” of the Home Ministry abolished

-       Political prisoners communist colleagues released

-       Liberalization of the constitution

-       Franchise to women

-       Liberal education

-       Democratization of economy (land reform, antimonopoly)

-       Shinto (emperor-centered government-sponsored cult) abolished on Dec 15

-       Trade Union Law guaranteeing the workers the right to organize, strike, and bargain, approved by the parliament, Diet on Dec 22

-       Decentralization of the police

-       Renovation of the electoral system

-       Promotion of greater local autonomy (decentralization)

 

Overall, toward a “pacifist course”

-       “The new national charter – initiated by GHQ in February 1946 and promulgated nine months later, after extensive public and parliamentary discussion – was the crown jewel of the reformist agenda. It not only codified the basic ideals of “democratization,” but wedded them to “demilitarization” by explicitly prohibiting Japan from resorting to war as a means of resolving international disputes.

-       Kato vs. Yoshida Shigeru (PM in 1946-47 and 1948-54, who “belittled the very possibility of making Japan democratic.”)

-       Vs. conservatives who rejected all arguments about “the “root” causes of militarism, repression, and aggression, choosing instead to depict the recent war as an aberration…” that it is only enough to bring the state back to “the status quo ante of the late 1920s”

 

*Pro-US perspective: “This was an extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid, moment – never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never to be repeated. Like Kato, many Japanese would indeed welcome the revolution from above… The American regimen cracked open the authoritarian structures of the old society in a manner that permitted unprecedented individual freedoms and unanticipated forms of popular expression to flourish”

 

 

***

 

Michael Shaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 1.

 

Chapter 1. “Japan: From Enemy to Ally, 1945-50

1946 Yoshida Shigeru – formed his first postwar cabinet

1945-1950: Occupation under Commander General Douglas MacArthur – “controlled revolution” – “the partial uprooting of political, economic, and social structures that had contributed to repression at home and aggression abroad.”

Faltering relationship between Douglas MacArthur and the Truman administration (Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and Texas Democrat Tom Connally): politically no option but to make MacArthur the Commander in Japan

Occupation(8):

-       Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers(SCAP) = MacArthur and the headquarters

-       + Two oversight committees, which “had the slightest influence on policy anytime during the next six years”: 1) The Far Eastern Commission; and 2) The Allied Council for Japan = only purpose in soothing British, Soviet, Chinese allies.

Official surrender: Sept 2, 1945 on the battleship “Missouri” in Tokyo Bay

General Headquarters (GHQ):

-       in the Dai Ichi Insurance Building

SCAP(9):

-       12 or so sections corresponding to the Japanese cabinet and American army organization

-       E.g. Intelligence section: monitor Japan and SKorea (Charles Willoughby)

-       E.g. Gov section: oversaw political reform (Courtney Whitney)

-       E.g. Economic and Scientific section: economic policy authority (William Marquat)

-       These heads of the sections = “Bataan gang”, a circle of acolytes of MacArthur

-       Until 1948, just over 3,000 Americans and foreign nationals served SCAP, relying heavily on the Japanese gov.

-       Censored describing the actions of Truman administration

Douglas MacArthur’s view(9): 1951, told a congressional inquiry - “measured by the standards of modern civilization,” the Japanese “would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of forty-five years.”5

 

The Reform Period, 1945-47

Different perspectives on the outbreak of war6:

1)       The progressive Japanese government had been “highjacked” by militarists = anomaly

2)       Fatal flaw in the institutions (MacArthur on this point = calling for a “revolution” against the existing “feudal” orders)

 

Result of reform = “Continuity and Change”

 * Efforts to Change

MacArthur’s revolution(9-11)

-       Japan as his political stage (sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1944 and 1948)

-       “controlled revolution”

-       To transform Japan into a “new Middle West”.7

-       Began in earnest in Oct. 1945 – when SCAP issued a civil liberties directive releasing political prisoners, legalizing all political parties, and assuring protection of the rights of assembly and speech.

-       1946 produced a new constitution for the Diet to pass: stripped the emperor of temporal authority, enhanced the Diet’s power, extended voting rights, and declared the legal equality of women, Article 9 forbade creation of armed forces or the right of the state to conduct war.

-       1946 Politicians purge: wartime leaders verdicted as war criminals, neutering the influence of many senior politicians. “Political moderates and most ordinary Japanese favored cleansing the landscape of militarists and ultranationalists”

ð  Yet the results were limited: 20 officers to investigate 2.5 million cases => Japanese bureaucrats involved in the process => as results: “about 200,000 Japanese, over 80 percent from military and policy ranks, lost their political rights. Relatively few politicians and fewer bureaucrats or business leaders fell victim to the purge. Among those who did, most had their rights restored before or just after the Occupation ended”

-       Land reform: “to tear down the large feudalistic land holdings” and the “exploitive nature of the rural economy” => “Land reform created a class of small farmers loyal to the conservative politicians who initially opposed the law”

-       Overall, “Reform touched nearly every major institution during the first three years of Occupation. SCAP reorganized the national police, remodeled public education along Western lines, voided repressive labor codes, and seemed pleased that by 1947 nearly half the urban workforce joined trade unions.”8

 

* Continuity:

-       Prewar career bureaucrats remained(11) in place hardly touched by the purge or new constitution

-       Conservative parties “continued to dominate the Diet”(11) (Concern for free election obscured the fact that the prewar roots of the conservative politicians extend to big businesses and rural districts)

ð  The first postwar election in April 1946: The two conservative parties (the Progressives and the Liberals) won a majority in the Diet

-       The zaibatsu: unfulfilled task(12)

ð  1945 MacArthur told to promote a wider “distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade” by pursuing anti-monopoly program => SCAP hesitated

ð  State and Justice Departments dispatched a “Special Mission on Japanese Combines” led by economic Corwin Edwards + Reparations mission under oilman Edwin Pauley

ð  1945-46, both groups faltered as Truman admin showed no interest in the program.

ð  Result in failing economy => US provided annual assistance of $400 million through the army’s Government and Relief in Occupied Areas program (GARIOA)

 

Rethinking the Occupation

 Truman turns its interest in 1947 due to(12):

-       Mostly the relationship with the Soviet Union

ð  Japan and Germany revival required for building strong allies to contain Soviet Union: Navy Secretary James Forrestal brought Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, Agriculture Secretary Clinton Anderson, former ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman to discuss on the matter… “Japan, Germany and other affiliates of the Axis… back to work.”(Forrestal)

-       Economic concerns of the region => “America’s key partners might seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union”

Yet hesitant Truman: “had recently appointed George C. Marshall to replace James F. Byrnes as secretary of state.”(13) 

As part of the containment strategy (13)

-       “Secretary of State George C. Marshall encouraged Acheson and Kennan to develop proposals along the lines. Joined by James Forrestal, named head of the new Defense Department late in 1947, and other civilian and military specialists, they contributed to the evolving containment program.”

Resented by MacArthur for interfering SCAP(13)

-       The recovery program was to extend the Occupation beyond early 1948 when MacArthur planned to return for presidency

-       So he argued that “he had fulfilled the essential goals of the Occupation” and that economic problems “could be resolved after the Americans left”

-       Vs. March 8 1947 Dean Acheson’s new approach to foreign policy: “World stability required building the “two workshops” on which the “ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends.”12

 Then came the Truman Doctrine and the debate further unfolds: “A bitter war of words” between Washington and SCAP (14-15)

-       March 12 1947 Truman Doctrine: Truman’s message to congress in times of crisis in Greece and Turkey, blaming the Soviet Union

-       March 17 1947 MacArthur press conference: reemphasized that his “spiritual revolution” has been successfully finished.11

-       July 1947 MacArthur’s unconsulted recovery package: to dismantle zaibatsu – “just as Washington resolved to make industrial recovery a priority, MacArthur ordered the Diet to pass a bill dissolving the combines and decentralizing industry”

-       George Kennan terms MacArthur’s plan as “socialism… if not near communism”13: Framing MacArthur that his scheme will destroy the major barrier to Soviet penetration in Asia – “socialization” attack on zaibatsus. MacArthur further accused of promoting reforms “far to the left of anything tolerated in America” and of embracing “lethal weapons” of socialism.15

-       Then last boom by Senator Joseph McCarthy who argued that Wisconsin is not really MacArthur’s “native state” => Most Republicans voted for Minnesotan Harold Stassen. After another defeat in Nebraska, MacArthur abandoned his quest for the GOP nomination.

 

Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff(16)

-       “Japan’s survival as an ally and the denial of its industrial base to the Soviets required action “to prime the Japanese economic pump.””16

-       Kennan noted: he was repelled by the “degree of internal intrigue” of the SCAP which resembled “the latter days of the court of the Empress Catherine II” or the last years of “Belisarius in Italy” – SCAP’s “social engineering” would wreck Japan.17

-       Kennan began to redraft the Occupation agenda in 1948 March

-       Army Undersecretary William Draper: visited and argued for curtailing reparations and assault on the zaibutsu – April 26 1948

 

1948, October by Truman - NSC13/2 – the Johnston report (17)

-       New Occupation agenda formalized by the Policy Planning Staff to the National Security Council during the summer of 1948.

-       “economic recovery as the “prime objective” in Japan.

-       Reparations halted, restrictions on industry restricted

-       By 1949, anti-monopoly program terminated

 

1948 Truman Election Triumph in November(17)

-       Now with full authority to reverse the course,

-       Special emissary Detroit banker Joseph Dodge to oversee SCAP and implement the program20(17)

 

Dodge(17)

-       American Council on Japan (ACJ): Dodge’s establishing of ties with critiques of MacArthur: Harry Kern (Newsweek editor in the previous year), Newsweek’s Tokyo corres. Compton Packenham, business lawyer James Lee Kauffman, former State Department Japan specialist Eugene Dooman (17)

-       1949~1950: Dodge and his staff – rigorous program of neoclassic economic policy “to rationalize an inflation-driven economy operating at little more than two-thirds of its prewar level.”(18)

ð  Envisioning “a high- volume, low-cost exporter of consumer goods primarily to Asian markets.

ð  To reduce “frivolous spending”: “major reductions in the public welfare budget, curtailment of business loans, and the firing of 250,000 government workers” => “These actions decreased domestic consumption and shunted bank credit, foreign currency, and raw materials to large enterprises engaged in export production”

-       April 1949 MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry)

ð  Promoted by Dodge and the compliant SCAP

ð  “modeled on the wartime Munitions Ministry and staffed by many of the agency’s veteran bureaucrats”

ð  MITI providing administrative guidance to banks and corporations

ð  Japan Inc, nurtured by American directives22

 

 

The Sinews of Containment: Japan, China, and Southeast Asia

The unimplemented Asian Marshall Plan: Marshall Plan for the Far East(18-19)

-       Southeast Asia as the market for Japan

-       Army Undersecretary William Draper: “economic aid program, similar to the Marshall Plan, for the Far East”25

-       Ralph Reid (Adviser to Draper and Dodge): proposal for linking Japan’s economy to Asian countries that are friendly towards US and provide a bulwark against Soviet Union – to assure that strategic raw materials do not go into the Soviet Union

-       “creating democratic governments to restore viable economies and check Soviet expansion” and keep “vital raw materials” out of Soviet control. 26

-       Although unimplemented, sparked the strategic interest in the Southeast Asian region, along with the Communist rise in China, rebellions in Indochina, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies

 

Stability of Southeast Asia vital for US now(19)

-       Acheson argued that stability in the region must be fulfilled for the region’s “function as a source of raw materials and a market for Japan and Western Europe”28

 

Loss of China (19-20)

-       1949 Oct 1, establishment of the People’s Republic of China

-       Acheson: If China was lost, “protecting Japan’s industrial base and Southeast Asia’s mineral wealth required “drawing the line” against Communist encroachment.”

 

Overall, “Much of the debate within the Truman administration about China and Southeast Asia reflected concern over Japan”

 

Nonconfrontational approach to the Chinese Communist regime (3 different strands):

-       argued by Acheson – communist fall may be weakened by its ties to Japan’s economy

-       Yoshida for the total seizure of China by the Soviet Union = leverage with US and stable trade with China

-       Against the growing ties between Japan and China

ð  “two-track policy, permitting Japan limited trade with China” meanwhile “development aid to Southeast Asia” for the “dual purpose” of “advancing American influence”35

 

March 1949 President Truman approved Acheson’s view “that a total embargo would hurt American allies and drive China closer to the Soviet Union”, therefore to take “the calculated risk”36 and allow “regulated trade”(22) 

“During the first half of 1950, the Truman administration dispatched several economic missions to Japan and Southeast Asia.

 

 

Diplomatic Gridlock

Leave/remain (24): Two different views that left US’s Japan policy “adrift”(25)

-       State: To leave Japan (Secretary of State Acheson), cautious of Japan becoming tired of American control

Vs.

-       Defense: Joint Chiefs of Staff considered “American air, naval, and land bases in Japan as vital “staging areas from which to project military power to the Asiatic mainland and to USSR islands adjacent thereto””

 

Feb 1950 China and Soviet Union signed a friendship pact, among other things to counter “aggressive action on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression.”(25)

ð  Used to justify to prolong the Occupation

 

Acheson’s New people to soothe congressional critics on the State Department for losing China & to convince the Defense Department to compromise over Japan (25)

-       Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk as principal adviser in Asia

-       Republican foreign policy spokesman John Foster Dulles as his adviser on Japan

ð  Both advocated more “vigorous support for Taiwan

ð  Dulles favored “bilateral defense treaty and a Pacific pact” to end the Occupation

 

This appointment coincide with “Japanese initiative to harness American interest in recovery and cold war cooperation into peace settlement”(26)

-       Yoshida Shigeru – longed for the early restoration of sovereignty on the bases of US support; public for “neutralism”

-       Contentious issues unresolved, delayed settlement: Soviet participation in a peace conference, rearmament issue, permanent American bases in Japan

 

Yoshida’s aspiration to end the occupation (26-27)

-       1947 Okinawa and the Bonin Islands offered for leasing bases (unaccepted by US, too early + requesting bases within Japan)

-       Sent three delegates to Washington (MacArthur forbade direct negotiation) – personal aide Shirasu Jiro, Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, and an aide to Ikeda, Miyazawa Kiichi – economic issues with Joseph Dodge on the surface, but to discuss the ending of the Occupation – “education mission” entitled

-       Ikeda conveying Yoshida’s proposal: “The Japanese government herein formally expresses its desire to conclude a peace treaty with the United States as early as possible. In the case of such a peace treaty being concluded, the Japanese government thinks it will be necessary to station American forces in Japan in order to preserve the security of Japan and the Asian area. If it is difficult for the United States to make such a request, the Japanese government itself is prepared to make the offer”

-       Tweaking “American anxiety” – Ho Chi Minh against French in Vietnam, South Korea vs. North, Communist victory in China, the possibility of Japanese opinion moving “far to the left”

-       “hoped to ease Japan back into the world community without incurring the costs of rearmament or alienating the United States.”

 

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk – Yoshida/Ikeda message to Acheson and Truman (28)

-       May 1950 Washington must show the Japanese “just what and when and where the United States would stand firm”51 – the need to defend Taiwan, South Korea, and Indochina (the former parts of Japan’s empire) against Communist force

 

Toward the final deal (28-29)

-       June 1 1950 Japanese government White Paper: willingness to sign the treaty separately with US if Moscow and Beijing refuse to sign.52

-       May June 1950 – Dulles and Rusk - package deal to support Taiwan to soothe the Defense side of the argument (proposing to increase military aid to Indochina)

-       Mid-June 1950 – rival fact finding missions to Tokyo by the State and Defense Departments:

ð  State: Dulles (along with his staff John Allison, Maxwell Hamilton, John Howard, and Robert Feary, “worried far more about Japan’s political and economic viability than tis value as a military platform”) “the danger he saw in the military’s plan to push Japanese rearmament and use Japan “as a major offensive air base.” “Overmilitarization,” as he called it, slighted the long-term interests of both Japan and America. If, on the other hand, the United States showed a determination to “stand fast” in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, where real military threats existed, Washington could protect Japan with merely a “defensive guarantee, stiffened by a skeleton U.S. force” and limited Japanese rearmament.”56

ð  Defense: Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Omar Bradley (“searching for a checklist of reasons for not ending the Occupation” – military platform prioritized)(29)

-       Split views became public when the delegations reached Japan on June 17 – State denounced by Louis Johnson at an impromptu briefing.57

 

Private message from the emperor (30)

-       Advice to Dulles to consult “older people, the majority of whom have been purged” (after the outbreak of the Korean War)59

 

MacArthur as the mediator

-       urging to link an end to the Occupation of Japan with a commitment to defend Taiwan. (Johnson and Bradley disputed that if US defends Taiwan then it won’t be necessary to retain bases in Japan or compel Jap rearmament vs. Dulles agreed)

-       MacArthur-Dulles: instead of Dulles’ proposal to rebuild small army in Japan, MacArthur argued for rebuilding munitions industry to assist the “reconstruction of American armament

-       MacArthur-Bradley and Johnson: MacArthur argued “In exchange for granting American forces virtually “unrestricted” base rights throughout Japan, Washington should offer Tokyo a peace treaty and pay $300 million per year in new aid to balance Japan’s trade deficit… [and] a small-self-defense force”

ð  Bases

ð  Peace treaty

ð  $300 million per year

ð  Small self-defense force

-       Bradley and Johnson refused till the end and left Tokyo to block a settlement

 

Korean War 1950.6.25 (50)

-       Dramatic effect on the diplomatic gridlock in Japan

-       Catalyst to transform US’s East Asia policy: Truman “sent troops to Korea, ordered the Seventh Fleet protect Taiwan, and expanded military and economic assistance to French Indochina and the Philippines.”

-       Within 15 months, US “agreed to end the Occupation while massive defense procurements lifted Japanese industry from its post-war topor.” = San Francisco Peace Treaty April 28 1952

-       “The war in Korea set the stage for Japan’s economic “miracle.””(50)

-       Yoshida’s “playing the part of a “good loser” could be the next best thing to outright victory.”(50) – (last sentence of the chapter)

 

***

 

Rieko Kage, Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapters 2-3.

 

Chapter 2. Civic Engagement

The Dependent Variable

 

Five major claims(19):

1.       Level of membership grew to much higher levels in the postwar period compared to the prewar period (in absolute terms)

2.       Level of postwar membership growth were at least as rapid for associations that operated under fairly liberal conditions during the prewar and wartime periods as those that had been more repressed

3.       Immediate postwar era, membership in groups with more “indigenous” Japanese origins appears to have risen at rates that are comparable with groups with more “Western” origins

4.       Evidence that associations are suppressed by the US occupation – less rapid increase in memberships compared to those that were not.

5.       Considerable intra-Japan variation in the extent to which membership in voluntary associations grew in the wake of WWII.

 

Data selection(20)

-       Range of voluntary membership associations:

1)       Youth/recreational groups

2)       Women’s organizations

3)       Social service groups

4)       Religious organizations (more emphasis on Western tradition “new religions” that are more prone to be “voluntary”)

5)       (labor unions)

 

The Rise in Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan, 1945-1955

-       Youth/Recreational Groups (YMCA Japan – oldest 1903, YWCA Japan, Boy Scouts, Girl Ccouts, Japan Alpine Club, Kodokan judo association)

*Japan Alpine Club: steady growth throughout prewar and postwar – less “Western”

*Kodokan: banned by SCAP during the Occupation from Jap schools 1945-50. Resumed faster growth after the lift of the ban

-       Women’s Groups: indigenous group “Tomo no Kai(Friends)” found in 1930 – not much affected during the wartime. Peak after postwar as well.

-       Social Service Organizations: Rotary Club, Japan Consumer Cooperatives’ Union, Kobe Consumer Cooperatives Union, Japan Seafarers’ Relief Association (JSRA))

-       Membership in Christian Churches – favored by MacArthur – a limited reason for growth during occupation and after.

 

Overall,

1.       Levels were generally much higher in postwar Japan compared to prewar

2.       Postwar growth rates in civic engagement do not merely represent a return to prewar levels but far outpace them

3.       This occurred both in the more Western as well as more indigenous groups despite repression of the former during the war and some of the latter during the occupation

 

Cross-Prefectural Variation in Civic Engagement, 1945-1955

Conclusion

Counter results to the victory/defeat hypothesis: civic engagement rose at an impressive rate in defeated Japan in the wake of WWII, and across prefectures

 

Chapter 3. War and Civic Engagement

A Theoretical Framework

Victory/Defeat hypothesis: “a country’s victory or defeat to crucially determine its trajectory of civic engagement in the wake of wars” 

Proven wrong. Why? Due to 2 key factors that shape the growth of civic engagement

-       The process of war: wartime mobilization

1)       Preparation for war as the great state-building activity (Tilly)

2)       “patriotic partnerships” – voluntary associations providing wartime services (Skocpol et al.)

e.g. Hitler Jugend

“In short, major war produces major mobilization, including at the neighborhood level for tasks that are often taken care of in peace time by civic associations. This coercive mobilization at the community level is not necessarily experienced as an imposition by the state, so that when the coercion ends, so too does the participation. Rather, this study argues that the effects of this wartime mobilization may be more lasting than is often assumed”(51)

3)       Limited coercion = promote learning civil skills and participation: Military Service, Required Community Service, Jury Duty

4)       War, strong state, strong society

-       Path dependency in civic engagement: Preexisting legacies of prewar civic activities

 

Previous explanations:

1.       Democratization

2.       Occupation

3.       Wartime destruction

Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[IR-Theories-요약] (SCRAP) Stephen M. Walt (1990) The Origins of Alliances - by Branislav L. Slantchev

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 22. 11:21

스크램: http://www.gotterdammerung.org/books/reviews/o/origins-of-alliances.html

The Origins of Alliances

Stephen M. Walt

Cornell University Press, 1990; Pages: 321

Review © 2001 Branislav L. Slantchev

Develops the balance of threat theory which, unlike traditional balance of power, claims that states do not balance against power, but against threats due to geographical proximity, power, and intentions of others. Finds balancing behavior explains best pattern of alliances in post-WWII Middle East; bandwagonning rare, ideology can have a divisive impact, and foreign aid or penetration do not have independent effect.

Theory

  1. Alliance - formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more states (p.12). General conclusions: (i) states balance against threats rather than against power alone; (ii) ideology is less powerful than balancing as motive for alignment; (iii) neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful cause of alignment (p.5).
  2. Alliance Formation:
    1. Response to threats: states may either balance (ally with others against the prevailing threat), or bandwagon (ally with the source of danger). Sources of threat are: (i) aggregate power; (ii) geographic proximity; (iii) offensive capability; (iv) aggressive intentions (p.25). Although balancing is far more common, bandwagonning tends to occur when (i) the state is weak and cannot add to a defensive coalition but can still incur the wrath of the threatening state; (ii) no allies are available - excessive confidence in allied support will encourage buck-passing; (iii) the outcome of war appears certain - balancing is usual in peacetime (to deter the aggressor) or early stages of war (to defeat him), (p.32).
    2. Ideology: the more similar the states are, the more they are likely to ally. When ideology calls for members to form a centralized movement, ideology will have a divisive role (p.35). Unifying ideologies that do not prescribe transnational unity under a single leader (liberal states, monarchies) do not pose an ideological threat to one another (p.36). Security considerations are likely to take precedence and ideologically based alliances are not likely to survive when pragmatic interests intrude (p.38).
    3. Foreign aid: provision of military or economic assistance can create allies because it communicates favorable intentions, evokes gratitude, and the recipient becomes dependent on the donor (p.41). Foreign aid gives suppliers effective leverage when (i) they enjoy a monopoly supply of an important asset; (ii) they are asymmetrically dependent vis-a-vis the recipient; (iii) they have asymmetrical motivation; (iv) they have a decision-making autonomy that can manipulate the level of assistance (p.44).
    4. Transnational penetration: manipulation of one state's domestic political system by another through (i) public officials with divided loyalties, (ii) lobbying, and (iii) propaganda. Penetration is more effective against open societies, when objectives are limited, and the means are not intrusive (p.49).

History of Middle East Diplomacy (1955-1979)

  1. From Baghdad Pact to the Six Day War - dominated by three main themes: (i) repeated failure of Nasser to translate his own charisma and Egypt's regional stature to permanent hegemony in the Arab world; (ii) steady growth of superpower commitments in the Middle East; (iii) persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the inability of the Arab states to form an alliance against Israel (p.51).

    Security environment product of four developments: (i) decline of the British and French imperial orders, (ii) revival of Arab nationalism and aspirations for unity, (iii) establishment of Israel, and (iv) active role of the superpowers (p.52). Phases:

    1. Baghdad Pact (1955) to Suez Crisis and Sinai War (1956): Iraq's bid for leadership (the Pact) thwarted by Nasser; Western influence reduced; Egypt and Syria break Western monopoly on aid by opening ties with Soviet Union; Israel's victory in the Sinai neutralized; Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in formal alignment with Egypt.

      Reasons for Nasser's success: (a) superpower competition that allowed freedom of action for Egypt; (b) Syria and Saudi Arabia fears of the Pact and unpopularity of Western influence brought them into an all-Arab alliance with Egypt; (c) Nasser exploited nationalist beliefs to intimidate the vulnerable Jordan into accepting his leadership (p.66).

      Consequences: Nasser's dominant position quickly erodes because his initial success removed several of his advantages: (a) support from the Soviets increased US interest in containing him; (b) his dominance made him the greater threat than Iraq to his neighbors (p.67).

    2. King's Alliance to the Syrian Crisis (1957): the Eisenhower Doctrine (p.67) encourages Saudi Arabia and Jordan to break the alliance with Egypt and form a counter-alliance between themselves and Iraq; Egypt's bid for dominance in the Arab world thwarted; US pressure on Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan to mobilize against Syria (believed to be ``going Communist'') brings in the Soviets and Egypt, which increases Nasser's popularity (p.70).
    3. United Arab Republic (1958-1961): union between Egypt and Syria, later joined by Yemen; Jordan and Iraq form a counter Federal Union; Lebanese crisis results in US marines intervention; Egypt-Iraqi rivalry presents dilemma for USSR, which opts for Iraq after its revolution; Iraq pulls away from USSR, also, Quassem's emphasis on national interests dissipates momentum to Arab unity; military coup in Damascus destroys UAR and restores Syrian independence (p.79).
    4. Yemen Civil War (1962) to the Cairo Summit (1964): Nasser's policy now premised on ideological considerations, attacks on conservative Arab regimes; Egyptian propaganda against secessionist Syrian regime, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq results in Egypt's isolation by 1962; Nasser moves to support republican government in Yemen against royalists to bolster revolutionary goals; Quassem executed in Iraq in 1963; pro-Egyptian coup in Syria; Iraq, Egypt, and Syria form a stillborn Tripartite Unity Agreement, which collapses after Syrian president forced from office and Nasser cancels it; Syria and Iraq draw together, prompting Nasser to initiate a detente with Jordan; unity movement between Syria and Iraq collapses due to Aref abandoning Ba'thist supporters; Cairo summit as response to Israeli water project establishes PLO; Egypt and Iraq adopt less aggressive posture, Syria embarks on ideological extreme (p.87).
    5. End of Inter-Arab Detente (1965) to the Six Day War (1967): efforts to settle Yemeni war fail; Saudis convene Islamic conference against Egypt; coup in Syria demolishes the old Ba'th Party, proclaims radical socialist platform; Egypt renews propaganda war against Jordan and Saudi Arabia, aligns with Syria, forced to adopt its extreme revolutionary views; Middle East effectively divided between the superpowers: (a) USSR with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen; (b) US with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Lebanon (p.98).

      Arab coalition between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq (with token participation by other Arab states and diplomatic support from USSR) prompts Israeli attack on June 5, which routs the Arab armies in six days; no direct action by the superpowers except Soviet threat to intervene when Israeli forces threatened Damascus, and US response in moving Sixth Fleet closer to Syria to deter the Soviets; UN cease-fire negotiated, USSR breaks diplomatic relations with Israel; Egypt, Syria, and Iraq break with the US (p.102).

  2. From the Six Day War to the Camp David Accords - dominated by two main themes: (i) gradual rise and dramatic decline in Arab collaboration against Israel, both the result of Egypt's abandoning its quest for hegemony; and (ii) the increasingly active role played by the superpowers, especially the US (p.105). Phases:
    1. The War of Attrition (1969)to the Jordan Crisis (1970): the crushing defeat Egypt and Syria have suffered force them to rely even more heavily on Soviet support; US reacts to Israel success by providing even greater assistance; US relations with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq worse than ever; war between Egypt and Israel begins in October 1968 at Nasser's own initiative, heavy Israeli initial losses lead both USSR and Egypt to hard-line stance; failure of USSR to control Nasser and US to influence Israel; cooperation in Arab world culminates in Eastern Command of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, which dissolves in 1970 amidst Iraqi-Syrian animosity; buck-passing among all Arab states to Egypt; Nasser accepts the Rogers ceasefire in 1970 (p.112). Jordan Crisis begins with crackdown on PLO in Jordan; Israel supports Hussein; Syrian invasion repelled by Jordan on its own (p.114);
    2. Yom Kippur War (1973) can be traced to three main developments: (i) failure to reach political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute; (ii) ability of Egypt and Israel to obtain increased military support from their superpower patrons; and (iii) formation of first effective anti-Israeli Arab alliance.

      Relations between Arabs and Israelis unable to break diplomatic stalemate; Sadat breaks with USSR despite strong military assistance but relations restored by 1973; Moscow hedges its bets with Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen; US increases assistance to Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; with Nasser's death, Egyptian bid for dominance is over and the way for cooperation cleared; Arab alliance forms in 1973, with Egypt and Syria choosing limited aims, Jordan agreeing to enter when Syria regains the Golan Heights, and Saudi Arabia hinting at using the oil weapon if necessary (p.122).

      First phase of war (October 6-10) with Arab tactical and strategic advantage and initial victories; next phase (11-18) with increased superpower involvement to resupply their respective allies; Israel gains the upper hand; the third phase (19-27) with superpowers succeeding in imposing a ceasefire on their clients; even though Egypt and Syria suffer a military defeat, they gain a political victory and break the stalemate (p.124).

    3. US ascendancy in the Middle East (1974-1979): Egypt gradually abandons USSR, concludes separate peace with Israel; significant growth of US military relations with Israel, and its traditional Arab allies; USSR forced to commit increasing resources to keeping its allies like Syria, South Yemen, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq; civil war in Lebanon with Syrian intervention to assist the government; the creation of the Arab Deterrence Force by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria implicitly endorses this action and realigns the countries by end of 1976; Sadat's peace drive culminates in Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 (result of previous year's Camp David Accords); in response, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria, and the PLO establish the Front of Steadfastness and Resistance in 1977, which is joined by Jordan and Saudi Arabia next year after the peace treaty is signed; Egypt suspended from the Arab League; Iraq now among the moderates; renewed commitment of US to its regional allies; increasing difficulties for the USSR; role of ideology declines significantly, pan-Arabism wanes, and inter-Arab politics driven more by material interests (p.146).

Analysis

  1. Balancing and bandwagonning: (i) external threats are the most frequent cause of alliances; (ii) balancing is far more common than bandwagonning; (iii) superpowers chose partners to balance against each other, and regional powers are indifferent to the global balance but ally in response to threats from other regional powers; (iv) offensive capabilities and intentions increase the likelihood of others joining forces in opposition (p.148). Bandwagonning is more likely when the state is small or does not have useful allies, the decision is based on hope that the threatening power will moderate its aggressive intentions (p.176).
  2. Ideology: (i) modest association between ideology and alignment, more pronounced between the superpowers and their regional allies, especially in the case of USSR; (ii) observed association exaggerates its impact, ideological agreement between superpowers and regional allies is fairly limited; (iii) certain ideologies a more a source of division than unity (i.e. pan-Arabism vs. monarchical solidarity), (p.181). In general, Arab ideological consistency is readily abandoned when threats to other interests emerge. However, USSR consistently aligned with ``progressive'' states which shared its opposition to Western imperialism, while the US supported the monarchies and democracies (p.183). The tendency of states with similar domestic systems to form alliances is greatest when they are fairly secure, when the ideology does not require that sovereignty be sacrificed, and when a rival movement creates a powerful threat to legitimacy (p.216).
  3. Foreign aid: efforts to attract allies in the absence of compatible political goals fails; client states serve the patron's interests only when the actions serve their own interests as well. Leverage of patron is reduced because (i) alternative sources always exist, especially in the other superpower; (ii) regional allies viewed as intrinsically valuable in their own right; (iii) providing aid can be self-defeating because in strengthens the recipient and reduces his need to follow advice; (iv) recipients are almost always more interested in the issue and they bargain harder; and (v) domestic constraints prevent the patron from manipulating the level of support (p.240).
  4. Penetration: (i) efforts to manipulate a state's domestic political system are more likely to generate resistance when they threaten a prospective ally's internal stability; (ii) most of superpower's effort to exploit domestic political forces have been counterproductive; (iii) the influence of pro-Israeli forces on US policy-making is significant because (a) the Jewish community is cohesive, prosperous, and well-educated, (b) its activities are viewed as legitimate interest groups politics, and (c) their objectives are limited and easy to justify in terms of US interests (p.259). Penetration can create effective alliances when it reinforces an existing alignment and does not threaten the political system itself (p.260).

Conclusion

Balance of threat theory provides an excellent explanation for the balance of power in the bipolar world. The Soviets are doomed because their geographical size makes them potentially able to control the vast Eurasian resources. This puts them in direct opposition with all their neighboring countries, which regard this as very threatening. On the other hand, the US is separated by two oceans and has had very tolerant relations with its two neighbors. In addition, the military doctrine of the offensive necessitated by the possibility of fighting on more than one front forces the USSR to acquire weaponry that makes it even more threatening. Finally, the Marxist-Leninist support for world revolution makes its intentions more aggressive, which further alienates potential allies. The intra-Communist disputes due to contradictions within the ideology itself weakens the ``bloc'' even further. US should not worry too much about its allies defecting. Being slightly less credible may even be better as it give allies more incentives not to free-ride on US efforts. Because the US does not appear threatening, most countries are predisposed to align with it (p.284).


Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[일본-노트] 교육법안비교 1890, 1947, 2007

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 17. 19:50


Reform Forward or Backward?

Basic Education Law 1947 and 2007

Bee Yun Jo (2014.9.16) 


Focusing on the debate whether Abe's reform is an effort to reindoctrinate patriotism and breach the spirit of post-war Constitution...


Meiji Law on Education: 1890


Essential Points

   Focus on imperialistic moral

-  Worship of the Emperor, Service for the nation

-  Diminished individual freedom

- Signed by Emperor Meiji of Japan on 30 October 1890

- Purpose & Implementation:

1) to articulate the principles of education on the Empire of Japan.

2) The 315 character document was read aloud at all important school events, and students were required to study and memorize the text.

3) Mobilization purposes: loyalty and moral force to support the rise of militarisn and ultranationalism in the prewar years; Confucian virtues incorportated.

Should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth

4) Overall, to educate individuals to loyal surbordinates of the state:

The attitude that education should be for the purpose of the State rather than for the liberation of the individual has permeated the entire system.[각주:1]

Eradication of thoughts based on individualism and liberalism, and the firm establishment of a national moral standard with emphasis on service to the state.”[각주:2]



Basic Education Law 1947


Essential Points

Initiated by GHQ under the US Occupation.

Esteem “individual value” and nurture an “independent spirit”

  To establish “peaceful and democratic state and society” (Article1)

- Abolishment of Meiji Law on Education (June 19th, 1948)


In comparison to the Meiji Education Law, the 1947 law reflects the efforts:

-          To adopt the 1946 Peace Constitution - the overeall pacifist, democratic emphasis of the constitution

-          To dismantle the wartime militarist feudal regime in Japan

-          To influence the sentiment of masses towards the wartime regime’s repressive and anti-democratic methods.

-          To replace “the pre-war education system which was based on conservative Confucian ideology and the glorification of the Japanese imperial system”[각주:3] – “virtue of filial piety, loyalty to the emperor and love for the state”

-          To establish mandatory free education for all young people for nine years emphasizing the “full development of personality” (Article 1)

-          To abolish state control on education: “Education should not be subject to improper control, but shall be directly responsible to the whole people”(Article 10); teachers are the “servants of the whole community”(Article 6).

-          To prevents discrimination against race, religion, gender, social position, economic status, etc – egalitarian values emphasized



Basic Education Law 2006 (revised in December 2006, issued in June 2007)



Essential Points

Initiated by the first Abe Cabinet

- Debate on the possible breach on the spirit of post-war constitution, by revoking nationalism within the Education Law

- 18 Articles in total


Many critiques have pointed out the traits of patriotism in the new reform bill as concrete evidences to Abe’s aim to breach the spirit of country’s post-war constitution. Some of the main arguments are as the following:


THE DEBATE

Aiming to revise patriotism?

-        Article 1: Revised Article 1 now states that education shall aim at the “full development of personality” and nurture their citizens, sound in mind and body, who have the necessary qualities for building “a peaceful and democratic state and society.”

-      Article 2: “…Foster an attitude to respect our traditions and culture, love the country and region that nurtured them, together with respect for other countries and a desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community.

=> In reference to Article 2, critiques point out that Abe declared the goal of education as to develop students’ “respect for the nation’s tradition and culture and fostering an attitude of love for the nation and the homeland that cultivated them.” Citing declining education skills and deteriorating morality, Abe declared that his aim was “to nurture people with ambitions and create a country with dignity”. Such phrases, critiques argue, are nationalism and patriotism that have been muted in the previous 1947 law.

-    Elimination of Article 6 and 10 of the 1947 Education Law:

=> Many critiques have also pointed out that the new law aims to increase state control on education as the new law has deleted the two essential features of 1947 law: “Education should not be subject to improper control, but shall be directly responsible to the whole people.”(Article 10), and Article 6 defined teachers as “servants of the whole community” in the 1947 Education law.

=> Replaced with: “The schools prescribed by law shall be of a public nature, and only the national government, local governments, and juridical persons prescribed by law shall be entitled to establish them” (Article 6)


 

Meiji Law on Education

Basic Education Law 1947

Basic Education Law 200

Patriotic spirit

O

X

O

Emphasis on the “virtue of filial piety, loyalty to the emperor and love for the state”

Emphasis on “full development of personality” (Article 1)

* Abe administration now denounces this as the “cause for the moral decay of Japanese society.”[각주:4]

 

Emphasis to ““to nurture people with ambitions and create a country with dignity”, “respect for the nation’s tradition and culture and fostering an attitude of love for the nation and the homeland that cultivated them.” (Article 2)

State Control

O

X

O

 

Article 10 declared: “Education should not be subject to improper control, but shall be directly responsible to the whole people.” Article 6 defined teachers as “servants of the whole community”.

Deleted the Article 10 and 6 phrases of the 1947 law. Replaced with “The schools prescribed by law shall be of a public nature, and only the national government, local governments, and juridical persons prescribed by law shall be entitled to establish them (Article 6)



Or
Just an update to fit 21st Century Japan?

While Abe’s take on the reform is a hotly debated topic, a critical review of the 2007 law illustrates that the new law does not necessarily mean a return to the past. The review of  article 1, 2, 3, 4 incorporate the efforts to update the education law to fit the 21st century.
 

Article 1 and Article 2

 Article 1 Education shall aim for the full development of personality and strive to nurture the citizens, sound in mind and body, who are imbued with the qualities necessary for those who form a peaceful and democratic state and society.

 Article 2  To realize the aforementioned aims, education shall be carried out in such a way as to achieve the following objectives, while respecting academic freedom:

 (1) to foster an attitude to acquire wide-ranging knowledge and culture, and to seek the truth, cultivate a rich sensibility and sense of morality, while developing a healthy body.

 (2) to develop the abilities of individuals while respecting their value; cultivate their creativity; foster a spirit of autonomy and independence; and foster an attitude to value labor while emphasizing the connections with career and practical life.

 (3) to foster an attitude to value justice, responsibility, equality between men and women, mutual respect and cooperation, and actively contribute, in the public spirit, to the building and development of society.

 (4) to foster an attitude to respect life, care for nature, and contribute to the protection of the environment.

 (5) to foster an attitude to respect our traditions and culture, love the country and region that nurtured them, together with respect for other countries and a desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community.

 

Article 3 and 4 of the law further specify that all citizens should be given the equal opportunities for education:

Article 3 and 4


Article 3 Society shall be made to allow all citizens to continue to learn throughout their lives, on all occasions and in all places, and apply the outcomes of lifelong learning appropriately to refine themselves and lead a fulfilling life.

Article 4 (1) Citizens shall all be given equal opportunities to receive education according to their abilities, and shall not be subject to discrimination in education on account of race, creed, sex, social status, economic position, or family origin.

 (2) The national and local governments shall provide support in education to persons with disabilities, to ensure that they are given adequate education in accordance with their condition.

 (3) The national and local governments shall take measures to provide financial assistance to those who, in spite of their ability, encounter difficulties in receiving education for economic reasons.

 

In overview, it  may be arguable that the new law serves as to update the law to fit 21st century Japan. The new law serves as:

1)   emphasis on the value of tradition, history, and culture (community) in the modern era of individualism (Article 2)

2)  emphasis to adopt the demographic changes of the aging society – transition to a lifelong egalitarian learning society (Article 3)

3)  emphasis on entrepreneurship and creativity (Article 2)

4)  emphasis on the impacts of internationalization, modern media, and the need to build a harmonious society (Article 2)


 

Emphasis

Articles                                               ⓒBee Yun Jo, http://bjo.co.kr, 2014                 

Tradition, history, culture, love for nation

Article 2 “To foster an attitude to respect our traditions and culture, love the country and region that nurtured them

Demographic Change

Article 3 “to continue to learn throughout their lives, on all occasions and in all places, and apply the outcomes of lifelong learning appropriately to refine themselves and lead a fulfilling life.”

Entrepreneurship and Creativity

Article 2 “foster an attitude to value labor while emphasizing the connections with career and practical life”; “cultivate their creativity”

Internationalization

Article 2 “together with respect for other countries and a desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community”




References


·      Basic Education Law http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H18/H18HO120.html (in Japanese)

·      http://www.mext.go.jp/english/lawandplan/1303462.htm  (in English)

·      Education in the Empire of Japan: The Imperial Rescript on Education.

·        MEXT, Basic Act on Education (Act No. 120 of December 22, 2006 http://www.mext.go.jp/english/lawandplan/1303462.htm (in English) (Accessed Sep 16, 2014)

·      The politics of Structural Education Reform by Keith A. Nitta

·      UNESCO, World Data on Education, 7th edition, 2010/11, Available at http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Japan.pdf, p.1




  1. An Office of Strategic Services document on Japanese education, 1941 [본문으로]
  2. Speech by the mister of education, 1941 [본문으로]
  3. Joe Lopez, ‘Japan’s “Education reform” to indoctrinate nationalism?’, (3 January 2007) Avaialble at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2007/01/japa-j03.html (accessed September 9, 2014) [본문으로]
  4. Joe Lopez, ‘Japan’s “Education reform” to indoctrinate nationalism?’, (3 January 2007) Avaialble at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2007/01/japa-j03.html (accessed September 9, 2014) [본문으로]
Trackbacks 0 : Comments 0

Write a comment


[국제안보의 이해] Defining Security

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 16. 09:32