'국제정치이론'에 해당되는 글 10건

  1. 2014.09.09 [미중관계-논문요약] “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia” - 토마스 J. 크리스텐슨(Thomas J. Christensen)
  2. 2014.08.26 IR Theories - 국제관계이론 관련 동영상
  3. 2014.08.13 [IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Institutional Liberalism
  4. 2014.08.13 [IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Neo-Marxist Approach on IR (Critical Theory of Hegemony)
  5. 2014.08.08 [IR-Anarchy and Cooperation] Bull, Hedley (1966) “Society and Anarchy in International Relations”
  6. 2014.08.07 [IR-Anarchy and Cooperation] Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation
  7. 2014.07.15 [IR-Theories Evidences Inferences] Fearon, James (1991) “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science”
  8. 2014.07.10 [IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1954) Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis
  9. 2014.07.10 [IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Jervis, Robert (1976) “Perceptions and the Level-of-Analysis Problem,”
  10. 2014.07.10 [IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Wolfers, Arnold (1962) Discord and Collaboration

[미중관계-논문요약] “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia” - 토마스 J. 크리스텐슨(Thomas J. Christensen)

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 9. 19:40

[미중관계-논문요약 발제문]-2014.09.06 - 조비연

T.J. Christensen (2006) “Fostering Stability of Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 81-126. 

 

“Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?

The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia”

토마스 J. 크리스텐슨(Thomas J. Christensen)

 

1.   요약

중국의 부상과 미국의 상대적 쇠퇴, 그리고 나머지 국가들의 부상(rise of the rest)으로 인한 동북아시아 국가들의 역학관계변화에 대한 다양한 논의가 진행되어 왔다. 중국의 초강대국으로의 부상이 결국 미국과 주변국들에게 위협이 될 지, 아니면 장기간의 상호공존을 통해 균형이 가능할 것인지 라는 상이한 전망을 바탕으로 미국의 대중정책은 일관되기 보다는 대중포용과 대중봉쇄라는 이중적인 양상을 보여왔다. 토마스 J. 크리스텐슨은 이번 논문을 통해 이러한 미국정책의 이중성에 대한 이론적 배경을 추적하고(중국의 부상을 위협/협력의 대상으로 인식하는 이론적 배경) 이론의 영역에선 상반되게만 보이는 중국의 부상에 대한 전망이 실질적인 정책의 영역에선 그 구분이 모호하다는 것, 따라서 중국의 부상은 위협과 협력의 대상으로 동시에 바라볼 수 있는 것이며 대중정책 또한 봉쇄와 협력을 모두 포괄적으로 다루는 전략이 필요하다고 시사한다.


1)  미중관계에 대한 두 가지 시각: 포지티브섬(Positive-sum)과 제로섬(Zero-sum)[1]

가장 먼저, 크리스텐슨은 중국의 부상으로 인한 미중관계-지역 내 역학관계의 변화에 대한 전망이 크게 두 가지 이론적 시각을 기점으로 형성되어왔다고 설명한다.

포지티브섬(Positive-sum Perspective)

첫 번째는 기존 강대국과 부상국가의 경쟁관계를 포지티브섬(Positive-sum)의 게임이란 틀에서 조명하는 것이다. 즉 한 쪽의 득이 반드시 다른 쪽의 실이 되는 것이 아니라 오히려 양쪽 모두 윈윈할 수 있는 장기적 관계가 가능하다는 시각이다. 따라서 중국과 미국의 관계 또한 장기간에 걸쳐 상호이익의 관계-균형을 구축할 수 있다는 결론이며(부상국가가 세력전이론자들이 주장하는 필연적 revisionist가 아니다) 무엇보다 군사적 갈등과 안보딜레마 긴장악화(spiral of tension)를 지양한다. 이러한 시각은 다양한 이론적 배경을 기반으로 성립한다: 이 지역에서 나타나는 강대국 간의 견제, 국가 간 분쟁과 불신, 정치적 대립에도 불구하고(현실주의자들의 주목하고 있는 요소들)[2] 경제적 상호의존의 증가(자유주의자), 다자 기구의 확산과 활성화(자유주의 제도주의자 liberal institutionalists), 사회 문화 교류 증가(구성주의자)[3] 등을 통한 지역 내 협력이 가능하다고 보는 주장을 모두 포함하는 것이다.[4]

제로섬(Zero-sum Perspective)

이와 반대로, 미중관계는 제로섬(Zero-sum Perspective)” 게임이란 틀로 보면 매우 상반되게 전망되었다. 제로섬 게임이란 한 편이 득을 보면 반드시 다른 쪽이 손해를 보아 결국 전체 손실의 합이 제로가 된다는, 일방의 승리와 상대편의 패배로 귀결되는 시각이다. 따라서 제로섬 게임의 미국과 중국은 상대편보다 보다 많은 이익을 추구할 수 밖에 없는 무한경쟁구도로 치닫는 것이다. 따라서 제로섬주의자들은 현실주의자, 급속한 부상국가의 성장은 기존 패권국가와의 안보딜레마 및 갈등심화로 이행된다는 세력전이론자들과 궤를 같이 한다. 다시 말해, 이러한 시각에서의 미중관계는 결국 갈등적인 패권경쟁으로 귀결될 것이란 전망이다.[5] 

 

2)  두 가지 시각으로 보는 미국의 대중정책 평가

이렇게 상반된 미중관계에 대한 게임구도를 바탕으로 미국의 대중정책 또한 긍정적이고 또 동시에 부정적으로 평가되어왔다는 것이 크리스텐슨의 해석이다.

포지티브섬 시각으로 평가하는 미국의 대중정책

우선 균형과 협력을 가능하다고 보는 포지티브섬주의자들은 냉전 이후의 미국 정책이 성공적이였다고 파악한다. 주요 근거는 아래에 요약하였는데, 간략하게는 미국이 부상국가인 중국과 포지티브섬의 게임을 할 수 있는 정치적 경제적 제도적 요인들이 상대적으로 많이 발전되었다는 것이다: 미국은 지역 내 국가들과 새로운 관계수립 및 관계개선에 큰 진척을 보였고(중국 문제에 대한 다자주의적 접근), 새로운 세력으로 부상한 중국 또한 미국을 포함한 주변국들과 경제적 상호의존도를 심화시켰으며, 뿐만 아니라 다양한 다자주의 이니셔티브 기구에 적극 참여 및 새로운 협력체제를 추진하였다. 추가적으로, 미국의 지역 내 균형자, 중재자 역할(공동안보의 제공 등)은 중국의 부상으로 인한 동아시아 안보역학관계변화를 풀어가는데 핵심적인 요소로 평가되었다.[6] 

-         미일관계심화 – 1997 미일신방위협력지침 (1994 Nye Initiative 이후)

    1994 Nye Initiative 이후 1997년엔 새로운 안보동맹 가이드라인을 수립 예전보다 명확하게 일본의 분담내용 구체화. 특히 20019/11 테러와 중국의 급속한 발전은 이러한 미일관계를 심화시킴 (중국 부상의 긍정적 효과)

-         중국 주도 아시아 지역의 경제적 관계 심화

     1990년대 초반엔 현저하게 낮았던 아시아 국가들간의 무역빈도-경제적 상호의존도가 두드러지게 심화되었다. 중국의 부상은 지역 내 국가들과의 무역과 외교에서의 발전으로 나타나면서 이러한 상호의존도는 무역마찰이나 군사적 갈등에 대한 가능성을 과거에 비해 효과적으로 줄일 수 있을 것이라는 전망이다.

-         중국의 외교력 증진과 다자주의 발전

     중국의 부상은 지역 내 외교적 다자주의적 역량강화와 함께 이루어졌다는 평가다. 특히 1990년대 중반부터 중국이 다양한 다자주의기구에 참여하기 시작하고 이후엔 새로운 형태의 다자적 협력기구를 주도하면서 세력분포가 변화하는 과정에서도 안정을 유도할 수 있는 다양한 제도적 조건들이 갖추어졌다는 평가다 (ARF, SCO, 1997 ASEAN+3). 이외에도 중국의 외교력 증진은 2003 6자회담 등 지역 내 평화를 구축하는 다양한 시도들로 이어졌다는 평가다.

 

물론 그렇다고 해서 포지티브섬주의자들이 지역 내 잔존하는 갈등요소(중일관계, 양안관계, 북핵문제 등)들을 부인하는 것은 아니다. 하지만 상대적으로 아시아 지역은 1990년대 초반 보다는 안정화되어 보이고, 그에 필요한 정치적 제도적 경제적 요소들을 갖추는데 미국이 성공적인 중재자 역할을 해왔다는 것이 포지티브섬주의자들의 평가이다.


제로섬 시각으로 평가하는 미국의 대중정책

중국에 대한 상반된 전망과 일맥상통하게 제로섬주의자들은 미국의 대중정책에 대한 부정적인 평가를 내놓는다. 무엇보다 제로섬주의자들은 포지티브섬에서 성공요인이라 다룬 중국에 대한 다자적 접근, 지역 내 국가들과 중국의 관계 심화유도, 중국의 외교력 강화, 미국과 중국의 경제적 상호의존도 심화 등은 중국이 보다 협력적일 것이라는 어리석고”(unwisely) “헛된 희망”(false hope)에 기인한 것이라 비판한다: 제로섬의 경쟁구도에서 이러한 조치들은 중국이란 부상국가의 영향력만 확대시키고 지역 내 미국의 위치만 흔들리게 한 꼴이며, 결국 미국의 이익을 저해하게 되는 잘못된 방향으로 가고 있는 것(heading down the wrong track)”이라 평가한다[7]:

 

-   중국의 경제적 부상과 상호의존도 증가 = 안보위협, 미국의 영향력 쇠퇴 촉진

  제로섬의 시각에서 중국의 경제성장은 미국이 우세했던 지역에서의 세력쇠퇴/세력전이를 의미한다. 1990년대 후반부터 중국의 군비는 두 배 이상 증가경제적 부분에서도 중국은 미국에 대한 의존성을 낮출 정도로 주변국들과의 경제적 교류가 심화되었다. 중국이 일본과 영토분쟁 등을 해결하기 위한 외교적 역량은 부족하지만 이러한 중국의 경제적 성장과 주변국들과의 상호의존도심화는 중국이 앞으로 행사할 수 있는 영향력이다: 일본 한국 대만의 경우 중국과 관계된 민감한 안보이슈에 대한 입장을 취할 때 이젠 중국과의 경제적 관계도 고려해야만 한다. 제로섬의 시각에서 이러한 경제적 상호의존도는 미국의 지역 내 전략과 동맹국에 대한 영향력을 저해하는 것이다.

-   중국의 다자주의적 외교전략 = 미국을 제외한 다자주의 전략

  포지티브섬 시각에선 지역내 안정을 도모하는 제도로 인식된 ASEAN+3제로섬 경우 중국이 미국의 동맹국 일본, 필리핀, 싱가포르, 한국, 태국 을 포섭하려는 시도로 이해할 수 있다 (미국이 제외된 새로운 형태의 제도적 기구). 1990년대 이후 중국은 미국의 동맹국들과 양자관계를 심화시키고 있으며 이러한 양자주의적 다자주의적 시도 모두 지역 내 중국의 영향력을 확대하겠다는 중국의 외교전략으로 이해될 수 있는 것이다. 중국의 이니셔티브로 설립된 SCO 또한 중앙아시아와 남아시아 국가들을 포함하되 미국을 제외하는 등 제로섬의 시각에서 보았을 때 중국과 미국의 대립을 불가피하게 만드는 매우 우려되는 사례들이다. 중국의 소프트파워 또한 대두되고 있는 시점이다.

 

3)  저자의 논지: 두 가지 시각의 접점 찾기

중국의 부상에 대한 전망은 이렇게 미중경쟁의 속성에 대한 두 가지 시각으로 대립하며 미국의 대중정책에 대한 평가 또한 접점 없는 논쟁으로 보여져 왔다. 하지만 크리스텐슨이 이 논문을 통해 궁극적으로 주장하고자 하는 것은 바로 실제 정책의 영역에선 그 구분이 때론 무관하기도 하고 오히려 반직관적(counterintuitive)인 유연성을 통해 보다 전략적인 정책을 운영할 수 있다는 점이다. 크리스텐슨은 크게 두 가지 근거를 제시한다:

첫째, 미중경쟁의 속성에 대한 상반된 시각(포지티브섬/제로섬)에 무관하게 동일한 정책으로 귀결되는 경우가 있다: 

-          동아시아 지역 내 미국의 군사적 외교적 영향력 유지 정책

      제로섬의 시각에선 중국의 부상을 억제하기 위해 미국의 지역내 군사적 영향력 유지를 핵심으로 꼽는다. 하지만 포지티브섬의 게임 또한 마찬가지로 이러한 군사력을 바탕으로 유도될 수 있다. 이는 미국이 냉전 이후 중국보다 우월한 군사력을 바탕으로 지역 내 중재자 역할(공동의 안보제공)을 하면서 중국의 부상을 포지티브섬의 게임으로 이끌었다는 주장이다(“provide common security and reassure local actors who mistrust each other more than they mistrust Washington”). , 이론적 논리는 다르지만 귀결되는 정책이 같은 경우이다.

-          미국의 양안관계 개입 정책

      또한 양안관계에 있어서도 두 가지 시각 모두 대만에 대한 중국의 무력공격은 개입하여 막아야 한다는 결론에 도달한다. 제로섬의 시각에서는 중국이 대만을 통합하여 물리적-외교적 세력을 늘리는 것을 봉쇄해야하고, 포지티브섬의 시각에서도 이러한 무력싸움은 중국과 주변국들 사이 심각한 안보딜레마를 초래하게 되는 것으로 지양해야 하는 것이다. 미국의 비개입 또한 그 동안 중재자의 역할을 해왔던 미국에 대한 주변국들의 신뢰를 떨어트리는 반포지티브섬적인 결과이다.

-          중국의 미래에 대한 불확실성 요소 포지티브섬/제로섬 게임여부가 무관

     중국의 미래가 어떻게 귀결될지에 대한 불확실성도 이러한 이분법적 경직성이 선호되지 않는 중요한 이유다. 중국이 향후 미국 주도 신자유주의 자본주의 질서에 대하여 revisionist일지 아니면 accommodator일지는 여전히 명확하지 않다. 따라서 두 가지 시각이 제시하는 중국에 대한 해석을 제외하고도 미국이 지역 내에서 영향력을 유지해야 하는 이유는 여전히 있는 것이다.


둘째, 오히려 반대편의 시각의 목적을 달성하는 것으로 보이는 방법들로 이룰 수 있는 반직관적인 정책사례들이 존재한다: 무엇보다 포지티브섬의 시각은 미중관계를 상호윈윈의 협력과 균형이 가능하다고 보는 것으로 흔히 중국에 대한 포용정책(engagement, accommodation)으로 등치 되어 왔다. 이와 반대로 제로섬 시각은 중국의 부상을 억제하고 현상유지에 중점을 두는 것으로 주로 강경책으로 한정 지어져 왔다. 하지만 여기서 크리스텐슨이 주장하는 반직관적인 발견은 바로 이러한 방정식의 오류이다. , 포지티브섬 경쟁을 통한 협력과 균형은 포용정책뿐만이 아니라 제로섬 시각과 일치해 보이는 군사적 위협과 같은 강경책으로도 가능하다. 또한 제로섬 경쟁을 통한 상대방에 대한 봉쇄와 현상유지는 흔히 등치되는 강경책뿐만이 아니라 포지티브섬 시각과 연관 지어지는 포용정책으로도 달성이 가능하다는 것이다.[8]:

 

-          포용정책이 강경책보다 안정을 추구하는 것이 아니다

     중국이 1990년대 중반 이후 양자 및 다자주의적 노력을 기울이게 된 이유는 당시 미국의 중국에 대한 다자주의적 포용주의적 접근법이라기 보다는 미국이 중국의 주변국인 일본, 대만, 동남아시아 등과 안보관계를 강화함으로써 중국에게 포위의 위협(fear of encirclement)을 느끼게 만들었기 때문이라는 분석이다.[9]

-          또한 제로섬의 경쟁이라고 해서 강경한 봉쇄정책이나 포위정책이 상대방 보다 많은 이익을 보장하는 것이 아니다

     예를 들어 아시아 지역의 주요국들은 대부분 미국뿐만이 아니라 중국과 다양한 정치적 경제적 관계를 맺고 있다. 따라서 미국이 중국에 대한 섣부른 봉쇄정책은 주변국들에게 미국이나 중국 중 하나를 선택하도록 강요하게 됨으로써 오히려 그들을 미국으로부터 멀어지게 만들 수 있다. , 제로섬의 경쟁이란 인식에 치중하여 적용하는 강경책은 오히려 중국에게 더 많은 이득을 주고 미국은 손해를 보게 되는, 미국이 제로섬의 경쟁에서 패하게 되는 결론이 가능하다.


간략하게, 대중봉쇄정책이 강경책으로만 달성되는 것이 아니며 대중협력정책이 포용정책을 통해서만 이뤄지는 것이 아니라는, 다양한 정책이 전략적 사고를 통해 교차될 수 있다는 것이 저자의 논지이다.

 

4)  정책제언: “Moderate Mix” of the Two – 포지티브섬-제로섬의 혼합정책

이러한 인사이트를 바탕으로 크리스텐슨이 제시하는 정책제안은 바로 앞서 논의한 포지티브섬적이고 제로섬적인 요소들을 적당히 배합하는 접근방식이다: 중국의 경쟁적 욕구를 주변국들과 포지티브섬적인 관계를 이루고 지역의 안정과 평화를 형성할 수 있도록 유도하고, 미국은 지역 내 군사력과 동맹국들의 관계를 전략적으로 유지함으로써 중국이 패권국으로의 전철을 밟지 않도록 적당히 억제하는, 이른바 포지티브섬과 제로섬의 경쟁이 적절히 합쳐진 믹스전략이다. 중국의 부상에 대한 대중봉쇄(제로섬게임)와 대중협력(포지티브섬게임)에 있어서 강경책과 포용정책의 활용에 대한 구분이 없다는 저자의 논지는 다시 한번 상기되어야 할 것이다.

 

***

 

2.   의견 (Comments)

크리스텐슨의 논문은 크게 네 가지 부분에서 그 분석이 탁월하다고 평가될 수 있다. 첫째, 크리스텐슨이 제시하는 포지티브섬-제로섬의 믹스전략은 학계에서 미중경쟁 대한 상반된 분석을 바탕으로 대립하고 있는 포지티브섬주의자들과(상호의존론자들과 세력균형론자들) 제로섬주의자들(세력전이론자들)이 정책분야에서 합의를 이룰 수 있는 가능성을 제시한다. 둘째, 미중경쟁의 속성에 대한 상반된 시각은 대중협력과 대중봉쇄의 이중성을 띠어온 미국의 전략을 정당화하는데 기여한다. 또한 정책분야에서 활발하게 논의되고 있는 soft containment congagement 같은 유사한 정책개념들에 대한 이론적 타당성을 제공한다. 셋째, 무엇보다 중국의 부상에 대한 이론적 해석이 정책분야에서 오히려 이분법적인 경직성을 띠어 보다 전략적인 사고를 저해할 수 있다는 부분은 미국의 대중정책에 대한 보다 전략적인 Grand Strategy의 필요성을 상기시킨다. 넷째, 무엇보다 미중관계에 대한 다양한 국제정치학적 논의가 주로 이론적 분석에 치중하거나 정책페이퍼에 집중되어 왔다면, 크리스텐슨의 본 논문은 이론적 접근법과 정책적 논의라는 두 가지 영역의 중요한 접점을 모색하는 시도이다.


그럼에도 불구하고 몇 가지 의문을 제기하자면 첫째, 군사적 강경책과 평화적 포용정책이 똑같은 전략적 결과를 달성할 수 있다는 저자의 논지는 현실세계에서의 오인(misperception)의 가능성을 과소평가한 부분이 없지 않다. 저자가 사용한 예로 아시아지역에서의 미국의 강경적 군사정책(중국 주변국들과의 안보관계심화 특히 미일안보동맹)이 중국이 주변국들과 포지티브섬적인 협력 관계를 맺도록 유도했다는 부분은 이러한 포위정책에 대한 상대방의 오인의 가능성, 폭력적 대응의 가능성(Tit-for-Tat)과 그 무게를 과소평가하는 것이다.

아시아 지역에서의 한미일 안보동맹강화를 한가지 예로 생각해 볼 수 있다 (한국의 MD편입, 미일동맹강화 등). 냉전시대가 막을 내린 90년대 초반에 강경적 안보정책(중국 주변국들과 안보관계심화)이 중국이 오히려 주변국들과의 협력을 유도했다는 저자의 논지와 달리 현재 중국의 반응은 매우 다를 수 있다. 과거와 달리 포지티브섬의 요소는 배제되고 오히려 제로섬의 안보딜레마가 촉발될 가능성을 부인할 수 없다. 무엇보다 이러한 강경책은 한중, 중일 등 양자관계의 복합체제로 움직이는 동아시아 지역에 큰 영향을 끼칠 수 있다는 점에서 과소평가되어선 안 된다. 미중사이에서 선택이 강요되는 한국의 이익은 어떻게 달라지는가미중관계에서 상호공존과 균형을 유도할 수 있는 강경책이라고 해서 한국에게도 포지티브섬의 게임이 주어지는가?


둘째, 크리스텐슨의 혼합정책에 대하여도 의문을 제기해보고 싶다. 적당한 제로섬의 경쟁과 포지티브섬의 게임을 필요로 하는 미중경쟁에 대한 저자의 정책제언은 무엇보다 정책가들에게 이론적 사고의 유연성을 주문하다. 이는 미중관계에 대하여 상황에 따라 적절하게, ‘전략적으로 운영해야 한다는 함의를 담고 있는 것인데 soft containment, ‘전력적 관계 유지,’ congagement와 같은 기존의 정책논의보다 얼마나 더 실효성이 있을지에 대하여는 의문이 남을 수 있다. 전략적 유연성은 흔히 실제 실행과정에선 매우 모호하고 여러 가지 갈등과 오인을 불러일으키는, 무엇보다 주변국들에게 모순적이란 비판을 받게 하고 있는 요인이다. 따라서 저자가 제언하고 있는 혼합정책은 그것을 도출해내는 이론적 과정에선 의미가 크지만 미국의 대중정책에 대한 보다 포괄적인 대전략(Grand Strategy)을 수립할 수 있는 것인가? 크리스텐슨의 혼합정책 또한 기존의 미국의 대중정책 처럼 중국위협론에 기초한 중국봉쇄와 상호의존론에 의한 대중협력 사이에서 오락가락할 가능성은 여전히 높다.


마지막으로 크리스텐슨의 논문에 드러나는 미국중심적 사고를 주목해보고자 한다. 결론적으로 미중관계에 대한 그의 평가는 비관적이지 않고 많은 포지티브섬주의자들과 유사하게 중국을 ‘manageable’한 것으로 파악하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 또한 지역 내 미국의 역할을 강조하고 있는 포지티브섬주의자들과 같이 미국의 힘과 외교력에 대한 신뢰가 높다: “포용적인 정책이 미국의 동맹을 약화시킬 것이라 보는 사람들은 미국의 힘과 외교력에 대해 너무 적은 믿음/과소평가 하는 것이다.("In fact, the United States should foster China’s engagement with the United States and its allies on issues of common concern. Observers who believe that these policies would weaken U.S. alliances have too little faith in U.S. power and diplomacy.Christensen, p. 124).” 절제적 균형자-Circumscribed balancer와 같은 개념으로 파악하고 있는 미국의 역할, 이에 대한 보다 비판적이고 건설적인 논의가 필요해 보인다.



[1] '제로섬(zero-sum) 게임' '넌제로섬(non-zero-sum) 게임': 제로섬으로 인식하는 경쟁구도에서는 한 쪽의 득이 곧 상대편의 실이 된다. 반면 넌제로섬의 경쟁구도에서는 한 쪽의 득이 반드시 상대편의 실을 의미하는 것이 아니다. 이러한 넌제로섬 게임은 다시 '포지티브섬(positive sum)' '네거티브섬(negative sum)'으로 구분된다. 포지티브섬은 크리스텐슨이 지적한 것과 같이 게임 참여자의 양쪽이 다 이기는 윈윈의 사례이고, 네거티브섬은 그와 반대로 양쪽이 다 잃는다.

[2] 크리스텐슨이 설명하길 현실주의자라고 해서 포지티브섬의 시각을 배제하고 제로섬적이거나 국제정치에 대하여 비관적인 것만은 아니다. 이들은 지역내 세력전이는 심각하게 받아들이면서도 과거 전통적 현실주의와 달리 중국의 부상이 꼭 군사적 갈등을 필연적으로 가져오는 것이 아니며, 무엇보다 핵무기 개발 등으로 인해 과거 같은 영토적 싸움으로 번지는 것이 상대적으로 어려워졌다고 이해한다. 특히 방어적 현실주의자(defensive realists)들의 경우 다른 비현실주의자들과 같이 지역내 갈등을 초래하는 것은 상대적 material power의 변화가 아니라 이것이 어떠한 “mutual perceptions of hostility” 동반되는지가 중요하다고 주장했다 (Christensen).

[3] 웬트(Wendt) 참고 - 갈등을 사회적 상호작용(“social interaction”)을 통해 만들어진 것, 권력분포에 의해 필연적으로 만들어진 것이 아니라고 보는 것 (Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[4] “a positive-sum perspective in which the United States, China, and other regional actors have strong incentives to increase mutual trust, transparency, and economic times, thereby minimizing the likelihood of avoidable military conflicts that serve no nation’s long-term interests.” (Christensen, p. 81)

[5] “a zero-sum perspective, in which the continued relative increase in Chinese power poses the most formidable long-term danger to the national security and economic interests of the United States and its allies in the region, regardless of whether Beijing’s relations with the United States or its neighbors appear cordial and constructive in the decade.”(Christensen, p.81)

[6] 크리스텐슨이 포지티브섬주의자들로 일컫는 학자들은 미국을 중국의 부상 이후 아시아 국가들이 경제적 정치적 관계의 안정화가 될 때까지 시간을 벌어주는 지역내의 균형자 역할로 평가하며 그 동안의 미국의 아시아정책을 성공적이라 평가하였다: 미국의 “continued presence as a provider of common security and an honest broker in regional disputes.”

[7] 미어샤이머: “misguided” policy, a false hope that international accommodation of China will make it more cooperative (John J . Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W.Norton, 2001, p. 402).; 카간: “illusion of ‘managing’ China” - false hope that China’s rise could be consistent with U.S. interests (Robert Kagan, “The Illusion of ‘Managing’ China,” Washington Post, May 15, 2005;).; 그리코: “The problem with this strategy is that, while there is less than a 100 percent probability that it will succeed in bringing about a more peaceful and responsible and even more democratic China in the years ahead, there is something approaching a 100 percent likelihood that such engagement will produce a more potent China” (Joseph M. Grieco, “China and America in the World Polity,” in Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), pp. 36-37).

[8]Relatively assertive U.S. policies sometimes promote goals that are consistent with positive-sum analysts' prescriptions for China and the region, whereas relatively accommodating policies toward China and its neighbors may at times be the most effective way for the United States to vie with China in a zero-sum competition.”

(Christensen, p. 37)

[9] 1995-1996년 중국이 대만에게 coercion => backfired: ASEAN 국가들은 미국과 군사적 연계를 추구하고 미국은 대만이슈에 적극 개입하게 됨으로써 지역내 미국의 역량이 강화됨. 미국은 이를 계기로 일본의 보다 적극적인 안보동맹활동(Nye Initiative-> 1997 revisions to the Defense Guidelines), 1996-1997년엔 호주와 안보관계심화, 9/11 이후엔 인도, 필리핀, 싱가포르, 태국이라는 아세안국가들과도 안보협력관계 심화; Xia Liping에 따르면 1996년 새로운 안보개념과 SCO, WTO 가입은 모두 냉전적 사고(Cold War thinking)”“power politics”에 대한 response (대만에 대한 미국의 개입과 지역내 국가들과의 관계설정) – Zhang Yunling도 유사하게 이는 모두 미국의 중국위협론과 중국에 대한 포위정책을 대비하기 위한 것. Allen Carson도 중국이 영토분쟁에 있어서 상대적으로 유연해지고 2002 11 Code of Conduct with ASEAN(for naval activities in the South China Sea)을 서명한 이유는 워싱턴의 동남아시아에 대한 military commitment 때문이라고 함. 중국의 인도와의 관계개선 또한 마찬가지로 미국과 인도의 관계개선이 촉진제가 되었다는 것(예로 2005년 중국이 인도를 SCO의 옵저버로 참가할 자격을 부여하였다).

[10] “In fact, the United States should foster China’s engagement with the United States and its allies on issues of common concern. Observers who believe that these policies would weaken U.S. alliances have too little faith in U.S. power and diplomacy” (Christensen, p. 124).


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IR Theories - 국제관계이론 관련 동영상

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 26. 19:47

예전에 우연하게 유투브에서 찾은 영상들이다.

터키 이스탄불 Sabanci University에서 국제관계를 가르치고 있는 Meltem Müftüler-Baç 교수의 강의영상이다.

주로 슬라이드 없이 말로 쭉 강의하는 내용인데 참 많은 것을 쉽게 설명해서 참고자료로 좋다.


Week 1


Week 2


Week 3


Week 4


Week 5


Week 6


Week 7


Week 8


Week 9


Week 10


Week 11


Week 12


Week 13


Week 14


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[IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Institutional Liberalism

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 13. 20:32

Keohane, Robert (2012) “Twenty Years of Institutionalism Liberalism,” International Relations, Vol. 26, pp. 125-138.


*A paper that clearly outlines the theoretical relevance of Realism on Institutional Liberalism

 

Purpose of this paper:

-          to use Carr’s perspective in The Twenty Years’ Crisis to interrogate Institutional Liberalism

-          identify three trends (legalization, increasing legalism and moralism, decline in the coherence of some international regimes) – reviewed in light of Realist critiques of liberalism

 

 

Introduction

 

1.       What is Institutional Liberalism (IL)?

 

Institutional Liberalism (IL): Cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal principles.

-          (Keohane) originating from John Ruggie’s conception of international political authority (30yrs ago) – IL as one basis for the political authority – ‘fusion of power and legitimate social purpose’[1]

-          Institutions and rules can facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation within and among states

-          The social purpose: “to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of more peaceful, prosperous and free world.” (126)

-          Yet, realist assumptions are not negated (“[no belief] in a harmony of interests” – 126)

 

*Note on the difference between IL and Liberalism:

-          IL “very different” from what E.H Carr describes as “liberalism” (“which is the 19th century liberalism based on abstract rational principles” – “harmony of interests based on a ‘synthesis of morality and reason’”; “separated power from economics” (126)

 

2.       More on Ruggie (from which IL originates, according to Keohane) – “embedded liberalism”

 

Ruggie’s notion of “embedded liberalism compromise”[2]

-          emerged as “the result of the Depression and World War II” (126)

-          seeks to “foster pluralism in economics and politics and promotes international cooperation” (126) – like 19th century liberalism.

-          yet, difference from 19th century liberalism: Ruggie’s notion is “multilateral in character… and predicated upon domestic interventionism”[3]; like IL, “dependence of economics on politics” and no belief “in a harmony of interests” (126)

 

3.       IL – Pluralist conception of power and interests

 

“The people… should rule, but they have to rule through institutions”

“an antidote to fatalism and a source of hope”[4] – unlike Realism (127)

 

 

 

 

Questioning Institutional Liberalism

 

Purpose here: Evaluation of the last 20 years of liberal dominance (after the collapse of Soviet Union)

 

1.       Overview

 

-          Before 1991: Institutions – security justification (US and its allies against Soviet Union)

Ø  “to create economic prosperity and patterns of cooperation that would reinforce the position of the West in the struggle with the Soviet Union” (127)

Ø  American hegemony, esp the institutions created after WWII – “ ‘constructed on the basis of principles espoused by the United States, and American power was essential for their construction and maintenance’” (127)

Ø  Realist relative gain competition between the West and the Soviet bloc; Cooperation among the West (mutually beneficial cooperation)

Ø  Cooperation on the basis of “mutual self-interest and reciprocity, without much legalization

Ø  Towards many “robust international regimes”: monetary regimes (esp. 1958-1971, fixed EX), GATT (127)

Ø  1980s projection: “a continuation and gradual strengthening of international institutions grounded in domestic politics and achieving substantial cooperation on the basis largely of specific reciprocity” (128)

 

2.       Main Question

-          Since the early 1990s: the three trends noted above (legalization, increasing legalism and moralism, decline in the coherence of some international regimes)

=> Reassessement of IL in the light of the experience of the last 20 years

Ø  Does IL contain a hidden logic (explanation) for these three trends? Or has liberalism become inconsistent with the changes in power structures? (129)

 

3.       Definitions First:

-          Legalization: “property of institutions” where the rules are “precise and obligatory, and they provide arrangements for third-party adjudication” (128)

-          Coherence: “also a property of institutions, but refers more to the relationship among institutions than to the properties of any single institution” – Note on decline in the coherence of international regimes , becoming ‘regime complexes’ – “loosely coupled arrangements of rules, norms and institutions”\

-          Legalism and Moralism: “not properties of institutions but rather of the human mind” (130); Legalism: “the belief that moral and political progress can be made through the extension of law”; Moralism: “the belief that moral principles provide valuable, if not necessarily sufficient, guides to how political actors should behave….” (130)

 

4.       Critique

-          Keohane’s “ambibalen[ce]” on legalism (130):

Ø  Serves as a “veil” to the “hiding exercise of power” (130)

Ø  Stehen Krasner: “organized hypocrisy”[5] (130)

Ø  Overall, Keohane’s purpose to distinguish legalization from legalism.

 

-          E.H Carr also critical of moralism and legalism – calling them “utopian thinking”

 

 

 

Idealism and interests: the revival of moralism in world politics

 

1.       Since 1991: Language of moralism now “detached from great power struggles” (after 1991) (131)

-          Topics now: human rights, democracy, themes decried by ppl like Morgenthau and Kennan.

-          Unlike the realists view, Carr: Criticizes both realist (denial of values) and liberal (utopian) views “there is a world community for the reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community” – but this world community is thin – “the role of power is greater and that of morality less” and any “international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power”(131) – against the utopian view and also the realist denial on morality

-          Note on the potential danger of moralism:

“A concern for morality is therefore both essential and dangerous… a concern for morality is dangerous because in the hands of fools or demagogues it can become a pernicious form of moralism, serving not to check power but to justify its use in ways that are false and typically damaging” (131)

 

2.       Overall, moralism provides:

-          “impetus to social movements” (132)

-          “enhance the legitimacy of hegemonic states and the orders they seek to maintain” (132)

-          “moralism and also generate arrogance, facilitate the distortion of reality, and even conceal nefarious purposes” (132)

 



The revival of legalism and its penumbra (“increasing legalized”(133) IL since 1991)

 

1.       Four prominent examples of international legal institutions since 1991 (132):

-          The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993)

-          World trade law legalized in WTO (1995)

-          The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – permanent basis in 1998

-          The International Criminal Court (ICC) - 2002

* Efforts to “domesticate world politics” (133) – against Realist view of anarchy (vs. order of domestic politics)

 

2.       Yet, problematic of legalism:

-          “misattributed causality”: “law always rests on power and interests” (134)

Ø  E.H Carr: “‘the law is not an abstraction. It cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and of the political interests which it serves’[6]” (134)

-          “straitjacket for policy-makers” (134)

 

3.       Overall,

-           (+) “It can provide a rationale for smoothing the edges of rough order, motivating people to create more consistent legal arrangements that do, under the right conditions, have a positive impact” (134)

-           (-) “But legalism that ignores power and interests misattributes causality and limits adaptation to change.” (134)

 



Changes in structure and the decreasing coherence of international economic and environmental regimes

 

1.       Realist Scenarios of the past:

-           Gilpin: ‘recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy’[7]

-           Mearsheimer: Collapse of the USSR -> ‘back to the future’ to a world power politics in Europe’[8]

-           Waltz: dominance of US would generate a blocking coalition (balance of power theory; that “power generates attempts to counter it” – 134)

* above scenarios did not occur. Yet, the point is that “there is a counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative of Institutional Liberalism” (134)

 

2.       Striking Changes during the last 20 years:

-           Development of the Third World

-           Diversified interests -> “a progressive extension of international regimes… has been halted if not reversed” (134)

 

3.       Implications on Realism and IL (Mix of the Two) – Remaining relevance of Realism

-           Realism remains relevant: power and interest structures that lie below “the veil of rhetoric and law” (134) = “With the rise of China, India and other emerging economies, structures of power and interest have become more diverse; and as Structural Realism would have anticipated, the institutions that link major powers have been weakened, with more contention (134)

-           “As institutional theorists anticipated, many of these institutions persist despite changes in patterns of power and interests; but as Realists claimed, it has become increasingly difficult to construct strong new institutions” (135)

-           “We need to be careful, as E.H. Carr was, about the ways in which Realism remains relevant” (135)

 

4.       Is Realism then a good?

-           As E.H Carr, Keohane also views it as “not a good moral guide: it dodges many issues of ethical choice by unduly discounting how much choice leaders of great powers have. ‘Necessity’ is not a convincing justification for the very powerful.” (135)

-           Yet major lesson from Realism: “Institutions rest on power and changes in power generate changes in institutions.” (135)

-           Realism + the fact on domestic politics and learning

 

 

Conclusion

-           Overall, here, projection for the rise of “newly strong countries, as well as the obstacles that domestic politics places in the way of farsighted adaptation.” (136)

ð  Yet, this doesn’t mean a collapse of the existing system as “‘a set of networks, norms and institutions, once established will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange’[9]” (136)

-           Going back to Keohane’s first question: whether the changes of post-1991 are within the IL tradition:

Ø  His answer is “mixed”

Ø  Intrinsic features of liberalism: the first two trends (legalization, moralism and legalism)

Ø  Yet, decline in liberalism: the third trend (decline in the coherence of international regimes)

-           What to do now: Efforts less in legalism and moralism but to “form coalitions that will build and maintain coherent multilateral institutions to address the major challenges of our time” (136)

 

 

-           “Moralism, legalization and legalism reflect the fusion of power and social purpose represented by the dominance of liberalism since 1991” (136)

-           “decline in regime coherence stems from a divergence of interests, a diffusion of power, and the difficulties of persuading domestic democratic publics to bear the costs of adjustment” (136)

-           “Power continues to be important but institutions can help to tame it, and states whose leaders seek both to maintain and use power must be attentive, as E.H. Carr recognized, to issues of legitimacy. At the moment, legalism and moralism thrive, but the comprehensiveness and coherence of multilateral institutions are suffering. We need at this time less to profess and preach legalism and moralism than to figure out how to form coalitions that will build and maintain coherent multilateral institutions to address the major challenges of our time. The fact that these institutions are not foolproof is less a counsel of despair than a motivation to build them on as firm foundations as we can” (136)

-            

 

Comment/Critique points:

-           realist tenet on power + institutions, idea of legitimacy

-           Keohane’s proposal: “form coalitions that will build and maintain” the institutions

 



[1] John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36(2), 1982, pp. 379415, quotation on p. 382.

[2] Ruggie “International Regimes,” p.393

[3] Ruggie “International Regimes,” p.393

[4] Robert O. Keohane (2002) Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, p. 59

[5] Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[6] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 179.

[7] Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15(1), 1990, pp. 5056; the quotation is on p. 8.

[9] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th edn (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012), p. 46.



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[IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Neo-Marxist Approach on IR (Critical Theory of Hegemony)

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 13. 20:26

Cox, Robert (1981) “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 126-155.


*Neo-Marxist Approach to IR (Bringing Gramsci’s theory on hegemony)

- Realists-Marxists’s hegemony: domination by material capabilities

- Gramsci’s: hegemony separated from the idea of domination. Material capabilities-ethical-political ideology (강제가 아닌 합의-정통성에 바탕한 hegemony)

*Problem-solving Theories vs. Critical Theories

 

1. Overview: Changes in international relations (convention):

-          “actors (different kinds of state, and non-state entities)” (126)

-          “the range of stakes (low as well as high politics)” (126)

-          “greater diversity of goals pursued” (126)

-          “a greater complexity in the modes of interaction and the institutions within which action takes place” (126)

 

*In more specific (changes in intellectual conventions in IR)

-          18th & 19th century distinction between state and civil society (foreign policy as “pure expression of state interests”)

-          Replaced by society based on contract and market relations – state and civil society distinction blurred.

 

*Recent trends in theory:

-          “undermined” “conceptual unity of the state” (127)

Ø  “by perceiving it as the arena of competing bureaucratic entities” (127) : rational choice

Ø  “by introducing a range of private transnational activity and transgovernmental networks of relationships among fragments of state bureaucracies” (127)

ð  Yet these approaches are still limited, looking at the state as “a singular concept,” with “little attempt… to consider the state/society complex as the basic entity of international relations” (127) – Need for studies on the “plurality of forms of state” – “different configurations of state/society complexes” (127)

 

*Other attempts to fill “the gap” (127) – Breaking down the unitary concept of the state:

-          Marxist revival as alternatives to diversify the notion of state “by amplifying its social dimensions.” (127) – yet the implications are not strongly developed.

Ø  Defining the state as “a singularly-conceived capitalist mode of production” (127) (in reference to Althusser[1], Poulantzas[2])

Ø  Attention “away from state and class conflict to a motivational crisis in culture and ideology” (127) (in reference to Habermas[3])

ð  Yet, Limited Depth in the application of Marxism on IR: These approaches do not go “very far towards exploring the actual or historical differences among forms of state, or considering the implications of the differences for international behavior.” (127)

-          E.H. Carr and Eric Hobsbawm: social forces, the changing nature of the state and global relationships

-          Fernand Braudel: interrelationship between these forces in the 16th & 17th centuries

-          Immanuel Wallerstein (inspired by Braudel’s work): theory of world systems defined essentially in terms of social relations (exploitative exchange relations between a developed core and an underdeveloped periphery, different forms of labor control)

Ø  2 Main Weaknesses (Criticisms): state “as merely derivative from its position in the world system” and the “system-maintenance bias” – “Like structural-functional sociology, the approach is better at accounting for forces that maintain or restore a system’s equilibrium, than identifying contradictions which can lead to a system’s transformation.

 

 

2. “On Perspectives and Purposes”

(After the Overview of the ongoing tension against Neorealist assumptions, Cox goes on to illustrate his views on what theories are about. Here is where Cox distinguishes between the problem-solving and critical theories)

 

“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective… When any theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective” (128)

 

-          Two distinct purposes of theory

Ø  1) “problem-solving theory”:

n  “solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure” (128); “It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action” (128); 

n  The general aim: “to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly” (129);

n  “fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres… each of which assumes a certain stability in the other spheres” – “the institutional and relational parameters assumed” (129)

n  Toward “subdivision and limitation of the issue” (129) – narrowing down the scope

Ø  2) “critical theory”

n  “more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its relation to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world.” (128)

n  “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted”; the “parameters” problem-solving theory accept are questioned.

n  Towards “construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved.” (129)

n  “lack in precision” (129) in comparison to problem solving theory (ahistoric – fixed point): critical theory must continually adjust to changes (historic)

 

-          Limitations of problem solving theory:

Ø  The “assumption of fixity” = “a convenience of method” “ideological bias” “conservative” (129)

Ø  “value-bound” (unlike the proponents’ view that they are value free”) “by the virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework” (130)

Ø  Moreover, unlike problem-solving theory, Critical theory: clarifies range of “alternatives” – “contains utopianism” that “it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order” – thus can guide to “strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order.” (130)

 

Historic vs. Ahistoric

Critical (Changer) vs. Status-quo Parameters

Comprehensive vs. Precision

Utopianism vs. Conservatism..?

 

-   Note on World order and Critical Theory: “a condition of uncertainty in power relations beckons to critical theory as people seek to understand the opportunities and risks of change.” (130) ~ e.g. 1970s

 

“To reason about possible future world orders now,” critical theory is needed to broaden “our enquiry beyond conventional international relations, so as to encompass basic processes at work in the development of social forces and forms of state, and in the structure of global political economy” (130) – Neo-Marxist and political economy perspective as an alternative to realist theory driven field.

 

 

3. “Realism, Marxism and an Approach to a Critical Theory of World Order”

 

Marxism considered as a preliminary attempt to develop a critical approach to interstate relations and world orders

 

*Realism

-          Origin in a historical mode of thought: Friedrich Meinecke (1957), E.H Carr, Ludwig Dehio (delineating particular configuration of forces in different periods to understand within their historical contexts) – historic view that things are susceptible to change

-          However, Since WWII: Realism transformed into a form of problem-solving theory (Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz), “coinciding with the Cold War” – “imposing bipolarity” upon IR (131)

-          Characteristics by three levels in this new realism: fundamental and unchanging 1) nature of man; 2) the nature of states; 3) the nature of the state system

ð  These core assumptions lead to “variations on always recurrent themes”; conclusion that “the future will always be like the past.” (131)

ð  The idea of rationality and game theories in this tradition reinforce “the nonhistorical mode of thinking” (132)

 

Debate against Realism(Problem-solving theory)

-          Debate between the civil philosophy of Hobbes and the natural-law theory of Grotius in the 17th (based on different perspectives on the nature of man, the state and the interstate system)

-          Against the Realist view, Neapolitan Giambattista Vico argued for continuity (Critical Theory): Vico criticized the “conceit of scholars” (Vico) who will have it that “what they know is as old as the world” (Vico) “consists in taking a form of thought derived from a particular phase of history… and assuming it to be universally valid. This is an error of neorealism and more generally, the flawed foundation of all problem-solving theory.” (133)

 

*“How does Marxism relate to this method or approach to a theory of world order?”

 

-          Two divergent currents in Marxism:

1)       Historical approach to social relations: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (Marx, Eric Hobsbawm, Gramsci)

Ø  “a foremost source of critical theory and it corrects neorealism in four important aspects”(133):

i)                     Dialectic at two levels (logic and history): “exploration of contradictions” for truth seeking and “potential for alternative forms”… Neorealism sees conflict “as a recurrent consequence of a continuing structure, whereas historical materialism sees conflict as a possible cause of structural change” (134)

ii)                   Focus on Imperialism: Historical materialism gives a “vertical dimension of power” among the states. (134)

iii)                  Enlarging the realist perspective (the relationship between the state and civil society (134)

iv)                 Production process as a critical element

 

2)       Ahistorical approach – framework for the analysis of the capitalist state and society: STRUCTURAL MARXISM (Althusser and Poulantzas)

 

*Basic Premises of Critical Theory

 

1)       Embeddedness of our actions (Our actions within the shared paradigm)…? “an awareness that action is never absolutely free but takes place within a framework for action which constitutes its problematic” (135)

2)       Embeddeness of theory “a realization that not only action but also theory is shaped by the problematic” (135)

3)       Changes… “the framework for action changes over time and a principal goal of critical theory is to understand these changes” (135)

4)       “historical structure” – combination… “the context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action takes place” (135)

5)       “the framework or structure within which action takes place is to be viewed… from the bottom or from outside in terms of the conflicts which arise within it and open the possibility of its transformation” (135)

 

 

4. “Frameworks for Actions: Historical Structures”

 

= “a particular configuration of forces”

 

*Three categories of forces within a structure:

1) material capabilities: e.g. technological and organizational capabilities, accumulated forms of resources

2) ideas: 2 kinds – intersubjective(organized/commanded by states) or those shared notions (“collective images of social order held by different groups of people”) (136)

3) institutions: “means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations.” (136)

 

*The method of historical structures:

- “limited totalities”: it does not “represent the whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality; static is avoided by “juxtaposing and connecting historical structures in related spheres of action.” (137)

- “contrast models”: “a simplified representation of a complex reality and an expression of tendencies… rather than fully realized models.” (137)

 

*The method of historical structures applied to the three levels/spheres of activity (while these three levels are “interrelated”:

1) the organization of production (“the social forces engendered by the production process” (138))

2) “forms of state as derived from a study of state/society complexes” (138)

3) “world orders”

=> “Considered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions… Considered in relation to each other, and thus moving towards a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others.” (138)

 

Shortly after: how the configuration of the three categories of forces allows us to see and determine the changes in the world order (social forces shaped by production relations – between capital and labor).

 

Main assumption: social relations as the basis of World Order; States as institution as any other in history (State as a distinctive form of political community with its own particular functions, roles, and responsibilities that are socially and historically determined).

 

 

5. “Hegemony and World Orders”

(Towards Cox’s Critical Theory of International System Neorealist static explanation of hegemony and world orders vs. Historic view…)

 

> Neo-realism – material forces focused

 

> Viewed in historical structures:

Ø  Pax Britannica

1)       Material capabilities: sea power

2)       Ideas (norms): free trade, gold standard, free movement of K&L – neoliberal economics

3)       Institutions: None but the ideological separation between economics and politics -> presence of universal rules

Ø  In transition (late 19th ~WWII)

1)       Material capabilities: weakened

2)       Ideas (norms): faltered with the rise of protectionism, the new imperialisms, and ultimately the end of the gold standard

3)       Institutions: as result, collapsed into a world of rival power blocs

 

Ø  Pax Americana:

based on greater number of formal international institutions; increased role of state after WWII and the Great Depression. – “ideology is a determining sphere of action which has to be understood in its connections with material power relations”

 

6.Cox’s Redefinition of Hegemony: “Social Forces, Hegemony and Imperialism”

– often called as Cox’s Critical Theory of Hegemony

 

 

*Despite the explanatory power of using the configuration of material power, ideology and institutions, the theory still cannot explain why and how of a hegemony:

Ø  “hegemony may seem to lend itself to a cyclical theory of history; the three dimensions fitting together in certain times and places and coming apart in others… What is missing is some theory as to how and why the fit comes about and comes apart” (141)

ð  Cox’s Explanation here: by “social forces shaped by production relations” (Capital and Labor Relations) – Political Economy Perspective on IR – which he argues to be more fit as a critical and historic view, able to illustrate the processes of a hegemony:

By taking this perspective (political economy) “we move from identifying the structural characteristics of world orders as configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions… to explaining their origins, growth and demise in terms of the interrelationships of the three levels of structures” (141)

 

ð  (Example: Rise and fall of hegemonic order in terms of capitalism that mobilized social forces in specific directions (power seen as “emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities[(neorealists-power fetishism)], that is as the result of these processes [(Marx)] (141))

 

*Social Forces & Pax Britannica: Rise and Fall both explained by the development of social forces

- Ascendancy: class based social forces of manufacturing capitalism (bourgeoisie in Europe)

- Demise: emergence of industrial workers – industrialization and mobilization of social classes (liberal form of state “slowly replaced by the welfare nationalist form of state”) changed the international configuration of power

- Capitalist production & periphery: new social forces created in the periphery (liberal imperialism):

“imperial system is a world order structure drawing support from a particular configuration of social forces, national and transnational, and of core and periphery states… Actions are shaped either directly by pressures projected through the system or indirectly by the subjective awareness on the part of actors of the constraints imposed by the system”(144)

 

Two main questions to answer whether pax Americana come apart:

1)       “What are the mechanisms for maintaining hegemony in this particular historical structure” (144)

-          “internationalization of the state” (144)

-          “internationalization of production” (146)

-          Idea of FREE TRADE

 

2)       “What social forces and/or forms of state have been generated within it which could oppose and ultimately bring about a transformation of the structure?” (144)

-          “international production and class structure” (147) – “international production is mobilizing social forces, and it is through these forces that its major political consequences vis-à-vis the nature of states and future world orders may be anticipated.” (147)

-          But this idea of Free Trade is for a specific class structure (지배계급) – beneficial for hegemony, and not for the third world countries…

 

7. “Social forces, state structures, and future world order prospects”

 

Predictions of future world order (one of the functions of critical theories) – “social forces generated by changing production processes are the starting point for thinking about possible futures” (149)

 

i)                    New hegemony based upon the global structure of social power generated by the internationalizing of production (inter-state power configuration among US, Germany, Japan and other OECD countries, coopted third worlds, OPEC)

ii)                  Non-hegemonic world structure of conflicting power centers (neo-mercantilist coalitions…)

“more remotely possible outcome” (150): Development of a counter-hegemony based on a Third World coalition against core country dominance…

 

 

Overall,

*an attempt to sketch a method for understanding global power relations

*Cox’s critical international theory = a social approach; historicist mode of understanding world order (influenced by Vico, Gramsci, and Braudel); international system must consider the social and historical construction of both agents and structures that underlie economic and political interaction.

*theories are for someone and for some purpose. Therefore if the structures of the time changes, then the ideas and values change. Unlike the realist view on what they call fundamentals, Cox’s view is transformative. *Realism in this sense is a mere reflection of the current hegemon and 지배계급, which can be used to as a tool to maintain the status-quo power structure.

*Brief sketch of Neo-Marxist Approach to IR

 

Rather than problem-solving preoccupation with the maintenance of social power relationships, a critical theory of hegemony directs attention to questioning the prevailing order of the world. It ‘does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing” (p. 129) Thus, it is specifically critical in the sense of asking how existing social or world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order. As such, a critical theory develops a dialectical theory of history concerned not just with the past but with a continual process of historical change and with exploring the potential for alternative forms of development. Cox’s critical theory of hegemony thus focuses on interaction between particular processes, notably springing from the dialectical possibilities of change within the sphere of production and the exploitative character of social relations, not as unchanging ahistorical essences but as a continuing creation of new forms.[4]

 

 

 



[1] Structural Marxism

[2] (1936-79) Greek neo-Marxist – the concept of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the capitalist state –the ‘structural position’ of the state – the status of state as a servant of capitalism <Political Power and Social Classes> (1968) - despite its formal separation from the institutions of economic production, the state promotes accumulation by maintaining the cohesion of capitalist society and its characteristic class system. Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/nicos-poulantzas#ixzz3AEuQOSDu

[3] Theory of “cognitive interests”- all knowledge is constituted through one of the three generic domains of human interest: 1) technical knowledge (scientific research domains); 2) practical knowledge (social interaction realm – historical-hermeneutic disciplines); 3) Emancipatory knowledge (self-knowledge, self refelction)

[4] Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton “A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations,” Capital & Class, Vol. 82, pp. 85-114.

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[IR-Anarchy and Cooperation] Bull, Hedley (1966) “Society and Anarchy in International Relations”

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 8. 09:27

Bull, Hedley (1966) “Society and Anarchy in International Relations,” in Butterfield, Herbert and Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, Harvard University Press.

Table of Contents(Whole Book)

 

Preface

1.       Why is there no International Theory?  - M. Wight

2.       Society and Anarchy in International Relations – H. Bull

3.       The Grotian Conception of International Society – H. Bull

4.       Natural Law – D. Mackinnon

5.       Western Values in International Relations – M. Wight

6.       The Balance of Power – H. Butterfield

7.       The Balance of Power – M. Wight

8.       Collective Security and Military Alliances – G. F. Hudson

9.       The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy – H. Butterfield

10.    War as an Instrument of Policy – M. Howard

11.    Threats of Force in International Relations – G. F. Hudson

12.    Problems of a Disarmed World – M. Howard

 

Chapter 2. Society and Anarchy in International Relations (Hedley Bull)

Presence of advocacy for the establishment of a world government

-           The League of Nations and the United Nations: not a diplomatic machinery in the tradition of the Concert of Europe, but as first steps towards “a world state.” (p. 36)

-           *In anarchy:

Ø  “states do not form together any kind of society; and that if they were to do so it could only be by subordinating themselves to a common authority” (p. 35).

Ø  Domestic analogy: as an individual man in a society, the states “require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale” (p. 35).

 

*Two main purposes of the paper:

1)        to examine the opinion that “anarchy in international relations is incompatible with society, or that the progress of the latter has been, or necessarily will be, a matter of the degree to which government comes to prevail.” (p. 35)

2)        to determine “the limits of the domestic analogy and thus establish the autonomy of international relations” (p. 35-36)

 

*Anarchy’s incompatibility with society (3 Main Strands)

- especially prominent in the years since the WWI (19th century saw it compatible)

- even a strong voice that rejects the notion of anarchy itself – moving towards a world government, in their view.

 

1)       International relations in terms of a Hobbessian state of nature

-           Morality and legal rules are limited (Machiavellian)

-           Moral imperatives to endorse the self-assertion of states in relation to one another (Hegelian)

-           Social life “asserted to be the same for states as they are for individuals” (p. 38)

-           Domestic analogy that men needs government does not go further in this school – social contract of states that could end anarchy is not discussed

2)       1) + demand that “the international anarchy be brought to an end” (towards a universal state)

-           Embracing the idea of social contract, search for an alternative to international anarchy (backward-looking to Roman or to Western Christendom

-           Kant’s belief in human progress.

3)       Creating society of sovereign states (BULL) = anarchy is compatible with society

-           Cooperation among sovereign states in a society without government

-           Instead of the Hobbesian view that moral and legal rules are limited and the Kantian view that we need to progress for a higher morality, duties and rights are asserted to be attached to the members of international society.

-           Two traditions in particular: Modern international law and the balance of power system analysis (converged since 18th century)

 

II. (Hobbesian state of nature)

 

Hobbes’ quote:

“But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiator; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons and Guns, upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continual Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war.”[1]

 

Hobbes’ Anarchy (war against all; absence of international society) - Three principal characteristics, which in turn disputed/negated by theorists of international society:

1)       There can be no interactions (“no industry, agriculture, navigation, trade or other refinements of living, because the strength and invention of men is absorbed in providing security against one another”) p. 40-41

2)       There are no legal or moral rules

3)       State of nature is a state of war: ‘such a warre, as is of every man, against every man’[2]

-           Presence of war -> the idea that “states do not form a society” (p. 42)

Ø  (disputed) in relevance of modern state: “If sovereign states are understood to form a society… whose operation not merely tolerates certain private uses of force but actually requires them – then the fact of a disposition to war can no longer be regarded as evidence that international society does not exist.” “war… as a part of its functioning” – “international society [as]… a means of settling political conflicts” (p. 43).

 

Criticism: “distils certain qualities that are present in the situation of international anarchy at all times and in all places and that in certain areas and at certain moments seem to drive all other qualities away.”

 

Alternative:

Ø  Locke’s conception of a society without government (private use of force tolerated and even required in certain circumstances)

Ø  Turn to modern anthropological studies of actual societies of this kind, which have been ‘forced to consider what, in the absence of explicit forms of government, could be held to constitute the political structure of people.’”(p. 44):

- principle of ‘hue and cry’

- ritual

- loyalty

 

ð  Yet, “at some point abandon the domestic analogy altogether” (p. 45) to deepen the subject matter and “also because international society is unique, and owes its character to qualities that are peculiar to the situation of sovereign states, as well as those it has in common with the lives of individuals in domestic society.” (p. 45)

 

Main differences between international society and domestic analogy:

 

1) international anarchy, unlike Hobbes’ view, provides “conditions in which the refinements of life can flourish” (p. 45)

2) “states have been less vulnerable to violent attack by one another than individual men” (p. 46) – reinforced by 3)

3) states have not been equally vulnerable

- distinctions between Great Powers and small, e.g. Great Britain in 19th century – “insecurity… exists in international society… not distributed equally among all its members” (p. 46)

4) “states in their economic lives enjoy a degree of self-sufficiency beyond comparison with that of individual men” (p. 47)

 

Overall,

“As against the Hobbesian view that states find themselves in a state of nature which is a state of war, it may be argued, therefore, that they constitute a society without a government. This society may be compared with the anarchical society among individual men of Locke’s imagining, and also with primitive anarchical societies that have been studied by anthropologists. But although we may employ such analogies, we must in the end abandon them, for the fact that states form a society without a government reflects also the features of their situation that are unique. The working of international society must be understood in terms of its own, distinctive institutions. These include international law, diplomacy and the system of balance of power” (p. 48)

 

 

III. (Universal State (System) or Society?)

 

*Criticism on Kant in Perpetual Peace:

Hobbesian domestic analogy to IR and the state of nature + the idea of social contract

Ø  Criticism: This is a “dilemma” as “the description… of the actual condition of international relations, and the prescription in provides for its improvement, are inconsistent with one another.” (p. 48)

Ø  Thus, the advocate of a universal state: Kant’s scheme is “feasible as well as desirable only by admitting that international relations do not resemble a Hobbesian state of nature.” (p. 49)

Ø  Solution may be to replace Hobbesian view with Lockean one => “to crown the anarchical society with a government” (p. 49)…

 

However, the limits of such universal state:

Ø  Limited role of universal state: “a universal state should be understood as providing, just as does the system of sovereign states, a particular solution to the problem of the management of violence, rather than a means of transcending it” (a universal state does not abolish war completely by eliminating the relationship between sovereign states) (p. 49)

Ø  International society rather than international system (universal state): “Formidable though the classic dangers are of a plurality of sovereign states, these have to be reckoned against those inherent in the attempt to contain disparate communities within the framework of a single government. It is an entirely reasonable view of world order at the present time that it is best served by living with the former dangers rather than by attempting to face the latter.” (p. 50)

 

Overall, Bull rejects here the Hobbesian view of international relations as a state of war, by using Hobbes's own arguments, so as to explain why the Hobbesian nature of state is different from/more bearable among nations than the perpetual struggle among individuals, and therefore why a universal state (Leviathan)/world government is not necessary nor desirable.

 

*

*Hedley Bull's Originality:

1) International society rather than system:

> System as contract between states and the impact of one state on another

> Society as common interests and values, common rules and institutions (Grotian approach)

     - Grotian conception of international society (the central Grotian assumption = solidarity of states in international      
         society, with respect to the enforcement of the law) – the solidarist conception, opposed to pluralists (Chp. 3)

 

2) His theory of change (emanating from 1))

Interested in society, Bull is interested in cultural change that causes a different perception of common interests

(Unlike Gilpin: change in international affairs as the rise and fall of hegemonic powers; Waltz: change as the result of shifts in the distribution of power between states, leading from a bipolar to a multipolar system, or vice versa).

 

ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (anarchy as absence of rule)

ð  Criticisms: Tension between his realisms and emphasis on the rules and institutions (also the community of culture) which are to dampen the anarchy.

 



[1] Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. Xiii, p. 65

[2] Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. Xiii, p. 66


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[IR-Anarchy and Cooperation] Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 7. 14:47

Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation 관련 유용.



The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition

저자
Axelrod, Robert 지음
출판사
Basic Books | 2006-12-04 출간
카테고리
과학/기술
책소개
Updated for the first time, the cla...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  

 

ü  Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, chs. 2 & 9

 


Review:

Axelrod’s experiment is a profound work in the application of game theory to political science, shedding new lights to how states can cooperate in the neorealist setting. Based on the use of theory, computer simulation, and historical examples, Axelrod argues here for the possibility of cooperative strategies in the world of perpetual rivalry (anarchy). Unlike the realist tenet that power maximization - zero-sum game (at the expense of others) is the best way of survival, Axelrod’s notion of reiterated interactions (reiterated prisoner’s dilemma) enlightens how states’ encounters are rarely one-time based in reality, how they are able to learn the consequences of their strategies in long term (shadow of future), which in turn create the incentives for egoist actors to cooperate rather than defect despite the absence of any central authority. Following Axelrod’s logic/perspective of the world where actors interact in multiple times, a system of reciprocity becomes a possible cooperative solution: Viewed in this way – reiterated games – evolution of cooperation is viable among these rational egoist states as “The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of relationship... Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other (p. 182).” Furthermore, “The individuals do not have to be rational: the evolutionary process allows the successful strategies to thrive, even if the players do not know why or how (p. 174)”; “Likewise, there is no need to assume trust between the players: the use of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive. Altruism is not needed: successful strategies can elicit cooperation even from an egoist. Finally, no central authority is needed: cooperation based on reciprocity can be self-policing (p. 175).”

As a sidenote, Axelrod’s discovery of reiterated game (shadow of future – anticipation of continued interaction, that states’ encounters are not one-time based) counters Mearsheimer’s central argument (offensive realism) that states possess the incentives to use offensive strategies to maximize their rate of survival. Instead, Axelrod’s notion on “limited provocability” is in agreement with Waltz’s proposal of the defensive realist theory, that it is “actually better to respond quickly to a provocation” but not defect first (TIT FOR TAT strategy).

Overall, Axelrod’s work is a highly honorable approach to social science, in which he devotes to go beyond mere explanation of the world and create a system where cooperation and peace become possibility (solution-oriented approach) – a respectable question, experiment, and creativity on how to promote cooperation and avoid a Hobbesian war of all against all.

 

Yet, some criticisms:

-    Applicability to real world – Prisoner’s dilemma with non-interruptable communication: unlike the designed setting of the game, the real world involves multiple channels of communication among the two parties(states). Also, the real world prospect of cooperation depends not only on the pairs of cooperation but also on multiple parties and overlapping pairs of relationships (Games).

-    Individual game to collective game decreases the solidity of Axelrod’s results

-    Additionally, some scholars have questioned Axelrod’s use of WWI trench example…

-    Note on the possibility of misperception: TIT FOR TAT proved to be the best rule, although “it got into a lot of trouble when a single misunderstanding led to a long echo of alternating retaliations, it could often end the echo with another misperception” (p. 183) -> In reality, states’ dislike or fear of the costs of trials-and-errors are in many cases insurmountable and/or detrimental – can states afford to practice?

-     Implications are in no doubt strong, but implementation prospect should be less optimistic than how Axelrod describes.

 

Table of Contents (Axelrod)

Preface

PART I. Introduction

1.       The Problem of Cooperation

PART II. The Emergence of Cooperation

2.       The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments

3.       The Chronology of Cooperation

PART III. Cooperation Without Friendship of Foresight

4.       The Live-and-Let-Live System in Trench Warfare in World War I

5.       The Evolution of Cooperation in Biological Systems (with William D. Hamilton)

PART IV. Advice for Participants and Reformers

6.       How to Choose Effectively

7.       How to Promote Cooperation

PART V. Conclusions

8.       The Social Structure of Cooperation

9.       The Robustness of Reciprocity

APPENDIX A

Tournament Results

APPENDIX B

Proofs of the Theoretical Propositions

Notes

Bibliography

Index

 

Essense:

-          Problem: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma = both mutual gains from cooperation and also exploitation are possible.

-          To find the best strategy: A computer simulation - Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament (1st round: invited game theorists in economics, psychology, sociology, political science, and mathematics for entries -14 entries in total)

-          Best strategy: TIT FOR TAT – “merely the strategy of starting with cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move” (preface p. viii)

-          2nd round of computer hobbyists and other professors in evolutionary biology, physics, and computer science, in addition to the fields in the 1st round, again proved TIT FOR TAT as the best strategy (RECIPROCITY)

-          Results extended to the question of fostering cooperative conditions among individuals, organizations, and nations… 3 part MAIN Arguments:

1)       TIT FOR TAT is the effective strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma (begin by cooperation then do what your opponent did in the previous step)

2)       This strategy as the best strategy in important real-life settings (WWI trench example- start by cooperating and this continues)

3)       Evolutionary: this strategy is natural and hence expect this to prevail in nature

-          Evolutionary Perspective on cooperation (reiteration, shadow of future, tit for tat): Unlike the common one-time play of the prisoner’s dilemma of the time, Axelrod’s reiterated version showcased how straightforward cooperation can outcompete the benefits of defection.


Summary

Chapter 1. The Problem of Cooperation

*Main Question:

“Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?”

Ø  “a world of egoists”: state as the actor, selfish (Hobbes, Morgenthau)

Ø  “without central authority”: anarchy (structural condition – Waltz)

= A question for cooperation in the neorealist setting of the world

=Solution: design a system of cooperation (tit-for-tat – reiterated games) = Neoliberal Institutionalism.

 

“The approach of this book is to investigate how individuals pursuing their own interests will act, followed by an analysis of what effects this will have for the system as a whole. Put another way, the approach is to make some assumptions about individual motives and then deduce consequences for the behavior of the entire system” (p. 6) 

“to develop a theory of cooperation that can be used to discover what is necessary for cooperation to emerge” (p. 6)

*Chapter devoted to introduction and discussion on the original Prisoner’s Dilemma

“What is best depends in part on what the other player is likely to be doing. Further, what the other is likely to be doing may well depend on what the player expects you to do” (Chapter II. p. 27) - *Both parties end up in a mutually despised outcome but cannot commit to the better result due to their selfish individual incentives.

 

Chapter 2. The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments

*Limitations of previous literatures on Prisoner’s Dilemma:

1)       Do not reveal very much “about how to play the game well” (p. 29)

2)       Mostly one-time, first-time played game analysis

3)       “All together, no more than a few dozen choices” have been analyzed… (p. 29)

4)       Even the ones that focus on “strategic interaction” are limited, studying the dilemma that is “designed to eliminate the dilemma itself by introducing changes in the game” (p. 29)

 

*New experiment needed = a computer tournament among game theorists in the above mentioned five disciplines (1st round)

- New setting (non-zero-sum setting) should account for the “Two important facts about non-zero-sum settings” (p. 30)

Ø  Information on other’s strategies - “what is effective depends not only upon the characteristics of a particular strategy, but also upon the nature of the other strategies with which it must interact” (p. 30)

Ø  Information on the history – “An effective strategy must be able at any point to take into account the history of the interaction as it has developed so far.” (p. 30)

 

*New Experiment:

-          Round robin tournament (each entry paired with each other entry) + RANDOM (a program that randomly cooperates and defects with equal probability)

-          Each game: 200 moves

-          Mutual cooperation: 3 points for both players

-          Mutual defection: 1 point for both players

-          One defect, the other cooperate: defector 5 points, cooperator 0 points

-          Overall, benchmark for good performance is 600 points (always cooperating) and very poor performance at 200 points (always defecting)

-          Result: TIT FOR TAT, submitted by Professor Anatol Rapoport (Univ. Toronto) won – “playing what the other player did on the previous move” (p. 31)

 

*Important Findings:

 

-          The value of cooperating first: all of the eight top-ranking entries were “nice”; that is, they never defected first, at least not until near the end of the game. The “meanies,” which tried to take advantage of the programs that cooperated, often by clever and devious methods, were defeated by a wide margin.

-          The value of forgiving: “One of the main reasons why the rules that are not nice did not do well in the tournament is that most of the rules in the tournament were not very forgiving.”

-          The long-term danger of defection (“echo effect”): “A major lesson of this tournament is the importance of minimizing echo effects in an environment of mutual power. When a single defection can set off a long string of recriminations and counterrecriminations, both sides suffer.” (p. 38)

 

*Interesting strategies:

 

1)       DOWNING – “outcome maximization” principle – deliberating to attempt to understand the other player and then make a choice (probability of other player cooperating after one cooperates and probability of other player cooperating after one defects – each move “updating the estimate of these two conditional probabilities and then selects the choice which will maximize its own long-term payoff”) (p. 34)

Ø  Yet doomed to defect on the first two moves for the deliberation process…

 

2)       FRIEDMAN – lowest scored, least forgiving – “unforgiving rule that employs permanent retaliation. It is never the first to defect, but once the other defects even once, FRIEDMAN defects from then on.” (unlike TIT FOR TAT which “lets bygones be bygones” (p. 36)

 

3)       JOSS – “a sneaky rule that tries to get away with an occasional defection… it always defects immediately after the other player cooperates. But instead of always cooperating after the other player cooperates, 10 percent of the time it defects after the other player cooperates. Thus it tries to sneak in an occasional exploitation of the other player” (p. 36)

 

*2nd round (62 entries), many attempted to develop a better and more complex program – yet the original simple TIT FOR TAT still proved to be the best.

 

*Better Rules do Exist:

Ø  TIT FOR TWO TATS rule: defecting only if the other player defected on the previous two moves -> against our common perception, more gains were made from being even more forgiving (p. 39)

Ø  LOOK AHEAD

Ø  Slight modification of DOWNING (now assuming that other players would be responsive rather than unresponsive)

 

*Three levels of analysis on choice:

1)       First level = analysis of the direct effect of a choice

2)       Second level = analysis of the indirect effects

3)       Third level = Tertiary effects… 부메랑 에펙트와 유사… (“echo effects”)


Overall,
Axelrod draws significant conclusions on the prospect for cooperation: “Mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central control by starting with a cluster of individuals who rely on reciprocity.” Furthermore, considering the overall success of TIT FOR TAT, the value of being “nice” and “forgiving” must be noted. Yet, it is also noted that too forgiving strategies (TIT FOR TWO TATS), not retaliating immediately, are unable to survive the game.

 

Chapter 9. The Robustness of Reciprocity

Main Concluding Remarks: The value of reciprocity in the prospect of cooperation

 

*Value of a system, institution that fosters reciprocity:

“The main results of Cooperation Theory are encouraging. They show that cooperation can get started by even a small cluster of individuals who are prepared to reciprocate cooperation, even in a world where no one else will cooperate. The analysis also shows that the two key requisites for cooperation to thrive are that the cooperation be based on reciprocity, and that the shadow of future is important enough to make this reciprocity stable. But once cooperation based on reciprocity is established in a population, it can protect itself from invasion by uncooperative strategies” (p. 173)

 

*Only required info:

1) History of interactions

2) Information on others’ strategies (shadow of the future deliberation)

 

But what is most interesting is how little had to be assumed about the individuals or the social setting to establish these results. The individuals do not have to be rational: the evolutionary process allows the successful strategies to thrive, even if the players do not know why or how. Nor do the players have to exchange messages or commitments (p. 174)… Likewise, there is no need to assume trust between the players: the use of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive. Altruism is not needed: successful strategies can elicit cooperation even from an egoist. Finally, no central authority is needed: cooperation based on reciprocity can be self-policing. (p. 175)”

 

*Overall Cooperation Solution: Institution based on the norm of reciprocity:

-           Examples:

Ø  Diamond markets (“The key factor is that the participants know they will be dealing with each other again and again” p.178)

Ø  Ordinary business transactions (“based upon the idea that a continuing relationship allows cooperation to develop” p. 178)

 

-           “The importance of future interactions can provide a guide to the design of institutions. To help promote cooperation among members of an organization, relationships should be structured so that there are frequent and durable interactions among specific individuals.” (p. 180)

-           “The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of relationship. When the conditions are right, the players can come to cooperate with each other through trial-and-error learning about possibilities for mutual rewards, through imitation of other successful players, or even through a blind process of selection of the more successful strategies with a weeding out of the less successful ones. Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other” (p. 182).

 

*Note on the possibility of misperception: Still, TIT FOR TAT proved to be the best rule, although “it got into a lot of trouble when a single misunderstanding led to a long echo of alternating retaliations, it could often end the echo with another misperception” (p. 183)

 

*Note on “limited provocability” and the “speed of response”

(in line with Waltz’s defensive realism):

-           “one of my biggest surprises in working on this project” (p. 184)

-           “one should be slow to anger” – the results demonstrate that “it is actually better to respond quickly to a provocation. It turns out that if one waits to respond to (p. 184) uncalled for defections, there is a risk of sending the wrong signal. The longer defections are allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it is that the other player will draw the conclusion that defection can pay. And the more strongly this pattern is established, the harder it will be to break it… By responding right away, it gives the quickest possible feedback that a defection will not pay.” (p. 185)

-           yet, the danger of provocability – echo effect and the continuation of the conflict

ð  “Limited provocability is a useful feature of a strategy designed to achieve stable cooperation (p. 187)”

 

“It is precisely when this anticipation of future interaction, breaks down that an external authority is invoked.” (p. 179)

 

*As concluding remark, Axelrod admits the slow and painful process of instilling reciprocity in the international system:

“The core of the problem of how to achieve rewards from cooperation is that trial and error in learning is slow and painful. The conditions may all be favorable for long-run developments, but we may not have the time to wait for blind processes to move us slowly toward mutually rewarding strategies based upon reciprocity. Perhaps if we understand the process better, we can use our foresight to speed up the evolution of cooperation” (p. 191)


 


 

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[IR-Theories Evidences Inferences] Fearon, James (1991) “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science”

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 15. 18:32

Fearon, James (1991) “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, Vol. 43, January 1991, pp. 169-195.

In making a causal claim, that C was the cause of event E, Fearon suggests here that there are two empirical strategies: by making 1) a counterfactual case (~ if it had not been the case that C (or not C), it would have been the case that E (or not E); or 2) a comparative approach (comparison of actual cases). While counterfactual case remains underdeveloped and underacknowledged in political science (for its “speculative” approach), Fearon argues that many overlook the fact that the comparison of actual cases also requires counterfactual thoughts for serious justification and elaboration of causal claims: Even if comparison of actual cases provides us the existing samples to compare and therefore the seemingly more degree of references (evidences and therefore confidence), the process also requires counterfactual process in picking the right variables and justifying that these cases are appropriately comparable/identical… and this is more so in small-N research where there are too many variables and too few cases.


NOTE

Counterfactuals: If not C, then not E

(“If it had been the case that C(or not C), it would have been the case that E(or not E).”(169).

Fearon: such propositions “play a necessary and fundamental, if often implicit and underdeveloped, role in the efforts of political scientists to assess their hypotheses about the causes of the phenomena they study” (169)

Focus on “the role of counterfactuals in small-N research” (174) – “the necessity of counterfactual argument for justifying causal claims in small-N settings… the point is that when degrees of freedom in the actual world are negative, a causal claim requires argument about counterfactual cases for its justification (or addition of other actual cases).” (180)

 

Main arguments:

1)      Counterfactual propositions and arguments play “a central role in the efforts of political scientists to assess their causal hypotheses” (170) – examples: i) on the causes of WWI; ii) the nonoccurrence of events such as WWIII, social revolutions, the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America; and iii) the origin of fascist and corporatist regimes in Latin America

2)      Counterfactual method vs. Comparison of the actual cases: This strategy is “related but also differs from methods of hypothesis testing based on the comparison of the actual cases”(170)

3)      To address the question: “Is counterfactual argument a viable means of assessing causal hypotheses in nonexperimental research settings?”(170)

 

Structure:

1)      Section I: Outlining the differences between the two strategies of hypothesis testing: i) comparison of actual cases; and ii) counterfactual argument

2)      Section II: Showing examples of counterfactual cases in international relations and comparative politics

3)      Section III: Questioning the viability of the counterfactual strategy

 

Counterfactuals, Actual Case Comparisons, and the Logic of Inference

>Hypothesis: C was the cause of event E<

ð  To test this hypothesis, according to Fearon, there are “only two strategies” for “empirically”(171) assessing this hypothesis, which aim to “solve the same statistical problem” (173).

1)      Counterfactual case: Imagine C had been absent and ask whether E would have been possible…

2)      Comparison of actual cases: that resemble E but where C is sometimes absent or had different value =  testing the association between the occurrence of C & E in the set of actual cases = formally known as the regression analysis

ð  Also, we cannot but explain why some event E occurred rather than some other possible outcomes.

Note on the main risks with these strategies:

1)      Counterfactual case: “how can we know what would have happened with any degree of confidence?”(173) – a question avoided by many historians (“historian should never deal in speculations”) and also political scientists and sociologists who preferred to deal with actual cases and refrain from the question

-          Exception:

n  Weber (1949) “Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation,” in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Free Press

n  Elster (1978) Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds, Wiley.

n  Also addressed: Nelson Polsby (1982) What If?: Essays in Social Science Fiction, Lewis Publishing.  

2)      Comparison of actual cases: Even if the degrees of freedom have been increased (including more actual cases), how can we know “if the additional cases are appropriately identical”(173).

 

Case application:

1)      The Cause of WWI: by a “cult of the offensive” and belief in the advantage of striking first:

-          Actual cases comparison: set of international disputes that some escalated to war and some that did not => variables control => test for the association between “commitment to offensive doctrines and escalation”(176)

-          Counterfactual case strategy: “which often goes under the name “case study””(177) – “imagine the prewar world without a cult of the offensive but otherwise similar” (177) -> and show that “the outbreak of a general war would have been much less likely” in this counterfactual case – e.g. Stephen Van Evera who asked “How would statesmen have behaved if they had believed that defense rather than offense had the advantage?” (177)

 

Differences yet Similarities between the Two Strategies:

1)      Difference – dependence on other theories:

-          Counterfactual, to make its case, depends on “invoking others – laws, regularities, or principles” (177) as in Van Evera’s dependence on rationality

-          Actual case strategy – no need of “other principles,” “only a strength of association across actual cases matters” (177)

2)      Similarity: actual case strategy itself implicitly depends on counterfactuals to be confident that “the other causes would not vary” as well…

-          “when the actual case strategy is employed in a nonexperimental setting, the validity of a causal interpretation of the results in contingent on the truth of a counterfactual assumption about the other unspecified, unmeasured causes. We must be ready to accept the proposition that had variable X taken values different from those in the sample, no such other causes of the dependent variable would have been systematically different as well” (177)

3)      More differences:

-          Causal weight: actual cases can extract contrasting weights from the sample (frequencies and magnitudes can be measured); whereas counterfactuals lack in the sample for varying weight -> inevitably, “a proliferation of counterfactual cases”

-          Precision of estimates: Counterfactuals lack in criterion for gauging the risk of error associated with some independent variable. All depends on the plausibility of arguments about what would have happened.

 

Counterfactuals and Causation

 

Conclusion

“Counterfactuals and the counterfactual strategy of hypothesis testing play an important but often unacknowledged and underdeveloped role in the efforts of political scientists to assess causal hypotheses… any non experimental research that makes causal claims, be it of the large-N or small-N variety, must confront counterfactuals in the form of key assumptions or in the use of hypothetical comparison cases. Particularly in small-N research, the common condition of too many variables and too few cases makes counterfactual thought experiments a necessary means for serious justification of causal claims.” (p. 194)

 

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[IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1954) Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 10. 18:23

(INCOMPLETE) 

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Man, the State, and War

저자
Waltz, Kenneth N. 지음
출판사
Columbia University Press | 2001-01-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
-- American Political Science Revie...
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Kenneth N. Waltz

Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis

New York, Columbia University Press, 1954 (1959 edition)


RQ: Where are the major causes of war to be found?

-          3 Levels:

1)      “within man” (p. 12) – the first image

2)      “within the structure of the separate states” (p. 12) – the second image

3)      “within the state system” (p. 12) – the third image

-          “Within each image there are optimists and pessimists agreeing on definitions of causes and differing on what, if anything, can be done about them (p. 19)”


Chapter I. Introduction

 

1.      Fleeting moments of Peace

“fleeting moments of peace among states. There is an apparent disproportion between effort and product, between desire and result.” (p. 1)

 

“Can we have peace more often in the future than in the past?” (p. 1)

 

2.      Human nature?

Human Nature as Evil

“Our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war…”

St. Augustine, Luther, Malthus, Swift, Inge, and Niebuhr…

“In secular terms, with men defined as beings of intermixed reason and passion in whom passion repeatedly triumphs, the belief has informed the philosophy, including the political philosophy…(p. 3)”

 

Yet, “Does man make society in his image or does his society make him?” (p. 4)

-          Rousseau = society makes man:

Ø  “man being a social animal, one can explain his behavior in society by pointing to his animal passion and/or his human reason. Man is born and in his natural condition remains neither good nor bad. It is society that is the degrading force in men’s lives, but it is the moralizing agency as well,” although unwilling to surrender on the latter and “lamented the advent of society” (p. 3-4, Waltz)

Ø  Like Plato, “believes that a bad polity makes men bad, and a good polity makes them good” (Waltz, p. 4)

-          Thomas Malthus = man makes society

Ø  “though human institutions appear to be the obvious and obtrusive causes of much mischief to mankind; yet in reality, they are light and superficial, they are mere feathers that float on the surface, in comparison with those deeper seated causes of impurity that corrupt the springs, and render turbid the whole stream of human life”[1]

 

3.      System (Structure)

-          Origins – Rousseau, who found that the major causes of war neither in men nor states but in the state system itself – one man cannot begin to behave unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him (“The State of War” Essay) => basis for balance of power approaches to IR.

 

“Aggressive tendencies may be inherent, but is there misdirection inevitable? War begins in the minds and emotions of men, as all acts do; but can minds and feelings be changed?” (p. 9)

 

 

Chapter II. The First Image: International Conflict and Human Behavior

- by reviewing the below four figures’ works…

 

*First image of IR: “causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity. Other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors. If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social re-adjustment. This estimate of causes and cures has been dominant in the writings of many serious students of human affairs from Confucius to present-day pacifists. It is the leitmotif of many modern behavioral scientists as well” (p. 16)

 

*Pessimists (Niebuhr, St. Augustine, Spinoza, Morgenthau)

-          Reinhold Niebuhr[2]:

Ø  “potentiality of evil in all human acts”, in every progress, there is the “potentiality of evil as well as of good” (p. 21, Waltz) – progress causing harm to the other…

Ø  “Man, a self-conscious being, senses his limits. They are inherent. Equally inherent is his desire to overcome them. Man is a finite being with infinite aspirations, a pigmy who thinks himself a giant. .. he is born and reared in insecurity and seeks to make himself absolutely secure; he is a man but thinks himself a god. The seat of evil is the self, and the quality of evil can be defined in terms of pride.” (p. 21, Waltz)

Ø  Niebuhr’s thoughts dates back to the Christian tradition – St. Augustine, and also to the philosophy of Spinoza, and then also in Morgenthau’s (20th century)

 

-          “These four writers, despite their numerous differences unite in basing their political conclusions upon an assumed nature of man” (p. 21)

-          St. Augustine[3]: the desire for self-preservation in the hierarchy of human motivations is “an observed fact” (p. 22)

Ø  “original sin” (p. 23) “Human reason and will are both defective” (“Each man does seek his own interest, but, unfortunately, not according to the dictates of reason”, (p. 23))

-          Spinoza: “the end of every act is the self-preservation of the actor” (p. 22)

Ø  “Reason can moderate the passions, but this is so difficult that those who think that men” (Waltz, p. 24) “can ever be induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.”[4]

-          Key similarities:

Ø  Niebuhr: War has its origin in “dark, unconscious source in the human psyche”[5] (p. 25)

Ø  Morgenthau: “the ubiquity of evil in human action” arising from man’s ineradicable lust for power and transforming “churches into political organizations… revolutions into dictatorships… love for country into imperialism.”[6]

Ø  St. Augustine: man’s “love of so many vain and hurtful things” a long list of human tribulations, ranging from quarrels.. wars[7]

Ø  Spinoza: although states are not never honorable but peaceful, passion often obscures the true interests of states as of men.

 

-          Important distinction here:

Ø  “Spinoza’s explanation of political and social ills is based on the conflict he detects between reason and passion.” (p. 24)

Ø  “St. Augustine, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau reject the dualism explicit in Spinoza’s thought: the whole man, his mind and his body, are, according to them, defective.” (p. 24)

 

*Optimists:

-          See a possibility of turning the wicked into the good and ending the wars that result from present balance-of-power politics.

 

*Critical Evaluation on attributing “political ills to a fixed nature of man” (p. 27)

- recurrent theme in Augustine, Spinoza, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau (that the nature of man has an inherent potentiality for evil as well as for good.

 

-          Evaluation: Incomplete… Hard to prove

Ø  “It is a statement that evidence cannot prove or disprove, for what we make of the evidence depends on the theory we hold.” (p. 28)

Ø  “To attempt to explain social forms on the basis of psychological data is to commit the error of psychologism: the analysis of individual behavior used uncritically to explain group phenomena” (p. 28)

Ø  Emile Durkheim: “the psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of social phenomena. Since it does not call for one social form rather than another, it cannot explain any of them”[8]

Ø  “Human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910. In the intervening years many things changed, but human nature did not” (p. 28)

Ø  “If human nature is the cause of war and if, as in the systems of the first-image pessimists, human nature is fixed, then we can never hope for peace. If human nature is but one of the causes of war, then, even on the assumption that human nature is fixed, we can properly carry on a search for the conditions of peace.” (p. 30)

Ø  Overall, both Durkheim and the pessimists(realists) such as Niebuhr and Augustine are half correct: “Human nature may not explain why in one state man is enslaved and in another comparatively free, why in one year there is war, in another comparative peace. It can, however, explain the necessary imperfections of all social and political forms” (p. 30)

 

* Pessimists vs. Optimists (Realists vs. Utopians)

 

*Conclusion:

> “The evilness of men, or their improper behavior, leads to war; individual goodness, if it could be universalized, would mean peace: this is a summary statement of the first image”

> “What first-image analysts, optimists and pessimists alike have done is: (1) to notice conflict, (2) to ask themselves why conflict occurs, and (3) to pin the blame on one or a small number of behavior traits” (p. 39)

> “The assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood, itself helps to shift attention away from human-nature – because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot be changed, whereas social-political institutions can be.” (p. 41)

 


Chapter III. Some Implications of the First Image: The Behavioral Sciences and the Reduction of Interstate Violence

 

“Nevertheless one can distinguish several different approaches within the behavioral sciences. It is widely held that increased understanding among peoples means increased peace.”

 

*Society as the patient.

 

*Lawrence Frank’s logic: War is a social institution, not a necessary product of man’s nature. This is proved by the fact that in some societies war is unknown. Since institutions are social inventions, if we want to get rid of one institution, we must invent another to take its place.[9] People engage in duels only so long as the custom of dueling exists in their society…. Warfare, like the duel and trial by combat, “is just an invention known to the majority of human societies by which they permit their young men either to accumulate prestige or avenge their honor.”[10]

 

*”considering a quality shared by pacifists and many behavioral scientists suggests the more general point that in the absence of an elaborated theory of international politics the causes one finds and the remedies one proposes are often more closely related to temper and training than to the objects and events of the world about us. The pacifist’s appeal, like that of Alexander Leighton, is for treatment of the deep-seated causes of war. The one approaches this from the realm of spirit, the other with the techniques of psychiatry. The pacifist waits and quietly hopes that men will behave as God intended they should,..” (p. 77)

 


Chapter IV. The Second Image: International Conflict and the Internal Structure of States

 

*First image imagery:

> “pot boils when we mean the water in it boils (p. 80)”

*The second image imagery:

> water from the “faucet is chemically the same as water in a container, but once the water is in a container, it can be made to “behave” in different ways… (p. 80)”

 

*Second Image: “the idea that defects in states cause wars among them” (p. 83)

 

*What is the definition of the “good” state?

> Karl Marx: in terms of ownership of the means of production

> Immanuel Kant: in terms of abstract principles of right

>Woodrow Wilson: in terms of national self-determination and modern democracy

=> Reforms as the sine qua non of world peace.

 

*Domestic Politics: Liberal View

-What makes it run smoothly? = Utilitarian-liberalists: liberty, small government (Decentralization), economy(laissez-faire)

> Adam Smith (market mechanism, unnatural inequalities = caused by governmental interference)

> Ricardo

>John Stuart Mill

>Jeremy Bentham

 

Yet… “The liberals’ insistence on economy, decentralization, and freedom from governmental regulation makes sense only if their assumption that society is self-regulating is valid. Because a self-regulating society is a necessary means, in effect it becomes part of the liberals’ ideal end. If a laissez-faire policy is possible only on the basis of conditions described as necessary, the laissez-faire ideal may itself require state action.” (p. 95)

 

*International Relations: Liberal View

 

 

Chapter V. Some Implications of the Second Image: International Socialism and the Coming of the First World War

 

Is it capitalism, or states, or both that must be abolished?

 

 

 

Chapter VI. The Third Image: International Conflict and International Anarchy

 

“everyone’s policy depends upon everyone else’s(p. 226)” – the third image - “there is a constant possibility of war in a world in which there are two or more states each seeking to promote a set of interests and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for protection (227)”

 

“The state of nature among men is a monstrous impossibility. Anarchy breeds war among them; government establishes the conditions for peace...” (p. 227)

 

“In each image a cause is identified in terms of which all others are to be understood.” (p. 228)



[1] Malthus, Thomas (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population, pp. 47-48.

[2] Niebuhr, Reinhold and Sherwood Eddy (1936) Doom and Dawn, Eddy and Page., p. 16: “It is the human effort to make our partial values absolute which is always the final sin in human life; and it always results in the most bloody of human conflicts.”

[3] Augustine, Saint (1948) The City of God

[4] Spinoza, Political Treatise

[5] Niebuhr, Reinhold (1938) Beyond Tragedy, p. 158

[6] Morgenthau, Hans (1946) Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 194-95

[7] Augustine, Saint (1948) The City of God

[8] Durkheim, Emile (1938) The Rules of Sociological Method, p. 108.

[9] Mead, Margaret (1942) And Keep Your Power Dry, pp. 182-83, 211-14, 242.

[10] Mead, Margaret (1940) “Warfare Is Only an Invention – Not a Biological Necessity,” Asia, XL, pp. 402-5

 

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[IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Jervis, Robert (1976) “Perceptions and the Level-of-Analysis Problem,”

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 10. 18:19



Perception and Misperception in International Politics

저자
Jervis, Robert, 지음
출판사
Princeton University Press | 1976-11-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
This book demonstrates that decisio...
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Jervis, Robert (1976) “Perceptions and the Level-of-Analysis Problem,” ch. 1, in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press.


Overview (Jervis)

Jervis’s renowned work Perception and Misperception in International Politics

-          Contrast to rational-choice

-          Contrast to “the traditional approach” discussed by Wolfers – “State-as-the-sole-actors approach”

-          Equivalent/Similar to Waltz’s First Image – focus on individual actors and their decision-making process

-          Main points

1.        Weaknesses of non-decision making level analysis:

1) international environment (external factor): “The environment may influence the general outline of the state’s policy but not its specific responses” (pg. 17); to test how changes in international environment alter behaviors is near impossible.

2) national/domestic determinants (internal): “If states of the same type behave in the same way, then changes in a state’s leadership will not produce significant changes in foreign policy, and we need not examine the images, values, and calculations of individual decision-makers. Unfortunately, claims about continuity in a state’s foreign policy are notoriously difficult to judge…” (pg. 22);

3) bureaucratic

2.        Decision-making approach and the perceptions and misperceptions of the world and how they diverge from reality in detectable patterns.

3.        Psychological analysis incorporated to view how decision-makers process information, and form, maintain, and change their beliefs about international relations and other actors.

4.        Presence of misperception undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretical models

5.        (pg28) “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others.” “…even if we found that people in the same situation – be it international, domestic, or bureaucratic – behave in the same way, it is useful to examine decision-making if there are constant differences between the decision-makers’ perceptions and reality” (Wolfers’ house on fire – circular logic back to decision makers)

-          Critique:

1.        Limits of psychological analysis

2.        Focus on misperception

3.        Difficulty in patternization – Theoretical rigorousness debatable

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[IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Wolfers, Arnold (1962) Discord and Collaboration

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 10. 17:51


Overview (Wolfers)

The title itself, Discord and Collaboration, is a notable implication to Wolfers’ approach to international relations: Composed of two antonyms – discord and collaboration – the title implies Wolfer’s approach to both “ends” of a spectrum in understanding the behaviors of states (actors) in international relations. This “two-ends” approach is prominent throughout Wolfers’ chapters, where Wolfers illustrates the pros and cons of each contrasting(in a sense that A’s main assumptions differ/negate B’s: e.g. realist vs. idealist) theories and concepts in international relations. In Chapter 1, Wolfers provides critique on both the structural and individual/decision-making approach in international relations – the two main strands in the level of analysis debate in international relations; Chapter 2, the concepts of both “amity” and “enmity” are debated; Chapter 3 discusses the spectrum of both the internal and external forces in foreign policy; Chapter 4, terms like “perfectionist moralist” and “nonperfectionist moralist” in the discussion of “statesmanship and moral choice”; Chapter 5, “possession goals(national interest)” versus “milieu goals”(environment, “shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries”), “direct national goals” versus “indirect national goals” and so forth. With such critique on the “both ends,” Wolfers recognizes the danger of polarization and absolutism in IR: Single theory cannot be the answer to all; by critiquing the both ends of every spectrum, Wolfers argues for flexibility in our frame of thoughts, away from resting on one idea/theory to explain the rest.

One possible critique on Wolfers’ work may be this duality in approach itself, where the discussion of the both ends makes his perspective less evident. Nonetheless, a careful reading of his lines do illustrate Wolfers’ view that the world affairs have the tendency to slant towards quests for power – within the realist-idealist continuum, Wolfers’ view lies more close to the former. And this is more clearly marked again by his title, where “Discord” precedes “Collaboration.” 


Point on the Level of Analysis in IR (Chapter I)

- State Level Analysis or Further Down...(Individuals and Corporate Bodies)...?

In respect to the level of analysis debate, Wolfers provides a chronological overview of the debate in the first chapter: Departing from the “traditional approach” – “state-as-the-sole-actors” approach (especially after the Napoleonic Wars, discovery of nation-states, and the era of European “great powers”), Wolfers points out two newly emerged approaches in the field. First is the approach that emphasizes “human individuals” (which is soon followed by the decision-making approach) – the “humanizing” process of international politics, also called as “minds-of-men approach”, and second is the emphasis on international organizations (corporate bodies). Now the state is no longer a single actor/entity, but a collection of different individuals or corporate bodies: state is no longer a blackbox and thus its behaviors can be interpreted from forces “emanating simultaneously from individuals and corporate bodies.”


Wolfers' Take: State Level Analysis supplemented by the new approaches

(pg. 24)

“While it would be dangerous for theorists to divert their primary attention from the nation-state and multi-state systems which continue to occupy most of the stage of contemporary world politics, theory remains inadequate if it is unable to include such phenomena as overlapping authorities, split loyalties, and divided sovereignty, which were pre-eminent characteristics of medieval actors.”

ð  Traditional approach and the new approaches “must supplement each other” to draw the “realistic” realities in contemporary international politics.



*Note on Wolfers’ Interesting and Important Metaphors to explain which level of analysis is appropriate at different situations:

 

1) House on fire (pg 13):

“Imagine a number of individuals, varying widely in their predispositions, who find themselves inside a house on fire. It would be perfectly realistic to expect that these individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel compelled to run toward the exits. General fears of losing the cherished possession of life, coupled with the start external threat to life, would produce the same reaction, whatever the psychological peculiarities of the actors. Surely, therefore, for an explanation of the rush for the exits, there is no need to analyze the individual decisions that produced it. The situation would be different if one or several members of the group had not joined the stampede, but had remained unmoved after the fire was discovered or had even failed to perceive it. Such “deviationist behavior”, running counter to expectation would justify and require intensive psychological inquiry.

 

2) Overheated house (pg. 13-14):

“A different situation would arise if, instead of being on fire, the house in question merely were overheated. In such a case, the second prerequisite of compulsion – serious external danger – would be absent. The reactions of different inhabitants might range all the way from hurried window-opening and loud complaints to complete indifference. To formulate expectations concerning behavior in an overheated house one would need intimate knowledge of the varying individual predispositions and of the symptoms by which they could be recognized. Here then, the decision-making approach would become necessary to supplement vague generalizations about reactions to discomfort that might be deduced from human nature in general, and such supplementation would become the more necessary the less overheated the house.”



2014.07.10

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