'일본대외정책'에 해당되는 글 2건

  1. 2014.11.05 [일본-노트] Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11 (David Arase)
  2. 2014.10.29 [일본-노트] 일본의 대외정책 - 외압(gaiatsu), 반응형 국가(reactive state)?

[일본-노트] Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11 (David Arase)

[연구] Research 2014. 11. 5. 10:57

Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11 (David Arase)
Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July/August 2007), pp. 560-583.

Summary & Note (Oct. 29, 2014) – Bee Yun Jo

 

Overview

David Arase begins the article with a quote from Ishihara Shintaro, who in 2005 projected that the increasing regional tensions and uncertainties can stimulate Japan to emerge from its “passivity” and become “a strong nation,” as well as foreseeing the possibility of Japan’s more upfront confrontation with China. As Arase states, the central irony or interesting puzzle here is that while Ishihara’s view represents the perspectives of those always held by the “extremes,” the recent developments in Japan’s security policy seem indeed to be assimilating towards the extremes. Overall, Arase’s conclusion is that this is not because Ishihara’s view has “mellowed but because Japan has changed.”

 

Main Question and Argument

Q1.      Why and how has Japan changed? (Japan’s increasing activism)

n  Mix of the internal and external factors that encouraged Japan to change = “a new alignment of factors at the levels of international structure, domestic institutions, and national identity”:

Three major factors in consideration

-     (External) Security environments

-     (Internal) Domestic institutional environments

-     (External-Internal) National identity (9/11)

 

Q2.           How is Japan’s change influencing its security policy now?  

n  Expanding the U.S.-Japan alliance (Japan as an active ally)

n  But also Japan’s increasing autonomy and assertiveness in the regional security policy.

 

Evidences

Q1.     Why and how has Japan changed? (Japan’s increasing activism)

 

1.       “Resistant Phase” (1951-1989): “modest, defensively configured military”

Fundamental Factors:

1)       (External) International structure:

-        U.S. Occupation and the resulting postwar Constitution (demilitarization) => “free ride”

-        U.S. did not need Japan to balance the Soviet Union

2)       (Internal) Institutional:

-        Befitting the “Yoshida Doctrine” (focus on the recovery)

3)       (External-internal) National identity:

-        Trauma of atomic bombing and defeat (=> Article 9)

ð  Configuration of structural, institutional and normative factors = obstruction on Japan’s rearmament and U.S. policy toward Japan (“one-sided burden” to U.S. and Japan’s “free-ride”)

 

Yet “Passive Resistance”

During this phase, the right wing view lacked support, yet remained where U.S. pressure factor played an important role (low-profile continuity in the efforts for Japan’s activism) – Hatoyama Ichiro => Kishi Nobusuke => Nakasone Yasuhiro => Abe Shinzo

-        Korean War => Self Defense Force (SDF) in 1954, yet senshu boei (exclusive defense) – the Basic Policy for National Defense

-        Vietnam War => “autonomous defense (jishu boei)” (Prime Minister Sato) => 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) – a compromise between jishu and senshu boei.

-        U.S.-Japan 1980s trade friction => Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and violation of the 1% GDP defense ceiling in 1987

ð  Overall, 1980s ended with “one-sided” burden on U.S., while Japan maintained its “passive resistance”

 

2.       “Reluctant Phase” (1989-2001): Reactive to U.S.’s “prod” for Japan’s “extra-territorial role”

Fundamental Factors:

1)      (External) International structure:

-        The post-Cold War international structure => Fall in the U.S.’s strategic interest in Japan

-        Japan’s threat of abandonment: dependence on U.S. (oil, security)

-        Japan’s checkbook diplomacy no longer suffices (exemplified by the U.S. reaction during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War)

-        1993 North Korea’s test of Nodong missile, withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)

2)      => (Internal) Institutional changes

-        International Peace Cooperation Law (1992), allowing SDF to join the PKO activities

-        1995 NDPO, authorizing the SDF to address “situations in the areas around Japan that have a direct effect on Japan’s security”

3)      => (External-internal) National identity:

-        “normative barrier” against overseas dispatch of SDF broken

 

Additional Internal Factors: Domestic Reforms since the 1990s

1)      The electoral reform in 1994 (SNTV + MMD -> SMD + PR): Weakened Factionalism

2)      Change in policy process – Administrative reform and centralization of power in the cabinet (1999 “Law to Amend the Cabinet Law” and “Law to Establish the Cabinet Office”)

 

ð  bureaucratic dominated => Prime minister, policy-oriented leadership

ð  A new alignment of structural (most important), institutional and normative factors = Japan’s “reluctant” move towards a more active security policy; “a redefined alliance”

 

 

Q2.     How is Japan’s change influencing its security policy now? 

 

3.       Japan as Active State? (2001-2006)

Fundamental Factors

1)      (External) 9/11 => SDF dispatch to Afghanistan and Iraq

-        (Koizumi) Anti Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001 (Afghanistan)

-        Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in 2003 (Iraq)

2)      (Internal) Generational change (Abe)

-        Rejection of the Yoshida doctrine (i.e. U.S.-Japan alliance, minimal security role, low profile, economy first)

-        Centralization of power under PM

-        Security and defense oriented Cabinet (security-oriented experts in the Cabinet, commission of defense experts, 2005 National Defense Program Guideline, the five year Mid-Term Defense Plan)

3)      National Identity: “reviving nationalist sentiment”

ð  The difference from previous years is that “key international, institutional, and normative factors that had inhibited a growing international security role for Japan… are today aligning in a mutually reinforcing way to facilitate a positive, forward-leaning toward security.”

 

Other Regional Factors that Convey Japan’s Increased Assertiveness
(autonomy from U.S.-Japan alliance)

1)      North Korea: “uncharacteristic activism” and “uncompromising line”

-        The launch of a Taepodong II missile on July 5, 2006 => “uncharacteristic activism” calling for a U.N. Security Council meeting (=> U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695)

-        Abduction issue => Abe’s “uncompromising line”

-        Participation in U.S.’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

2)      South Korea: Yasukuni Shrine visits and territorial issues

3)      China: arms-race, worsening public poll, territorial issues

4)      U.S.-Japan Alliance Transformation (Active SDF)

-        Inclusion of Taiwan strait issue as U.S.-Japan’s “common strategic objectives” in 2005

-        Towards a global scope bilateral cooperation (WMD, terrorism, energy)

-        New alliance that aims a close partnership between the SDF and U.S. (“U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” in 2005; “The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” in 2006).

 

To recap: By analyzing how the configuration of the structural (external), institutional (internal), and normative factors shifted in Japan, Arase provides a comprehensive overview on why and how Japan’s security posture transformed towards an increasingly active approach. In regards to the U.S.-Japan alliance, Arase provides the update on Japan’s regional policy and the impact of 9/11, and conveys that there are two sides to Japan’s increasing activism: 1) “the long-standing U.S. desire for a more active Japanese ally is being fulfilled”; while 2) the increased activism translates into Japan’s independent regional security policy (e.g. North Korean abduction issue, territorial and maritime disputes, and the normalization process with North Korea and Russia).

 

Conclusion & Comments

Arase’s Conclusion

Overall, based on the findings on how Japan’s activism transcends into Japan’s willingness to play the role of an active security ally to the U.S. (U.S.-Japan alliance strengthening) and an independent and assertive role in the region, Arase concludes with a caution that Japan’s remilitarization in the current environment – where Japan is becoming ever more “receptive” to U.S. pressure; Japan and the neighboring countries are interacting without a multilateral security regime or other collective framework to dissuade conflict – Japan’s new security role and assertiveness “may not turn out” as well as Ishihara, or the U.S. may have imagined.

 

Comments

*Comprehensive: Overview of both the domestic&international factors, mutually reinforcing.

*Going back to the debate on whether Japan is a reactive state, Arase’s paper provides a significant insight: Unlike the perspective that Japan’s post-war security policy is an example of Japan as a reactive state, responding to the U.S.’s gaiatsu, Arase’s paper implies that while the U.S.-led international structure or U.S.’s pressures served as important independent variable in determining Japan’s security policy, “reactive” may be a term too far-fetched or simplifying, for Japan has always maintained resistance (“passive resistance”) and strategically used U.S.’s pressure for Japan to “free-ride” and gradual remilitarization (right wing agenda). With 9/11 and previous domestic reforms, the 2000s marks the height of Japan’s relative activism which emerged from a continuity in the past.

*Implications on today: While published in 2007, Arase’s cautious remark on how Japan’s activism may endanger the complexity of the region still holds in today’s environment. Food for thought: U.S.’s pivot to Asia policy and Japan’s normal country agenda – As Arase comments, while U.S. may have wanted Japan’s increase in the security role in the region, current Abe’s agenda and Japan’s increasing autonomy in its regional policy may not be befitting to U.S.’s strategic interest.

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[일본-노트] 일본의 대외정책 - 외압(gaiatsu), 반응형 국가(reactive state)?

[연구] Research 2014. 10. 29. 12:03

Gaiatsu and Japanese Foreign Policy

Is Japan a Reactive State?

   

Definition

 n  Gaiatsu: Literally “foreign pressure” – Emphasis on the reactive, responsive nature of Japanese foreign policy to external pressure/stimulus[1]

 n  Kent Calder’s conceptualization of Gaiatsu = Japan as a “reactive state” – Japanese foreign policy is reactive to external pressure, especially in response to the American requests[2]

n  While the term “reactive state” remains in the academic discourse, the term gaiatsu hardly appears in the discussion

 

The Debate: Is Japan a Reactive State?

 

1.       Japan as a reactive state (Calder, 1988) – Gaiatsu as its nature

 

1)       2 characteristics of “reactive state”

        the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so

        it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely

 

2)       Actual cases during the late 1970s and the early 1980s

-        access to the Japanese market for beef and oranges(1978)

-        macroeconomic stimulation(1978)

-        market access for American telecommunications equipment(1980)

-        restraints on automobile export to the United States(1981)

-        Yen-Dollar Agreement(1984)

-        pressures for policy change in Japan by G-5 Plaza(1985)

                    

“Responded positively to U.S. pressures for liberalization of outward capital flow”

 

3)       Explanations

       Considerations of state strategy

-        Dictated avoiding broad international commitments or a pro-active global role, so as to devote maximum attention to economic growth, allying with the US

       Domestic constraints on international initiatives

-        the fragmented character(nawabari) of state authority in Japan makes decisive action difficult, and creates “a hierarchy, or complex of overlapping hierarchies, without a top”

       Intermittent Japanese Flexibility

-        In the orange negotiations with the US, “while the Japanese political system was not prepared to fully liberalize, it was prepared to compensate”

-        “all relevant actors in the negotiation were given a lucrative piece of what they wanted(customers unrepresented in the arena failed to reap major benefits)”

       Sense of vulnerability – “hypersensitivity to any form of anti-Japanese sentiment abroad”[3]

 

2.       Japan as a proactive state – Gaiatsu as a strategy

 

1)       “The myth of Gaiatsu” argument (Cooney, 2006)[4]

-        Re-interpreting Gaiatsu as a strategic tool for normalizing Japan

“Japanese elites want Japan to be a normal nation… Article 9 prevents this outcome…Gaiatsu is a tool for normalizing Japan without risking public displeasure over the reaction of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Japanese elites are using foreign pressure to their own ends”

-        “a strong, face-saving device to which [domestic] vested interest groups were persuaded to give in” by a government pretending to be their champion; frustration with the “country’s dithering passivity on all but trade.”[5]

 

2)       Japan as an aggressive and mercantilist nation[6]

 

3)       And with the recent developments in Abe’s diplomacy: “Strategic Diplomacy, Value-Oriented Diplomacy, and Claiming Diplomacy”[7]

-       Prof. Park finds distinctive values in Abe’s diplomacy where it is much more strategic—he sets up certain set of national goals and according to the priorities of the goals, he acts accordingly. For example, for the first time in Japanese diplomatic history, they set up National Security Committee (NSC) like America and began to disclose their strategy which is unprecedented. The two main pillars of Japanese national security is the Peace Constitution and the other is US-Japan Alliance. Whenever Japan wants to change diplomatic stance, they upgrade US-Japan Alliance and on the basis of the upgraded alliance system, they try to revise the self-defense forces law and revise the US-Japan security guideline.

-       Value-oriented Diplomacy emphasizes the ‘universal values’ such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Abe believes that Japan should take more responsibility in the international society and is especially cautious of the public space and maritime security against Chinese expansion.

-       Claiming diplomacy is a counter-reaction against DPJ’s passive diplomacy. Abe strongly believes that claiming diplomacy on territorial dispute and history perspective is important in setting up Japan’s national identity and territorial sovereignty. 

 

Continued Debate: Other Explanations

 

1.       Reactive-Proactive Hybrid model

 

1)       From reactive to a proactive, “a rising state”[8]

-        “Japan’s recent diplomatic behavior reveals considerable reactivity and equivocation, but there are also concurrent indications of greater activism and even hints of leadership, especially since the last half of the 1980s.”[9]

 

2)       Japan towards a normal country

-        The early 1990s emergence of the normal country debate[10]

-        Ishihara’s The Japan That Can Say No (1989)[11]

 

3)       “Coping strategy” (Curtis 1993)[12]

-        Reading the trend of the times and responding strategically = “reactive” is only a partial description.

 

4)       The Goldilocks Strategy (Samuels 2007)[13]

 

2.       Reactive only to certain countries (United States)

 

3.       Other countries are also reactive = “reactive” nature is not unique to Japanese foreign policy

 

Robert Putnam’s two-level games

-        Domestic and international politics are unavoidably intertwined (hence two-level-games) in the decision making processes underlying international relations

-        The 1978 Bonn Summit and Japan: “without the external pressure, it is even more unlikely that the expansionists could have overridden the powerful MOF”

-        Examples of openness for foreign pressure in every country; Japan no more a reactive than most other states of similar size and power (e.g. U.S., Germany)[14]

 

Policy Examples

 

1.       Japan’s Defense Policy in 2000s - : “Coping” and increasing “proactive” than reactive

 1)       Major Findings based on a Survey of Japanese Defense White Papers (2005-2014)

n  Security discourse as a key example of gaiatsu as strategy (2005 War on Terror -> 2007 Chindia, regional environment, territorial issues 2013): increasing emphasis on SDF, from passive to proactive

n  Mid-late 2000s: More coping than reactive (U.S.’s QDR, increasingly to China’s rise since 2007 report, North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities)

n  Early 2010s: More proactive than coping

 

Key findings of a Survey on Japan’s Defense White Papers (2005-2014)[15]

 

n  Overall, Japan, like other countries cannot but be reactive to changes in the external environment, triggering its strategic coping measures as responses; and these decisions resonate in terms of other countries responses, interacting/mutually reinforcing Japan’s strategic environment (Reactive-Proactive); indeed the 2014 is markedly strong in terms of proactive approach to national security.

 

2.       Japan’s ODA Policy – Case of Gaiatsu?

 

1)       Earlier Criticisms on Japan’s ODA Policy

-        “predominantly regional orientation with its assistance”; “heavy skewing toward bilateral assistance”

-        Absence of principle-based guideline until 1992

2)       Reactive: “To redress criticisms, Japan wrote its first ODA Charter in 1992 and revised it in 2002.”[16]

3)       Nevertheless, while reactive in terms of criticisms, yet increasingly proactive in its policy direction (regional orientation)

-        While the first ODA charter addressed the need for Japan’s more global role, with the revision of 2002 ODA charter refocuses on Japan’s regional orientation (proactive)- “With Focus on Asia”(2002) based on the “new challenges of the era”

-        ODA Charter Revision – “not only as a contribution to the international community, but also as a help to promote security and prosperity of Japan”;

 

Survey of Japan’s ODA White Papers (1994-2014)[17]

Year

Findings

Main Characteristic

2013

“rapid change of the political and security environment surrounding Japan” => “it is important to support countries which share strategic interests and fundamental values”; “investment”

“Growth of Southeast Asia and the role of Japan”, “Dynamic Africa”

Focus on Asia,
Strategic ODA

2011

The Earthquake

2009

Global financial crisis

“East Asian Community” (Hatoyama)

2003-2002

ODA Charter Revision – “not only as a contribution to the international community, but also as a help to promote security and prosperity of Japan”; “With Focus on Asia”(2002)

“Meeting the Challenges of a New Era”

1997

ODA budget cuts, begins with “why is ODA necessary” (changed from “popular support”)

“Substantial Policy and Philosophy Shaping Period (Original ODA Charter Period)” (1992-2002)

1994

1989, 1991-1993: Largest donor country ($11,474 bil in 1993)

- End of the Cold War (ODA Charter in June 1992)

 


Conclusion

 

-        “Coping” and increasingly proactive than reactive

-        Abe (Feb 22, 2013): “Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am here to make. And I reiterate this by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be.”[18]



 

[Appendix 1] Survey of Japanese Defense White Papers (2005-2014)[19]

 

Year

Gaiatsu / External factors

Key Responses

Result

2014

-     U.S.’s 2014 QDR – Emphasis on the sequestration cuts in defense spending

-     North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities

-     China’s military modernization, naval forces, maritime interests, presence in the South China Sea (Southeast Asia)

-     Russia’s increased activities in the “vicinity of Japan”

-     Middle East and Africa = appropriate responses are needed as “international community”

-     2014 July 1: The Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People

-     2013 Dec: The National Security Council Created

-     2013 Dec: Japan’s first NSS – Japan’s stance as a “Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation” – “Japan will contribute more”

 

Gaiatsu
=> National security and defense policies to “protect Japan”

2013

-     Territorial rights, China’s military capacity, North Korea: “security environment in the vicinity of Japan has increasingly grown severe”

-     “the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in the Asia-Pacific region”

Peace, security, and independence cannot be ensured by aspirations alone”

2012

-     U.S.’s rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific, reduction in defense spending

-     North Korea

-     “China’s maritime activities in waters near Japan”

-     2010 NDPG (developing Dynamic Defense Force)

-     “For the Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance”

2011

-     Earthquake

-     U.S’s war on terror (Osama bin Laden killed)

-     North Korea, China, Russia

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe

-     New National Defense Program Guidelines for 2011 and Beyond (new NDPG) drafted

-     “Dynamic Defense Forces”

-     Reform, reorganization of SDF

2010

-     “Complicated and Uncertain International Security Environment”

-     Cheonan incident, WMD, China’s rise

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe (Same structure upto 2014)

-     Feb 2010 “Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era”

-     SDF, US-Japan Security Alliance

2009-2006

-     Terrorism, WMD, Iran, North Korea

-     “Changes to “traditional relationships”(Rise of China and India) – (2007)

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe, U.N.

-     Similar to 2005 response: SDF, U.S.-Japan security alliance, PKO activities

-     MoD Reform (2008)

2005

-     War on terror (Non-state actors) – “new threats”

-     Transfer and proliferation of WMDs

-     Situations in Iraq

-     (Korean peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, Malacca and Singapore)

*List of countries overviewed (defense policies): U.S., Russia, Europe, U.N.

- U.S.-Japan alliance

- Self-sufficient defense posture against the new threats (emphasis on the right of self-defense)

- 2004 New National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG)

- 2004 “Mid-Term Defense Program” (new MTDP) for FY 2005-2009 – “establishing multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces”

“New” threats => Self-defense, U.S.-Japan alliance for “maintenance of regional order” and “global cooperation”



[1] The New York Times, “The Great Game of ‘Gai-atsu’,” (May 1, 1991) Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/01/opinion/the-great-game-of-gai-atsu.html (Accessed Oct 26, 2014).

[2] Calder, Kent (1988) “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics, Vol. 40(1). PP. 517-541.

[3] Blacker, Michael “Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,” in Curtis, Gerald L., ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 1-42.; Pyle, Kenneth B. “The Burden of Japanese History and the Politics of Burden Sharing,” in Makin, John H. and David C. Hellmann, eds., Sharing World Leadership: A New Era for America and Japan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989).

[4] Cooney, Kevin (2007) Japan's Foreign Policy Since 1945. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[5] The New York Times, “The Great Game of ‘Gai-atsu’,” (May 1, 1991). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/01/opinion/the-great-game-of-gai-atsu.html (Accessed Oct 26, 2014).

[6] Hirata, Keiko (2001): “Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Indochina in Y. Sato and A. Miyashita (eds.), Japan’s Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration. London: St. Martin’s Press.

[7] Park, Cheol Hee, “Basic Directions of Abe’s External Strategy,” in Cheol Hee Park Ed. Power Shift in East Asia and Changes in Japan’s External Strategy (2014) (in Korean).

[8] Hirata (2001).

[9] Yasutomo, Dennis (1986) The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy. London: Lexington Books.

[10] Soeya, Yoshihide & Masayuki, Tadokoro, and David Welch (2011) Japan as a Normal Country?, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

[11] Ishihara, Shintaro and Morita, Akio (1989): The Japan that Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster

[12] Curtis, Gerald (1993): Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[13] Samuels, Richard (2007): Securing Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[14] Putnam, Robert D. (1988): Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. In: International Organization, 42(3). PP. 427-460. P. 429.

[15] Japan’s Annual White Paper (2005-2014), Ministry of Defense. Available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ (Accessed Oct 29, 2014).

[16] Otopalik, Cameron M. (2010) “Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance: Assessing Conformance with Shifting Priorities,” International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, Vol 1, No. 1.1.

[17] Japan’s ODA White Papers (1994-2014) are available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000017.html (Accessed Oct 29th, 2014).

[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan is Back” by Shinzo Abe (Feb 22, 2013), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html (Accessed Oct 29, 2014).

[19] Japan’s Annual White Paper (2005-2014), Ministry of Defense, available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ (Accessed Oct 29th, 2014)

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