'국제정치'에 해당되는 글 8건

  1. 2014.10.01 [일본-노트] Electoral System (Reform 1993 and after)
  2. 2014.09.24 [일본-노트] 자민당 파벌 연구 (5개 주요 파벌) - LDP's Big Five Factions
  3. 2014.09.23 [일본-노트] Postwar Japan
  4. 2014.09.09 [책] <일본의 정치경제 연속과 단절> - 진창수 (2009)
  5. 2014.08.13 [IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Institutional Liberalism
  6. 2014.08.13 [IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Neo-Marxist Approach on IR (Critical Theory of Hegemony)
  7. 2014.07.10 [IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1954) Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis
  8. 2014.07.10 [IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Jervis, Robert (1976) “Perceptions and the Level-of-Analysis Problem,”

[일본-노트] Electoral System (Reform 1993 and after)

[연구] Research 2014. 10. 1. 11:24

Changes in Electoral System: Before 1993 and after 1994

 

1. Overview

 

Before 1993

After 1994

Major

Characteristics

Medium-size Election District

System (in effect since 1925)

Parallel system (winner-take-all)

Single Non-Transferable Vote

System (SNTV)

SNTV abolished

MMD System

Combination of SMD & PR System

Voting

Mechanism

1 vote per voter (1 candidate in the voter’s district)

2 votes per voter (1 for individual candidate from the district, 1 for party)

Changes in

numbers

- Lower house: 511 seats

·  1-6 seats per district, multi-member (130 districts)

- Lower house: 500 seats

·    300 seats from single member districts;

·    200 allocated (later reduced to 180) proportionally to parties in 11 regions (11 PR blocs)

Competition

-Intra-party Competition and Factionalism: Multiple candidates from single party competition (Multiple candidates can get into the parliament)

-Minority Party Representation despite small electorate support

 

-Single candidate from single party competition (only one candidate that attracts the largest share of vote in a district gets into the parliament)

-Main battlefield: SMDs > PR blocs

Effect

One-party dominant system

Candidate-centered election

Factionalism

Pork-barrel politics

Corruption

(*vote for party < individuals)

Two-party system (i.e. DPJ)

Party-centered election

Collapse of power-balance: Increase of Prime Minister’s authority

Focus on issues and party position

(*vote for big issues < local issues, subsidies, welfare)

 


 

2. Before 1993: Multimember District System (中選挙区制)

·   Multi-member District system was used to elect the members of the House of Representatives from 1925 to 1993.

·   The lower house had 511 seats which were filled with candidates from 130 districts.

·   Every voter had one vote he could give to one candidate in his district.

·   In every district, one to six seats were filled in an election. For these seats, a number of candidates ran. The candidates with the highest votes would fill these seats in descending order. It was common for multiple candidates from the same party to run for these seats.

·   A political party that wanted to win a majority of seats had to run more than one candidate, creating a particular kind of political competition. This generated intra-party competition.

·   This was unfavorable to the LDP, in which candidates competed with one another. Sometimes, this resulted in one candidate doing very well, leading to the defeat of another LDP candidate, even though the party was much more popular than any of the opposition parties that were running in the election.

·   The candidate-centered political style in Japan stemmed from this multi-member electoral system since multiple candidates from the LDP competed in each district, the LDP candidates had no choice but to differentiate themselves.

  

Consequences of Electoral System, Before 1993:

Positive Consequences

Negative Consequences

·   Minority Representation: Under this system, minor parties were able to survive even though they were not supported by a majority of the electorate. Therefore small party like the Komeito with approximately 10% of the popular vote could still win some seats.

 

·   Intra-party competition and Factionalism: Intra-party competition led to factionalism in the LDP. If there are multiple candidates running from the same party in the same district, each one of those candidates would look to a different faction leader for support.

·   Candidate-centered Election: Since multiple candidates from the LDP competed in each district, the LDP candidates could not simply rely on the party’s name for electoral victory but needed to differentiate themselves and maintain personal supporters.

·   Pork-barrel politics and Corruption: Multi-member District system created incentives for legislators to specialize in localized behavior, leading to political corruption and inefficient public spending.

 

 


 

3. Since 1994 after the reform


(Reference: Prefecture & PR map excerpted from http://www.highschooltimes.jp/news/cat24/000030.html)

 

Single Member District + Proportional Representation

·   Electoral-reform bill passed in the Diet in January 1994

·   Single-Member District (SMD) and proportional presentation (小選挙区比例代表並立制)

·   The lower house has 500 seats

1) 300 of them are filled with candidates from Single Member Districts (SMD)

2) The other 200 (later reduced to 180) allocated proportionally to the different parties in 11 regions.

=> Every voter therefore cast two votes - one for individual candidate and one for party

·   SMD: Japan is divided into 300 SMDs in which different candidates run against each other. In order to maximize their share of the vote, it makes sense for parties to have only one candidate running. The candidate that attracts that largest share of the vote in a district gets into the parliament.

·   PR Bloc: In the 11 regions each voter can give one vote to a party. The seats within the region – they vary from 7 to 33 – are then allocated to the parties proportionally based on the proportion of the vote they were able to attract.

 

Consequences & Effects 

1)    Weakening of Political Factions

It is no longer necessary for a candidate to get a faction’s support to help him/her fight against other candidates of the same party like in MMD system. And so from the point of view of the faction leaders, it's no longer necessary, or there's no longer an opportunity, to support a candidate who can run against a member of another faction that that leader is opposed to. So the whole rationale for factionalism is to some extent compromised by this new election system.

2)    The increase in the number of “floating voters”, who support different parties in succeeding elections.

 

3)    Threshold Effect (Hirano)


Reference: Shigeo Hirano (2006)

 

Before 1993 (MMD)

After 1994 (SMD+PR)

·          MMD electoral systems in which votes are cast for individual candidates provide strong incentives for candidates to cultivate narrow subconstituencies(cost & corruption).

·          Candidates have an incentive to choose positions dispersed along the policy space away from the median voter.

 

·          Under SMD, the incentives to cultivate broader cross sections of district constituencies

·          make incumbents less likely to choose policies that ignore the interests of particular geographic subconstituencies within their district, especially areas that are part of their party’s electoral base.

     = Weakening link between incumbents and geographically defined subconstituencies

 

4.) Failure to change the focus of election campaigns away from candidates to political issues and differences in basic party platforms.

After all, candidates who run in a local constituency are going to say the things that are important to the people who vote in that local constituency, and that tends to be issues that are of direct relevance to their daily life — whether they get more subsidies, if they're in a rural community or whether they get more daycare centers, if they're living in an urban community — and other issues that are very local and that don't relate to big issues of Japan's role in the world or issues of overriding national importance.

 

 

 

References:

  • 박철희 (2011) 자민당정권과 전후체제의 변용, 『아시아리뷰』, 1권 제2.
  • Raymond Christensen, Electoral Reform in Japan: How it was Enacted and Changes it May Bring (1994)
  • Shigeo Hirano (2002), Electoral Systems and Threshold Effects: Quantitative Evidence from the Japanese Experience in the 1990s, available at http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4754/hirano.pdf, accessed on September 29th, 2014
  • Shigeo Hirano (2006), Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities, World Politics, Volume 59, Number 1, October 2006, pp. 51-82

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[일본-노트] 자민당 파벌 연구 (5개 주요 파벌) - LDP's Big Five Factions

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 24. 21:02

The LDP’s Factions

조비연 (2014.9.24)


1.    Overview


1)    What are factions?

Factionalism has been part of LDP’s makeup since its founding in 1955:

o Faction as a “primary unit,” the “central force,” and the “real actors in intraparty politics” within the party in postwar Japanese politics

 o LDP is described as a “federation of factions” (rather than a unified national party)[1] – “government by, for, and of the faction.”[2]


2)    The rise and fall of faction in LDP

o  Started from “Hachiko Shidan(Eight corps)” in 1956

 -  3 major functions[3]

(1) Electoral support, including earning party nominations for its members and the mobilization of support

(2) Cooperative political funds mobilization

(3) A means for collective negotiations over portfolio distribution in times a cabinet shuffle

-  “It used to be the case that a faction leader would provide most of the money that the members of his faction needed for that political life, and in return the faction member gave the leader his loyalty[4]


o Around mid-1970s, “Big Five” factions were constructed

-  Because of multimember district electoral system, allowing for election of 5 candidates from one district, thus “LDP factions was reduced to five to correspond with the maximum number of candidates that the party could field in any multimember district.”[5]


In 1994, political reform diminished the power of factions

-  “Factions were characterized as a source of political evil that were a by-product of the existing multimember district electoral system. The government introduced a new electoral system that combined single-member districts with proportional representation in an effort to eliminate factions within the parties and strengthen party leadership.[6]


o  Koizumi tried to collapse the factionalism strongly-rooted in LDP

-  “Factions within the LDP never disappeared. In contrast to the view that factions will eventually fade away, I have argued that they are likely to survive, albeit with different structures and functions to perform[7]

 


2. LDP’s Five Major Factions (Lineages)



1)  Major Factions and Their Lineages

Most importantly, there are 5 major factional “lineages” that extend from 1956 to the current factions in LDP in 2014: The five factions in 1956 are headed by Hayato Ikeda(1956); Eisaku Sato(1956); Ichiro Kono(1956); Nobusuke Kishi(1956); Takeo Miki(1956). Figure 1 below is my update on Koellner’s figure in his study on LDP factions.

Figure 1. Lineage of LDP Factions 1956-Present (in terms of faction leaders)

Source: Updated on Koellner’s Figure 1. The Development of LDP factions[8]

As shown, these 1956 factions – headed by Ikeda, Sato, Kono, Kishi, and Miki – have remained in LDP as major lineages while the power is handed down from one leader to another: The Ikeda faction transcends to the current Kishida faction and Aso faction, Sato faction to current Nukaga faction, Kishi faction to Machimura faction (currently the largest faction), Kono faction to Ibuki and Ishihara faction, and Miki faction to Oshima. One thing to note here is the Yoshida Shigeru and Hatoyama Ichiro roots to these major faction lineages. As shown in the left part of the Figure 1, Yoshida who claimed for the peace treaty transcended to Ikeda and Sato faction. Hatoyama on the other hand who at the beginning argued for rearmament, the US-Japan security treaty, transcended to Kishi and Kono factions. And the current largest Machimura faction (2014), originates from this Kishi faction, the Hatoyama line, to which Shinzo Abe also belonged to.

 

2) Lineages and Sizes of Major Factions in 2014 (as of May 2014)

To clarify, the table below is an update of 2014 LDP factions table appeared on the Japan Times. I have added the left column to trace the lineages of these current factions: Out of the 7 factions, 6 factions have their roots to the major 5 factions in 1956. Another small note is that the names of these factions go by the names of current leaders, instead of the official faction names (2nd column), which is why it is often difficult to follow all the names that change as the leadership transforms.


Table 1. LDP Factions and its Lineages (as of May 2014)

LDP Factions and its Lineages (as of May 2014)

Five Faction Lineage

Name of faction

Leader

Number of members (number of rookies)

Kishi

Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai

Nobutaka Machimura

82

Sato

Heisei Kenkyukai

Fukushiro Nukaga

51

Ikeda

Kochikai

Fumio Kishida

42

Ikeda (Kono)

Ikokai

Taro Aso

34

Other.

Shisuikai

Toshihiro Nikai

32

Kono (Yamasaki)

Kinmirai Seiji Kenkyukai

Nobuteru Ishihara

15

Miki

Bancho Seisaku Kenkyujo

Tadamori Oshima

11    

Source: Based on LDP factions table in The Japan Times[9] (Left Column Added)


Largest Faction (2014): The Modern Kishi Faction (Machimura faction)

-         (Kishi-Fukuda-Abe-Mitsuzuka-Mori-Machimura) Shinzo Abe belonged to this faction

-         2004: Overtaken the modern Sato faction in the Lower House, which has been the largest faction in LDP for most of the postwar years.

As Table 1 illustrates, the current largest faction is headed by the Modern Kishi faction – the Machimura faction (first line), with the size of 82 members. As already mentioned Shinzo Abe belonged to this faction, and this Modern Kishi faction- currently called the Machimura faction has replaced the modern Sato faction (currently the Nukaga faction) starting in the mid 2000s (with fluctuations), which had been the largest faction in LDP for most of the postwar years.

 

3)    Size Variations Over Time

Table 2. Number of Major Five Faction Members over Time

Source: Based on Park (2001)[10]

The specific size variations of these lineages can be better explained by looking at the modified chart from Prof Park’s paper in 2001, Table 2. The top column and arrows had been added to note that these factions in the table represent the five major faction lineages (1956). 

Most importantly, the size of each faction matters because it means power within the party, over the party president, and in times of LDP majority in Diet, it also secures power, leverage over the PM and the Diet. As Prof Park’s paper noted, “one faction is able to lead the nation if it can recruit about 1/4 of the lDP’s membership” – around 100 individuals.

With that in mind, some interesting implications can be found in Table 2 – I have marked the areas of focus as the three boxes on the table:

-         Box A: As the box outlines, the modern sato faction, Tanaka faction in this table and now the Nukaga faction, can be stated to have had the maneuver of the country during 1980s~1990 where its member size exceeded over 100 (A decisive role in the selection of party leader for more than 20 years).[11] In specific, the modern Sato faction has been the largest faction in LDP during 1972-1990, playing the “shadow shogun” according to Schlesinger.[12] Also note the size of the largest number, 140 (54) in year 1986, which coincides with the 1986 landslide victory for LDP that year.

-         Box B: In specific to Box B, what we can notice is the overall fall in the size of the factions. Between the modern Sato and Kishi factions, along with modern Ikeda faction, the numbers are in close competition. Also, the majority faction’s size falls below 100, during 1993~2000. We can think of LDP’s historic loss in 1993 election for a short period; the introduction of Political Funds Control Law in 1994, and change to SNTV from multimember district system in 1993 – the electoral changes.

-         Box C: Interesting part here is Box C, where we see the return of the modern Sato faction as the largest faction in LDP in early 2000s. Also note on the re-increase in the size over 100, and the gap also increased among the first and the rest factions.

Overall, such variations in size signal the presence of significant changes in LDP, where the overall size of factions have decreased and the long-time majority faction (the modern Sato faction-currently the Nukaga faction) has been replaced by the current Machimura faction as the new majority – the Modern Kishi faction.

 

3. Weakened Factionalism?

The next question is then, has factionalism weakened?

As noted above, 1993 LDP failure, Political Funds Control Law and SNTV after 1993, Koizumi’s 2004 agenda to uproot factionalism may be the grounds to argue that factionalism has waned. Definitely it seems that the factions are playing by a different logic, because most importantly 1) LDP has lost its Diet majority, along with 2) the electoral changes after the single-member SNTV system. In short, it has become less about the inter-faction competition, but more about the challenges from the opposition parties.

Nonetheless, the factions have more and large survived: According to Prof Park’s paper, factionalism remains because the factions are “creatively adjusting to the changed political institutions”; and factions still 1) satisfy the career incentives of individual politicians; 2) provide effective management of the party as an organization.[13]

 

4. Abe and Factionalism

And finally, what can factions explain about Abe and Japan in 2014?

o  First, the 2014 Reshuffle is reported to have shown how factionalism still matters to Abe and LDP. The article states that Abe’s reshuffle has been “a strategic maneuver to secure his position prior to party elections slated for the fall of 2015.” With the reschuffle he had two goals: first to deal with Ishiba Shigeru –who is 2nd in rank within the party, and second to rebuild connections among the interparty factions. 

o  Another important note is how Abe’s Active pacifism, normal country agenda can be linked to the current largest faction’s lineage. As Figure 1 illustrated, the current largest faction, Machimura faction, which Abe also belonged to, is the long branch off from Hatoyama Ichiro (Hatoyama – US-Japan Security Treaty – “conservative anti-mainstream” hoshu bōryū vs. Yoshida line - Peace Treaty – “conservative mainstream” hoshu honryū).[14] The majority by Machimura faction explains the overall right click of the LDP, especially after the split of Takeshita faction(the modern Sato faction) into Obuchi faction and Hata (Ozawa), which defected from the LDP and form DPJ, causing the LDP’s fall in 1993. As the modern Sato faction has always maintained its majority and its midway political stance between the left and right political-ideological spectrum within the LDP, the split of the faction in 1993 meant that the midway position that the postwar LDP maintained has also waned. Now that the modern Kishi faction (Kishi-Fukuda-Abe-Mitsuzuka-Mori-Machimura) plays the majority, which is on the righter side of the spectrum, current Japan’s direction can be explained.

 





References

Baerwald, Hans H. (1986) Party Politics in Japan, Worchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin.

Curtis, Gerald L. (2002), Policymaking in Japan : defining the role of politicians (Brookings Institution Press).

Iyasu Tadashi (1984) Jiminto: kono fushigi na seito [LDP: This counterintuitive party]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Johnson, Chalmers (1990) "The People Who Invented the Mechanical Nightingale." Daedalus 12:71–90.

Meiji, Kakizaki, “Abe Shores up Power with Cabinet Reshuffle,” Nippon.com (Sept 18, 2014), Available at http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00138/ (Accessed Sept. 23, 2014).

Newsweek, “Hatoyama’s Philosophy of Yuai,” (Nov. 5, 2009) Available at http://www.newsweek.com/hatoyamas-philosophy-yuai-76847 (Accessed Sept 24, 2014).

Park, Cheol Hee (2001) “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP since Political Reform,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, (May/June), pp. 428-461.

Patrick Köllner (2004) “Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the LDP and the DPJ differ?”, Japan Forum, 16:1.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Masumi Junnosuke (1962) Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schlesinger, Jacob (1997) Shadow Shoguns, Simon & Schuster.

Shinoda, Tomohito (2013) Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts, Columbia University Press.

The Japan Times, “As LDP rides high, are factions biding time?” (May 18, 2013), Available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/18/national/politics-diplomacy/as-ldp-rides-high-are-factions-biding-time/#.VB-WZVfzTPo (accessed Sept 22, 2014)

Ward, Robert E. (1967) Japan's Political System. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Watanabe Tsuneo, Habatsu[Factions] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1959), p.3.

Zakowski, Karol (2014) “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” Available at http://leamplus.edu/factional-dynamics-in-japans-liberal-democratic-party/.

 



[1] See works like Scalapino and Masumi (1962); Baerwald (1986, 46-47); Ward (1967, 65 and 68-69)

[2] Matsuyama Yukio, former editor of the Asahi Shinbun , told an audience at Harvard University in 1991

[3] Watanabe Tsuneo, Habatsu[Factions] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1959), p.3.

[4] Curtis, Gerald L. (2002), p. 45 Policymaking in Japan : defining the role of politicians (Brookings Institution Press.)

[5] Park, Cheol Hee (2001) “Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP since Political Reform,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, (May/June), p. 431.

[6] Park (2001), p. 432

[7] Park (2001), p. 461.

[8] Patrick Köllner (2004) Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the LDP and the DPJ differ?, Japan Forum, 16:1, p. 91. Also refer to Park (2001), p. 434.

[9] The Japan Times, “As LDP rides high, are factions biding time?” (May 18, 2013), Available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/201 3/05/18/national/politics-diplomacy/as-ldp-rides-high-are-factions-biding-time/#.VB-WZVfzTPo (accessed Sept 22, 2014)

[10] Park (2001), p. 456.

[11] Shinoda, Tomohito (2013) Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts, Columbia University Press, p.78.; Park (2001), p. 447: “from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, … the numerical strength of the [Tanaka] faction allowed it to take a commanding position over the other factions.”

[12] Jacob Schlesinger, this faction as the so called “shadow shogun” of the party: Schlesinger, Jacob (1997) Shadow Shoguns, Simon & Schuster.

[13] Park (2001), p. 429.

[14] One related article: Newsweek, “Hatoyama’s Philosophy of Yuai,” (Nov. 5, 2009) Available at http://www.newsweek.com/hatoyamas-philosophy-yuai-76847 (Accessed Sept 24, 2014).

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[일본-노트] Postwar Japan

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 23. 15:20

 Two Book Recommendations for studies on postwar Japanese regime:


Embracing Defeat

저자
Dower, John W. 지음
출판사
Norton | 1999-03-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
Chronicles the events that took pla...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  



Altered States : The United States and Japan Since the Occupation

저자
Schaller, Michael 지음
출판사
Oxford USA | 1997-09-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
The relationship between the United...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  

Notes:


Postwar Japan after Defeat

Readings Assigned:

John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of the World War II (New York: The New Press, 1999), Chapter 2.

Michael Shaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 1.

Rieko Kage, Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapters 2-3.

Recommended:

Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” in Andrew Gordon, ed. Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 64-98.

Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (New York: Free Press, 1987).

Mark Caprio and Yoneyuki Sugita, Democracy in Occupied Japan (New York: Routeledge, 2007), Chapters 3 & 5.

***

 

John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of the World War II (New York: The New Press, 1999), Chapter 2.

Cartoonist Kato Etsuro’s war posters in the 1940s, 1942 – depicting Roosevelt and Churchill, later replaced by his illustrations of the first years after the defeat. Surrender… Turning to drawings about the vagaries and difficulties of ordinary life.


Revolution from Above

Victor’s revolution from above”

US depicted as the key to freedom, crushing the zaibatsu, “democratic revolution from above”

Until 1947, “leftists as well as liberals commonly regarded the overwhelmingly American occupation force as an army of liberation, and the notion of achieving a “democratic revolution””

Vs.

Precariousness of the new democratic revolution

Kawakami Tetsutaro – 1945 Oct described the U.S. policy as one of “rationed-out freedom”

“As timed passed, more than a few commentators called attention to the passivity and superficialty implicit in the very notion of a democratic revolution from above.” “Democracy came “too easily” in such a milieu and so failed to establish deep roots” only making people obey to the rules of the superior. 

Critic Kamei Katsuichiro: “the heralded revolution was more than a charade but less than a real struggle for democracy. Instead of revolutionizing consciousness,…, the occupation had tended to reinforce a “colonial mentality”

 

Demilitarization and Democratization

Misnomer #1: 1945 August~1952 April: “Allied occupation of Japan” = “misnomer” as “From start to finish, the United States alone determined basic policy…”

-       3 Basic documents drafted by U.S which established the initial objectives of the occupation:

1)       Potsdam Proclamation (US, GB, China announced the terms of surrender) – Japan placed under military occupation, trial of war criminals, “just reparations”, “completely disarmed”

2)       United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan (September announced)

3)       Comprehensive military directive, elaborating postsurrender policy (remained secret until Nov 1948)

-       Doughlas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander = “epitomized the American monopoly on policy and power”

Misnomer #2: International Military Tribunal for the Far East (for the top-level war-crimes trials) – it was “predominantly American show” where Americans dominated the “international prosecution section” that set the agenda for the tribunal.

Policy of reeducation: “Underlying this immodest objective [(of the documents]] was a growing sense of urgency that the country should not only be “democratized” to prevent the reemergence of militarism, but simultaneously immunized against a rising tide of communist influence.”

Extension of democratic ideals to the economic field: “the post-Potsdam formulations explicitly mandated the promotion of policies “which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.”” => “dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations” that emerged during the mobilization period for war + “promote labor unions and carry out a sweeping land-reform program”

The essence of the “Initial Postsurrender Policy”: to render Japan as a peaceful, democratic, law-abiding nation, eradicating the roots of militarism.

Exceptional aspects of this occupation:

-       “remaking the political, social, cultural, and economic fabric of a defeated nation, and in the process changing the very way of thinking of its” yet “they were still defining their grand mission as they went along.”

-       Notably different from Germany case after WWII, as the occupation then was by multiple countries (US GB FRA and Soviet Union)

-       “MacArthuresque” control – personality imprint on the policies (“messianic fervor” unseen in Germany)

-       Understanding militarism and ultranationalism as the sense of a feudalistic and Oriental culture, attempt to make Japan “law abiding” in the “Western mode”

 

Imposing Reform = “a signal expression of America’s commitment to a genuinely radical agenda of “democratization””

-       Abolishment of the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 (left wing critics arrested due to this law)

-       Return of freedom of speech and assembly

-       The Special Higher Police/”thought police” of the Home Ministry abolished

-       Political prisoners communist colleagues released

-       Liberalization of the constitution

-       Franchise to women

-       Liberal education

-       Democratization of economy (land reform, antimonopoly)

-       Shinto (emperor-centered government-sponsored cult) abolished on Dec 15

-       Trade Union Law guaranteeing the workers the right to organize, strike, and bargain, approved by the parliament, Diet on Dec 22

-       Decentralization of the police

-       Renovation of the electoral system

-       Promotion of greater local autonomy (decentralization)

 

Overall, toward a “pacifist course”

-       “The new national charter – initiated by GHQ in February 1946 and promulgated nine months later, after extensive public and parliamentary discussion – was the crown jewel of the reformist agenda. It not only codified the basic ideals of “democratization,” but wedded them to “demilitarization” by explicitly prohibiting Japan from resorting to war as a means of resolving international disputes.

-       Kato vs. Yoshida Shigeru (PM in 1946-47 and 1948-54, who “belittled the very possibility of making Japan democratic.”)

-       Vs. conservatives who rejected all arguments about “the “root” causes of militarism, repression, and aggression, choosing instead to depict the recent war as an aberration…” that it is only enough to bring the state back to “the status quo ante of the late 1920s”

 

*Pro-US perspective: “This was an extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid, moment – never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never to be repeated. Like Kato, many Japanese would indeed welcome the revolution from above… The American regimen cracked open the authoritarian structures of the old society in a manner that permitted unprecedented individual freedoms and unanticipated forms of popular expression to flourish”

 

 

***

 

Michael Shaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 1.

 

Chapter 1. “Japan: From Enemy to Ally, 1945-50

1946 Yoshida Shigeru – formed his first postwar cabinet

1945-1950: Occupation under Commander General Douglas MacArthur – “controlled revolution” – “the partial uprooting of political, economic, and social structures that had contributed to repression at home and aggression abroad.”

Faltering relationship between Douglas MacArthur and the Truman administration (Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and Texas Democrat Tom Connally): politically no option but to make MacArthur the Commander in Japan

Occupation(8):

-       Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers(SCAP) = MacArthur and the headquarters

-       + Two oversight committees, which “had the slightest influence on policy anytime during the next six years”: 1) The Far Eastern Commission; and 2) The Allied Council for Japan = only purpose in soothing British, Soviet, Chinese allies.

Official surrender: Sept 2, 1945 on the battleship “Missouri” in Tokyo Bay

General Headquarters (GHQ):

-       in the Dai Ichi Insurance Building

SCAP(9):

-       12 or so sections corresponding to the Japanese cabinet and American army organization

-       E.g. Intelligence section: monitor Japan and SKorea (Charles Willoughby)

-       E.g. Gov section: oversaw political reform (Courtney Whitney)

-       E.g. Economic and Scientific section: economic policy authority (William Marquat)

-       These heads of the sections = “Bataan gang”, a circle of acolytes of MacArthur

-       Until 1948, just over 3,000 Americans and foreign nationals served SCAP, relying heavily on the Japanese gov.

-       Censored describing the actions of Truman administration

Douglas MacArthur’s view(9): 1951, told a congressional inquiry - “measured by the standards of modern civilization,” the Japanese “would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of forty-five years.”5

 

The Reform Period, 1945-47

Different perspectives on the outbreak of war6:

1)       The progressive Japanese government had been “highjacked” by militarists = anomaly

2)       Fatal flaw in the institutions (MacArthur on this point = calling for a “revolution” against the existing “feudal” orders)

 

Result of reform = “Continuity and Change”

 * Efforts to Change

MacArthur’s revolution(9-11)

-       Japan as his political stage (sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1944 and 1948)

-       “controlled revolution”

-       To transform Japan into a “new Middle West”.7

-       Began in earnest in Oct. 1945 – when SCAP issued a civil liberties directive releasing political prisoners, legalizing all political parties, and assuring protection of the rights of assembly and speech.

-       1946 produced a new constitution for the Diet to pass: stripped the emperor of temporal authority, enhanced the Diet’s power, extended voting rights, and declared the legal equality of women, Article 9 forbade creation of armed forces or the right of the state to conduct war.

-       1946 Politicians purge: wartime leaders verdicted as war criminals, neutering the influence of many senior politicians. “Political moderates and most ordinary Japanese favored cleansing the landscape of militarists and ultranationalists”

ð  Yet the results were limited: 20 officers to investigate 2.5 million cases => Japanese bureaucrats involved in the process => as results: “about 200,000 Japanese, over 80 percent from military and policy ranks, lost their political rights. Relatively few politicians and fewer bureaucrats or business leaders fell victim to the purge. Among those who did, most had their rights restored before or just after the Occupation ended”

-       Land reform: “to tear down the large feudalistic land holdings” and the “exploitive nature of the rural economy” => “Land reform created a class of small farmers loyal to the conservative politicians who initially opposed the law”

-       Overall, “Reform touched nearly every major institution during the first three years of Occupation. SCAP reorganized the national police, remodeled public education along Western lines, voided repressive labor codes, and seemed pleased that by 1947 nearly half the urban workforce joined trade unions.”8

 

* Continuity:

-       Prewar career bureaucrats remained(11) in place hardly touched by the purge or new constitution

-       Conservative parties “continued to dominate the Diet”(11) (Concern for free election obscured the fact that the prewar roots of the conservative politicians extend to big businesses and rural districts)

ð  The first postwar election in April 1946: The two conservative parties (the Progressives and the Liberals) won a majority in the Diet

-       The zaibatsu: unfulfilled task(12)

ð  1945 MacArthur told to promote a wider “distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade” by pursuing anti-monopoly program => SCAP hesitated

ð  State and Justice Departments dispatched a “Special Mission on Japanese Combines” led by economic Corwin Edwards + Reparations mission under oilman Edwin Pauley

ð  1945-46, both groups faltered as Truman admin showed no interest in the program.

ð  Result in failing economy => US provided annual assistance of $400 million through the army’s Government and Relief in Occupied Areas program (GARIOA)

 

Rethinking the Occupation

 Truman turns its interest in 1947 due to(12):

-       Mostly the relationship with the Soviet Union

ð  Japan and Germany revival required for building strong allies to contain Soviet Union: Navy Secretary James Forrestal brought Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, Agriculture Secretary Clinton Anderson, former ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman to discuss on the matter… “Japan, Germany and other affiliates of the Axis… back to work.”(Forrestal)

-       Economic concerns of the region => “America’s key partners might seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union”

Yet hesitant Truman: “had recently appointed George C. Marshall to replace James F. Byrnes as secretary of state.”(13) 

As part of the containment strategy (13)

-       “Secretary of State George C. Marshall encouraged Acheson and Kennan to develop proposals along the lines. Joined by James Forrestal, named head of the new Defense Department late in 1947, and other civilian and military specialists, they contributed to the evolving containment program.”

Resented by MacArthur for interfering SCAP(13)

-       The recovery program was to extend the Occupation beyond early 1948 when MacArthur planned to return for presidency

-       So he argued that “he had fulfilled the essential goals of the Occupation” and that economic problems “could be resolved after the Americans left”

-       Vs. March 8 1947 Dean Acheson’s new approach to foreign policy: “World stability required building the “two workshops” on which the “ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends.”12

 Then came the Truman Doctrine and the debate further unfolds: “A bitter war of words” between Washington and SCAP (14-15)

-       March 12 1947 Truman Doctrine: Truman’s message to congress in times of crisis in Greece and Turkey, blaming the Soviet Union

-       March 17 1947 MacArthur press conference: reemphasized that his “spiritual revolution” has been successfully finished.11

-       July 1947 MacArthur’s unconsulted recovery package: to dismantle zaibatsu – “just as Washington resolved to make industrial recovery a priority, MacArthur ordered the Diet to pass a bill dissolving the combines and decentralizing industry”

-       George Kennan terms MacArthur’s plan as “socialism… if not near communism”13: Framing MacArthur that his scheme will destroy the major barrier to Soviet penetration in Asia – “socialization” attack on zaibatsus. MacArthur further accused of promoting reforms “far to the left of anything tolerated in America” and of embracing “lethal weapons” of socialism.15

-       Then last boom by Senator Joseph McCarthy who argued that Wisconsin is not really MacArthur’s “native state” => Most Republicans voted for Minnesotan Harold Stassen. After another defeat in Nebraska, MacArthur abandoned his quest for the GOP nomination.

 

Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff(16)

-       “Japan’s survival as an ally and the denial of its industrial base to the Soviets required action “to prime the Japanese economic pump.””16

-       Kennan noted: he was repelled by the “degree of internal intrigue” of the SCAP which resembled “the latter days of the court of the Empress Catherine II” or the last years of “Belisarius in Italy” – SCAP’s “social engineering” would wreck Japan.17

-       Kennan began to redraft the Occupation agenda in 1948 March

-       Army Undersecretary William Draper: visited and argued for curtailing reparations and assault on the zaibutsu – April 26 1948

 

1948, October by Truman - NSC13/2 – the Johnston report (17)

-       New Occupation agenda formalized by the Policy Planning Staff to the National Security Council during the summer of 1948.

-       “economic recovery as the “prime objective” in Japan.

-       Reparations halted, restrictions on industry restricted

-       By 1949, anti-monopoly program terminated

 

1948 Truman Election Triumph in November(17)

-       Now with full authority to reverse the course,

-       Special emissary Detroit banker Joseph Dodge to oversee SCAP and implement the program20(17)

 

Dodge(17)

-       American Council on Japan (ACJ): Dodge’s establishing of ties with critiques of MacArthur: Harry Kern (Newsweek editor in the previous year), Newsweek’s Tokyo corres. Compton Packenham, business lawyer James Lee Kauffman, former State Department Japan specialist Eugene Dooman (17)

-       1949~1950: Dodge and his staff – rigorous program of neoclassic economic policy “to rationalize an inflation-driven economy operating at little more than two-thirds of its prewar level.”(18)

ð  Envisioning “a high- volume, low-cost exporter of consumer goods primarily to Asian markets.

ð  To reduce “frivolous spending”: “major reductions in the public welfare budget, curtailment of business loans, and the firing of 250,000 government workers” => “These actions decreased domestic consumption and shunted bank credit, foreign currency, and raw materials to large enterprises engaged in export production”

-       April 1949 MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry)

ð  Promoted by Dodge and the compliant SCAP

ð  “modeled on the wartime Munitions Ministry and staffed by many of the agency’s veteran bureaucrats”

ð  MITI providing administrative guidance to banks and corporations

ð  Japan Inc, nurtured by American directives22

 

 

The Sinews of Containment: Japan, China, and Southeast Asia

The unimplemented Asian Marshall Plan: Marshall Plan for the Far East(18-19)

-       Southeast Asia as the market for Japan

-       Army Undersecretary William Draper: “economic aid program, similar to the Marshall Plan, for the Far East”25

-       Ralph Reid (Adviser to Draper and Dodge): proposal for linking Japan’s economy to Asian countries that are friendly towards US and provide a bulwark against Soviet Union – to assure that strategic raw materials do not go into the Soviet Union

-       “creating democratic governments to restore viable economies and check Soviet expansion” and keep “vital raw materials” out of Soviet control. 26

-       Although unimplemented, sparked the strategic interest in the Southeast Asian region, along with the Communist rise in China, rebellions in Indochina, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies

 

Stability of Southeast Asia vital for US now(19)

-       Acheson argued that stability in the region must be fulfilled for the region’s “function as a source of raw materials and a market for Japan and Western Europe”28

 

Loss of China (19-20)

-       1949 Oct 1, establishment of the People’s Republic of China

-       Acheson: If China was lost, “protecting Japan’s industrial base and Southeast Asia’s mineral wealth required “drawing the line” against Communist encroachment.”

 

Overall, “Much of the debate within the Truman administration about China and Southeast Asia reflected concern over Japan”

 

Nonconfrontational approach to the Chinese Communist regime (3 different strands):

-       argued by Acheson – communist fall may be weakened by its ties to Japan’s economy

-       Yoshida for the total seizure of China by the Soviet Union = leverage with US and stable trade with China

-       Against the growing ties between Japan and China

ð  “two-track policy, permitting Japan limited trade with China” meanwhile “development aid to Southeast Asia” for the “dual purpose” of “advancing American influence”35

 

March 1949 President Truman approved Acheson’s view “that a total embargo would hurt American allies and drive China closer to the Soviet Union”, therefore to take “the calculated risk”36 and allow “regulated trade”(22) 

“During the first half of 1950, the Truman administration dispatched several economic missions to Japan and Southeast Asia.

 

 

Diplomatic Gridlock

Leave/remain (24): Two different views that left US’s Japan policy “adrift”(25)

-       State: To leave Japan (Secretary of State Acheson), cautious of Japan becoming tired of American control

Vs.

-       Defense: Joint Chiefs of Staff considered “American air, naval, and land bases in Japan as vital “staging areas from which to project military power to the Asiatic mainland and to USSR islands adjacent thereto””

 

Feb 1950 China and Soviet Union signed a friendship pact, among other things to counter “aggressive action on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression.”(25)

ð  Used to justify to prolong the Occupation

 

Acheson’s New people to soothe congressional critics on the State Department for losing China & to convince the Defense Department to compromise over Japan (25)

-       Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk as principal adviser in Asia

-       Republican foreign policy spokesman John Foster Dulles as his adviser on Japan

ð  Both advocated more “vigorous support for Taiwan

ð  Dulles favored “bilateral defense treaty and a Pacific pact” to end the Occupation

 

This appointment coincide with “Japanese initiative to harness American interest in recovery and cold war cooperation into peace settlement”(26)

-       Yoshida Shigeru – longed for the early restoration of sovereignty on the bases of US support; public for “neutralism”

-       Contentious issues unresolved, delayed settlement: Soviet participation in a peace conference, rearmament issue, permanent American bases in Japan

 

Yoshida’s aspiration to end the occupation (26-27)

-       1947 Okinawa and the Bonin Islands offered for leasing bases (unaccepted by US, too early + requesting bases within Japan)

-       Sent three delegates to Washington (MacArthur forbade direct negotiation) – personal aide Shirasu Jiro, Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, and an aide to Ikeda, Miyazawa Kiichi – economic issues with Joseph Dodge on the surface, but to discuss the ending of the Occupation – “education mission” entitled

-       Ikeda conveying Yoshida’s proposal: “The Japanese government herein formally expresses its desire to conclude a peace treaty with the United States as early as possible. In the case of such a peace treaty being concluded, the Japanese government thinks it will be necessary to station American forces in Japan in order to preserve the security of Japan and the Asian area. If it is difficult for the United States to make such a request, the Japanese government itself is prepared to make the offer”

-       Tweaking “American anxiety” – Ho Chi Minh against French in Vietnam, South Korea vs. North, Communist victory in China, the possibility of Japanese opinion moving “far to the left”

-       “hoped to ease Japan back into the world community without incurring the costs of rearmament or alienating the United States.”

 

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk – Yoshida/Ikeda message to Acheson and Truman (28)

-       May 1950 Washington must show the Japanese “just what and when and where the United States would stand firm”51 – the need to defend Taiwan, South Korea, and Indochina (the former parts of Japan’s empire) against Communist force

 

Toward the final deal (28-29)

-       June 1 1950 Japanese government White Paper: willingness to sign the treaty separately with US if Moscow and Beijing refuse to sign.52

-       May June 1950 – Dulles and Rusk - package deal to support Taiwan to soothe the Defense side of the argument (proposing to increase military aid to Indochina)

-       Mid-June 1950 – rival fact finding missions to Tokyo by the State and Defense Departments:

ð  State: Dulles (along with his staff John Allison, Maxwell Hamilton, John Howard, and Robert Feary, “worried far more about Japan’s political and economic viability than tis value as a military platform”) “the danger he saw in the military’s plan to push Japanese rearmament and use Japan “as a major offensive air base.” “Overmilitarization,” as he called it, slighted the long-term interests of both Japan and America. If, on the other hand, the United States showed a determination to “stand fast” in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, where real military threats existed, Washington could protect Japan with merely a “defensive guarantee, stiffened by a skeleton U.S. force” and limited Japanese rearmament.”56

ð  Defense: Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Omar Bradley (“searching for a checklist of reasons for not ending the Occupation” – military platform prioritized)(29)

-       Split views became public when the delegations reached Japan on June 17 – State denounced by Louis Johnson at an impromptu briefing.57

 

Private message from the emperor (30)

-       Advice to Dulles to consult “older people, the majority of whom have been purged” (after the outbreak of the Korean War)59

 

MacArthur as the mediator

-       urging to link an end to the Occupation of Japan with a commitment to defend Taiwan. (Johnson and Bradley disputed that if US defends Taiwan then it won’t be necessary to retain bases in Japan or compel Jap rearmament vs. Dulles agreed)

-       MacArthur-Dulles: instead of Dulles’ proposal to rebuild small army in Japan, MacArthur argued for rebuilding munitions industry to assist the “reconstruction of American armament

-       MacArthur-Bradley and Johnson: MacArthur argued “In exchange for granting American forces virtually “unrestricted” base rights throughout Japan, Washington should offer Tokyo a peace treaty and pay $300 million per year in new aid to balance Japan’s trade deficit… [and] a small-self-defense force”

ð  Bases

ð  Peace treaty

ð  $300 million per year

ð  Small self-defense force

-       Bradley and Johnson refused till the end and left Tokyo to block a settlement

 

Korean War 1950.6.25 (50)

-       Dramatic effect on the diplomatic gridlock in Japan

-       Catalyst to transform US’s East Asia policy: Truman “sent troops to Korea, ordered the Seventh Fleet protect Taiwan, and expanded military and economic assistance to French Indochina and the Philippines.”

-       Within 15 months, US “agreed to end the Occupation while massive defense procurements lifted Japanese industry from its post-war topor.” = San Francisco Peace Treaty April 28 1952

-       “The war in Korea set the stage for Japan’s economic “miracle.””(50)

-       Yoshida’s “playing the part of a “good loser” could be the next best thing to outright victory.”(50) – (last sentence of the chapter)

 

***

 

Rieko Kage, Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapters 2-3.

 

Chapter 2. Civic Engagement

The Dependent Variable

 

Five major claims(19):

1.       Level of membership grew to much higher levels in the postwar period compared to the prewar period (in absolute terms)

2.       Level of postwar membership growth were at least as rapid for associations that operated under fairly liberal conditions during the prewar and wartime periods as those that had been more repressed

3.       Immediate postwar era, membership in groups with more “indigenous” Japanese origins appears to have risen at rates that are comparable with groups with more “Western” origins

4.       Evidence that associations are suppressed by the US occupation – less rapid increase in memberships compared to those that were not.

5.       Considerable intra-Japan variation in the extent to which membership in voluntary associations grew in the wake of WWII.

 

Data selection(20)

-       Range of voluntary membership associations:

1)       Youth/recreational groups

2)       Women’s organizations

3)       Social service groups

4)       Religious organizations (more emphasis on Western tradition “new religions” that are more prone to be “voluntary”)

5)       (labor unions)

 

The Rise in Civic Engagement in Postwar Japan, 1945-1955

-       Youth/Recreational Groups (YMCA Japan – oldest 1903, YWCA Japan, Boy Scouts, Girl Ccouts, Japan Alpine Club, Kodokan judo association)

*Japan Alpine Club: steady growth throughout prewar and postwar – less “Western”

*Kodokan: banned by SCAP during the Occupation from Jap schools 1945-50. Resumed faster growth after the lift of the ban

-       Women’s Groups: indigenous group “Tomo no Kai(Friends)” found in 1930 – not much affected during the wartime. Peak after postwar as well.

-       Social Service Organizations: Rotary Club, Japan Consumer Cooperatives’ Union, Kobe Consumer Cooperatives Union, Japan Seafarers’ Relief Association (JSRA))

-       Membership in Christian Churches – favored by MacArthur – a limited reason for growth during occupation and after.

 

Overall,

1.       Levels were generally much higher in postwar Japan compared to prewar

2.       Postwar growth rates in civic engagement do not merely represent a return to prewar levels but far outpace them

3.       This occurred both in the more Western as well as more indigenous groups despite repression of the former during the war and some of the latter during the occupation

 

Cross-Prefectural Variation in Civic Engagement, 1945-1955

Conclusion

Counter results to the victory/defeat hypothesis: civic engagement rose at an impressive rate in defeated Japan in the wake of WWII, and across prefectures

 

Chapter 3. War and Civic Engagement

A Theoretical Framework

Victory/Defeat hypothesis: “a country’s victory or defeat to crucially determine its trajectory of civic engagement in the wake of wars” 

Proven wrong. Why? Due to 2 key factors that shape the growth of civic engagement

-       The process of war: wartime mobilization

1)       Preparation for war as the great state-building activity (Tilly)

2)       “patriotic partnerships” – voluntary associations providing wartime services (Skocpol et al.)

e.g. Hitler Jugend

“In short, major war produces major mobilization, including at the neighborhood level for tasks that are often taken care of in peace time by civic associations. This coercive mobilization at the community level is not necessarily experienced as an imposition by the state, so that when the coercion ends, so too does the participation. Rather, this study argues that the effects of this wartime mobilization may be more lasting than is often assumed”(51)

3)       Limited coercion = promote learning civil skills and participation: Military Service, Required Community Service, Jury Duty

4)       War, strong state, strong society

-       Path dependency in civic engagement: Preexisting legacies of prewar civic activities

 

Previous explanations:

1.       Democratization

2.       Occupation

3.       Wartime destruction

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[책] <일본의 정치경제 연속과 단절> - 진창수 (2009)

[연구] Research 2014. 9. 9. 01:11



일본의 정치경제

저자
진창수 지음
출판사
한울아카데미 | 2009-03-16 출간
카테고리
정치/사회
책소개
1990년대 후반부터 일본은 꿈틀대기 시작한다. 55년 동안 이...
가격비교


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<목차>

1부 일본 정치의 연구

1장 전후 일본에서의 일본 정치연구의 한 단면? 이념에서 실증으로

 

2부 일본 국내정치의 개혁

2 1990년대 이후의 일본 정치

3장 장기불황의 정치경제?1990년대 일본을 중심으로

4장 일본 정당정치의 변동과 정책 변화?2001년 성청개혁을 중심으로

5장 일본 금융개혁?정책 변화의 정치적 요인

 

3부 일본 외교정책의 변화

6장 동북아 영토 분쟁의 일본 국내정치적 조건

7장 일본 엔 국제화정책 변화의 정치적 요인

8장 일본의 동아시아정책 변화?아시아로의 복귀

 

4부 한반도정책

9장 북핵문제에 대한 일본의 입장과 전략

10장 전략적 한일 관계를 위한 제언


 ***


 

이 책은 저자가 쓴 일본 정치경제의 개혁과 변화에 대한 논문들을 수정 및 재편집하여 한 권의 책으로 묶은 것이다. 이 중 중요한 부분들을 발췌해보았다.

 

1부 일본 정치의 연구

1장 전후 일본에서의 일본 정치연구의 한 단면? 이념에서 실증으로

1장에선 일본 정치연구 경향이 크게 3 가지 시기-연구경향으로 나뉘어 개괄적으로 정리되어 있다: 1) 전후 초기의 일본의 후진적 정치질서를 강조한 마루야마 마사오의 초현실주의적 연구 중심 (이후 관료지배론으로 발전); 2) 1980년대 일본형 다원주의론 중심 (관료지배론의 기본적 가정 부정); 3) 신제도주의론 중심 (역사적 제도주의론과 합리적선택론)

1)    마루야마 마사오 초현실주의와 관료지배론

마루야마의 연구는 일본의 자본주의의 특징을 봉건성, 후진성, 전근대적인 것으로 파악한 것이다 – “일본의 초국가주의가 명치 내셔널리즘의 극한에서 형성되었다는 정치사상사적인 분석이 사용되었고, 또한 일본과 독일의 비교에는 동시대의 비교정치문화(또는 심리학)적인 분석방법이 이용되었다.” (15) 이러한 마루야마의 연구는 이후 발전된 관료지배론으로 발전된 것으로 알려져 있다.

관료지배론이란?

-       배경: 관료지배론이 대두된 시점은 1950년대 전전의 정치가들이 정계에 복귀(보수세력의 재등장)하되 고도성장 이전의 시기로 사회전반에 전전의 공동체적인 규제와 권위주의적 사회관계에 대한 강한 비판이 남아 [있었으며],” 대부분의 지식인들은 야당, 노동조합과 함께 일본의 민주화를 어떻게 달성할 것인가에 집중하여 관료기구가 주도하는 근대화 노선에 대한 비판적 인식을 갖고 있었다.(16)

-       전전연속론과 관료지배론 (1970년대까지 지속)

n  즈지 기요아케(1969): 특히 전전 고급관료와 전후체제의 강한 인적 연속성과 이들의 전전 제도 복구 노력 지적 (재건정비법의 실시, 마을합병, 지사관선론, 경찰법 개정, 국정교육으로의 재편 등)

n  오카 요시다케(1958): 일본의 전전 지배층의 부활 지적 – “일본 엘리트층의 문제점을 일본 지배층의 항복에서 비롯된 구체제의 온존 때문이라고 지적이롭ㄴ의 지배층은 점령 개혁하에서 미국의 옹호로 살아남았을뿐 아니라 강화 후에는 미국의 정책에 편승해 구체적 부활의 움직임을 나타냈다. 따라서 일본의 지배층은 전전과 이데올로기적으로 공통성을 가지고 있으며, 전전과 같이 전후에도 동질적인 연속성을 지니고 있다고 판단” (17) 

n  주요 특징: 1) 역사적 접근법; 2) 관료제가 권력의 중추에 있다고 파악; 3) 다양한 정책결정의 장에 대한 재고 부족

n  따라서, 1970년대까지 일본정치연구에서 관료의 지배적 역할이 주목됨

 

2)    1980년대 일본형 다원주의론 무라마쓰 미치오의 연구

-       배경: 1) 자민당 중심의 일당우위체제 확립; 2) 국회, 관료기구에 대한 정당의 영향력 확대; 3) 경제적 저상장화 지속 재정적자 및 이해관계 변화; 4) 국제화, 고도기술화

-       무라마쓰 미치오의 연구: <전후일본의 관료제> 등을 통해 관료지배론의 기본 가정에 대한 반론을 제시 전전전후연속론, 관료우위설(자질과 정보), 출신관청영향설에 대한 의문

-       다원주의론 유형(21-22): 1) 이노구치 다카시 관료적 포괄형 다원주의 모델 관료 주도 + 대중포괄적; 2) 무라마쓰 미치오 & 로렌스 크라우스 정형화된 다원주의 관료기구의 역할을 정당정치의 대립과정에서 구조화되는 것으로; 3) 사토 세자부로 & 마쓰자키 데쓰히사 자민 = 관청 혼합체인 다원주의 – “코포라티즘보다는 유연하고, 미국형의 다원주의보다는 안정적인 것을 상정”(22)

-       특징: 1) 실증적 연구 중심; 2) 이익집단에 대한 논의 심화

 

3)    다원주의 이후: 신제도주의론

-       다원주의론의 두 가지 한계 지적: 1) 정치가와 관료의 관계를 제로섬으로 해석; 2) 일본의 보편성에 대한 설명을 시작으로 결국 특수론에 빠지는 모순

-       주요 유형: 1) 역사적 제도주의론 총체적 구조(제도)를 사회세력의 행동에 영향을 미치는 것에 주목; 2) 합리적선택론 액터에 더 치중 – “제도적 역할을 일정 부분 인정하면서도 자기의 재선을 달성하고자 하는 개개 정치가의 합리적 행동에 주목”(28)

-       특징: 각 액터의 관계보다는 제도를 중시하나 상호대립하는 것은 아님 (가토 준코 1997) – 상호보완적이라 볼 수 있음.

 

2부 일본 국내정치의 개혁

2 1990년대 이후의 일본 정치

장기불황, 냉전종언, 출산율 저하 및 고령화 등으로 일본 정치는 안전보장, 행정개혁, 지방분권, 재정재건, 규제완화, 금융제도 등이전과는 다른 신자유주의(행정개혁, 규제완화, 시장경쟁을 중시)적인 개혁을 진전시키고자 했으며, 이런 개혁은 구()정치와 신()정치의 대립축을 형성하였다.(34)

-       55년 체제와 비교하여 크게 3 가지 변화를 가져왔다고 설명한다:구정치와 신정치의 혼란 속에서도 1990년대 일본 정치는 55년 체제와 다른 변화를 가져왔다.”(38) – 1) 파벌의 영향력 저하, 2) 세대교체, 3) 조정정치의 쇄락

-       고이즈미 수상의 신자유주의 개혁: 1) 기존 정권들과 달리 기득권익과 대치함으로써 개혁을 진행”(48); 2) 포퓰리즘 대중과 매스컴 활용 개혁자로써의 이미지 구축

-       아베 정권에 이어진 고이즈미의 정치적 유산:

n  신자유주의 개혁 계승: 1993년 자민당의 일당지배가 끝나면서 자민당도 신정치의 구도를 수용할 수 밖에 없게됨 (단독과반수 유지 불과 -> 신자유주의적 개혁안 수용). 따라서 아베 수상도 고이즈미의 세출 세입, 신자유주의 개혁 계승 (‘개혁 없이 성장 없다는 고이즈미 수상의 논리 계승해 성장 없이 재정재건 없다는 경제정책 슬로건 내걸음)(55)

n  관저주도체제 (55년 체제에 비해 수상의 권력이 강화된 체제 소선거구-비례대표병립제와 정치자금규정법) 

3장 장기불황의 정치경제? 1990년대 일본을 중심으로

4장 일본 정당정치의 변동과 정책 변화? 2001년 성청개혁을 중심으로

5장 일본 금융개혁? 정책 변화의 정치적 요인

 

3부 일본 외교정책의 변화

6장 동북아 영토 분쟁의 일본 국내정치적 조건

무엇보다 영토분쟁에 대한 일본의 입장이 탈냉전기인 1996년 이후 변화되었다는 분석이다. 보다 구체적으로 전후 일본은 소위 요시다 노선에 기초해 미일협조외교, 미일안보동맹, 경제중심주의를 축으로 전개되어 영토분쟁 이슈도 수면 아래에서 관리되는 특성”(176)을 보인데 반해 1996년 이후부터는 자민당 정권이 미일동맹의 강화와 보수적 정치주의를 본격화하면서보다 적극적인 공세외교의 형태로 변화되었다는 설명이다.

-       전후 일본 외교의 예: 1978년 후쿠다-덩샤오핑 회담(일중평화우호조약)으로 센가쿠 열도 분쟁 연기; 일소 북방4도 문제 (에토로후, 하보마이 제도, 시코탄, 구나시라)

-       탈냉전기 일본의 적극적 공세외교의 예: 한일관계 독도문제 (1990년대 후반부터 – 1996년 자민당 총선 공약 독도 영유권 주장시작으로), 중일관계 센카쿠 열도와 해양자원분쟁 (2004년 경부터), 일러관계 북방영토 (2000년 이후부터)

변화의 원인은?

1)     고이즈미 총리의 개인적 리더십 특성

2)     탈냉전기 동북아에서의 미국의 영향력 약화 (양국 간의 새로운 조정기 라는 주장)

3)     세대교체에 따른 외교정책 변화 (전후세대: “일본의 패전과 패전 직후의 구입을 체험하지 못한 세대. 1950년대 이후 태어난 세대” (188)) – 국민의 민족주의적 정서에 부응하는 강경입장, 우파적인 강경정책 선호, 일본의 영향력 확대 우선시

* “현재 일본 정치권에서는 역사진보세력(예를 들면 사회당)의 영향력이 축소되고 있다. 특히 1994년 사회당의 무라야마 정권이 몰락한 이후 일본 정치권에서는 우파 정치인들의 영향력이 확대될 수밖에 없는 상항이 되었다.”(190)

 

7장 일본 엔 국제화정책 변화의 정치적 요인

8장 일본의 동아시아정책 변화? 아시아로의 복귀

일본의 대외정책은 시대에 따라 선진국(특히 미국)과의 협조아시아와의 연대라는 두 명제가 다르게 나타나고 있는 것이 특징이다. 이 두 가지 명제가 항상 정합적으로 나타나는 것은 아니다. 1980년대까지 일본의 정책은 아시아와의 연대를 중시하기보다는 선진국과의 협조에 치우친 측면이 강했다. 그렇지만 1985 9월 플라자합의 이후 일본 제조업의 동아시아 직접투자가 확대되면서 아시아 경제협력이 궤도에 오르기 시작했다.”(247) 그럼에도 불구하고 일본은 항상 “’미국과의 협조라는 틀 속에서 활동했기 때문에상대적으로 그 존재감이 오랜 기간 동안 미비했다. 하지만 아시아 금융위기를 기점으로 일본의 아시아정책이 보다 아시아 지역의 중요성을 인정하기 시작하면서 예전과 달리 더 이상 미국 추종적인 외교와 수동적인 외교로만 보기에는 한계”(248)가 생겨났다는 지적이다.

, 일본의 대외정책은 요시다 독트린 (안보는 미국에, 일본은 경제성장에 주력 궁극적으로 일본의 아시아 정책은 미국과의 관계를 벗어나서 생각할 수 없었음) 중심적 + 수동적(reactive) + 목적은 일본의 발전에만 치중하는 형태인 “‘아시아 연대서구 협조의 조화,”(252) => “적극적인 아시아주의”(264)를 추구하게 변화되었다는 분석이다.  

 

4부 한반도정책

9장 북핵문제에 대한 일본의 입장과 전략

10장 전략적 한일 관계를 위한 제언

 

 

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[IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Institutional Liberalism

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 13. 20:32

Keohane, Robert (2012) “Twenty Years of Institutionalism Liberalism,” International Relations, Vol. 26, pp. 125-138.


*A paper that clearly outlines the theoretical relevance of Realism on Institutional Liberalism

 

Purpose of this paper:

-          to use Carr’s perspective in The Twenty Years’ Crisis to interrogate Institutional Liberalism

-          identify three trends (legalization, increasing legalism and moralism, decline in the coherence of some international regimes) – reviewed in light of Realist critiques of liberalism

 

 

Introduction

 

1.       What is Institutional Liberalism (IL)?

 

Institutional Liberalism (IL): Cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal principles.

-          (Keohane) originating from John Ruggie’s conception of international political authority (30yrs ago) – IL as one basis for the political authority – ‘fusion of power and legitimate social purpose’[1]

-          Institutions and rules can facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation within and among states

-          The social purpose: “to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of more peaceful, prosperous and free world.” (126)

-          Yet, realist assumptions are not negated (“[no belief] in a harmony of interests” – 126)

 

*Note on the difference between IL and Liberalism:

-          IL “very different” from what E.H Carr describes as “liberalism” (“which is the 19th century liberalism based on abstract rational principles” – “harmony of interests based on a ‘synthesis of morality and reason’”; “separated power from economics” (126)

 

2.       More on Ruggie (from which IL originates, according to Keohane) – “embedded liberalism”

 

Ruggie’s notion of “embedded liberalism compromise”[2]

-          emerged as “the result of the Depression and World War II” (126)

-          seeks to “foster pluralism in economics and politics and promotes international cooperation” (126) – like 19th century liberalism.

-          yet, difference from 19th century liberalism: Ruggie’s notion is “multilateral in character… and predicated upon domestic interventionism”[3]; like IL, “dependence of economics on politics” and no belief “in a harmony of interests” (126)

 

3.       IL – Pluralist conception of power and interests

 

“The people… should rule, but they have to rule through institutions”

“an antidote to fatalism and a source of hope”[4] – unlike Realism (127)

 

 

 

 

Questioning Institutional Liberalism

 

Purpose here: Evaluation of the last 20 years of liberal dominance (after the collapse of Soviet Union)

 

1.       Overview

 

-          Before 1991: Institutions – security justification (US and its allies against Soviet Union)

Ø  “to create economic prosperity and patterns of cooperation that would reinforce the position of the West in the struggle with the Soviet Union” (127)

Ø  American hegemony, esp the institutions created after WWII – “ ‘constructed on the basis of principles espoused by the United States, and American power was essential for their construction and maintenance’” (127)

Ø  Realist relative gain competition between the West and the Soviet bloc; Cooperation among the West (mutually beneficial cooperation)

Ø  Cooperation on the basis of “mutual self-interest and reciprocity, without much legalization

Ø  Towards many “robust international regimes”: monetary regimes (esp. 1958-1971, fixed EX), GATT (127)

Ø  1980s projection: “a continuation and gradual strengthening of international institutions grounded in domestic politics and achieving substantial cooperation on the basis largely of specific reciprocity” (128)

 

2.       Main Question

-          Since the early 1990s: the three trends noted above (legalization, increasing legalism and moralism, decline in the coherence of some international regimes)

=> Reassessement of IL in the light of the experience of the last 20 years

Ø  Does IL contain a hidden logic (explanation) for these three trends? Or has liberalism become inconsistent with the changes in power structures? (129)

 

3.       Definitions First:

-          Legalization: “property of institutions” where the rules are “precise and obligatory, and they provide arrangements for third-party adjudication” (128)

-          Coherence: “also a property of institutions, but refers more to the relationship among institutions than to the properties of any single institution” – Note on decline in the coherence of international regimes , becoming ‘regime complexes’ – “loosely coupled arrangements of rules, norms and institutions”\

-          Legalism and Moralism: “not properties of institutions but rather of the human mind” (130); Legalism: “the belief that moral and political progress can be made through the extension of law”; Moralism: “the belief that moral principles provide valuable, if not necessarily sufficient, guides to how political actors should behave….” (130)

 

4.       Critique

-          Keohane’s “ambibalen[ce]” on legalism (130):

Ø  Serves as a “veil” to the “hiding exercise of power” (130)

Ø  Stehen Krasner: “organized hypocrisy”[5] (130)

Ø  Overall, Keohane’s purpose to distinguish legalization from legalism.

 

-          E.H Carr also critical of moralism and legalism – calling them “utopian thinking”

 

 

 

Idealism and interests: the revival of moralism in world politics

 

1.       Since 1991: Language of moralism now “detached from great power struggles” (after 1991) (131)

-          Topics now: human rights, democracy, themes decried by ppl like Morgenthau and Kennan.

-          Unlike the realists view, Carr: Criticizes both realist (denial of values) and liberal (utopian) views “there is a world community for the reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community” – but this world community is thin – “the role of power is greater and that of morality less” and any “international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power”(131) – against the utopian view and also the realist denial on morality

-          Note on the potential danger of moralism:

“A concern for morality is therefore both essential and dangerous… a concern for morality is dangerous because in the hands of fools or demagogues it can become a pernicious form of moralism, serving not to check power but to justify its use in ways that are false and typically damaging” (131)

 

2.       Overall, moralism provides:

-          “impetus to social movements” (132)

-          “enhance the legitimacy of hegemonic states and the orders they seek to maintain” (132)

-          “moralism and also generate arrogance, facilitate the distortion of reality, and even conceal nefarious purposes” (132)

 



The revival of legalism and its penumbra (“increasing legalized”(133) IL since 1991)

 

1.       Four prominent examples of international legal institutions since 1991 (132):

-          The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993)

-          World trade law legalized in WTO (1995)

-          The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – permanent basis in 1998

-          The International Criminal Court (ICC) - 2002

* Efforts to “domesticate world politics” (133) – against Realist view of anarchy (vs. order of domestic politics)

 

2.       Yet, problematic of legalism:

-          “misattributed causality”: “law always rests on power and interests” (134)

Ø  E.H Carr: “‘the law is not an abstraction. It cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and of the political interests which it serves’[6]” (134)

-          “straitjacket for policy-makers” (134)

 

3.       Overall,

-           (+) “It can provide a rationale for smoothing the edges of rough order, motivating people to create more consistent legal arrangements that do, under the right conditions, have a positive impact” (134)

-           (-) “But legalism that ignores power and interests misattributes causality and limits adaptation to change.” (134)

 



Changes in structure and the decreasing coherence of international economic and environmental regimes

 

1.       Realist Scenarios of the past:

-           Gilpin: ‘recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy’[7]

-           Mearsheimer: Collapse of the USSR -> ‘back to the future’ to a world power politics in Europe’[8]

-           Waltz: dominance of US would generate a blocking coalition (balance of power theory; that “power generates attempts to counter it” – 134)

* above scenarios did not occur. Yet, the point is that “there is a counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative of Institutional Liberalism” (134)

 

2.       Striking Changes during the last 20 years:

-           Development of the Third World

-           Diversified interests -> “a progressive extension of international regimes… has been halted if not reversed” (134)

 

3.       Implications on Realism and IL (Mix of the Two) – Remaining relevance of Realism

-           Realism remains relevant: power and interest structures that lie below “the veil of rhetoric and law” (134) = “With the rise of China, India and other emerging economies, structures of power and interest have become more diverse; and as Structural Realism would have anticipated, the institutions that link major powers have been weakened, with more contention (134)

-           “As institutional theorists anticipated, many of these institutions persist despite changes in patterns of power and interests; but as Realists claimed, it has become increasingly difficult to construct strong new institutions” (135)

-           “We need to be careful, as E.H. Carr was, about the ways in which Realism remains relevant” (135)

 

4.       Is Realism then a good?

-           As E.H Carr, Keohane also views it as “not a good moral guide: it dodges many issues of ethical choice by unduly discounting how much choice leaders of great powers have. ‘Necessity’ is not a convincing justification for the very powerful.” (135)

-           Yet major lesson from Realism: “Institutions rest on power and changes in power generate changes in institutions.” (135)

-           Realism + the fact on domestic politics and learning

 

 

Conclusion

-           Overall, here, projection for the rise of “newly strong countries, as well as the obstacles that domestic politics places in the way of farsighted adaptation.” (136)

ð  Yet, this doesn’t mean a collapse of the existing system as “‘a set of networks, norms and institutions, once established will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange’[9]” (136)

-           Going back to Keohane’s first question: whether the changes of post-1991 are within the IL tradition:

Ø  His answer is “mixed”

Ø  Intrinsic features of liberalism: the first two trends (legalization, moralism and legalism)

Ø  Yet, decline in liberalism: the third trend (decline in the coherence of international regimes)

-           What to do now: Efforts less in legalism and moralism but to “form coalitions that will build and maintain coherent multilateral institutions to address the major challenges of our time” (136)

 

 

-           “Moralism, legalization and legalism reflect the fusion of power and social purpose represented by the dominance of liberalism since 1991” (136)

-           “decline in regime coherence stems from a divergence of interests, a diffusion of power, and the difficulties of persuading domestic democratic publics to bear the costs of adjustment” (136)

-           “Power continues to be important but institutions can help to tame it, and states whose leaders seek both to maintain and use power must be attentive, as E.H. Carr recognized, to issues of legitimacy. At the moment, legalism and moralism thrive, but the comprehensiveness and coherence of multilateral institutions are suffering. We need at this time less to profess and preach legalism and moralism than to figure out how to form coalitions that will build and maintain coherent multilateral institutions to address the major challenges of our time. The fact that these institutions are not foolproof is less a counsel of despair than a motivation to build them on as firm foundations as we can” (136)

-            

 

Comment/Critique points:

-           realist tenet on power + institutions, idea of legitimacy

-           Keohane’s proposal: “form coalitions that will build and maintain” the institutions

 



[1] John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36(2), 1982, pp. 379415, quotation on p. 382.

[2] Ruggie “International Regimes,” p.393

[3] Ruggie “International Regimes,” p.393

[4] Robert O. Keohane (2002) Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, p. 59

[5] Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[6] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 179.

[7] Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15(1), 1990, pp. 5056; the quotation is on p. 8.

[9] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th edn (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012), p. 46.



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[IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Neo-Marxist Approach on IR (Critical Theory of Hegemony)

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 13. 20:26

Cox, Robert (1981) “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 126-155.


*Neo-Marxist Approach to IR (Bringing Gramsci’s theory on hegemony)

- Realists-Marxists’s hegemony: domination by material capabilities

- Gramsci’s: hegemony separated from the idea of domination. Material capabilities-ethical-political ideology (강제가 아닌 합의-정통성에 바탕한 hegemony)

*Problem-solving Theories vs. Critical Theories

 

1. Overview: Changes in international relations (convention):

-          “actors (different kinds of state, and non-state entities)” (126)

-          “the range of stakes (low as well as high politics)” (126)

-          “greater diversity of goals pursued” (126)

-          “a greater complexity in the modes of interaction and the institutions within which action takes place” (126)

 

*In more specific (changes in intellectual conventions in IR)

-          18th & 19th century distinction between state and civil society (foreign policy as “pure expression of state interests”)

-          Replaced by society based on contract and market relations – state and civil society distinction blurred.

 

*Recent trends in theory:

-          “undermined” “conceptual unity of the state” (127)

Ø  “by perceiving it as the arena of competing bureaucratic entities” (127) : rational choice

Ø  “by introducing a range of private transnational activity and transgovernmental networks of relationships among fragments of state bureaucracies” (127)

ð  Yet these approaches are still limited, looking at the state as “a singular concept,” with “little attempt… to consider the state/society complex as the basic entity of international relations” (127) – Need for studies on the “plurality of forms of state” – “different configurations of state/society complexes” (127)

 

*Other attempts to fill “the gap” (127) – Breaking down the unitary concept of the state:

-          Marxist revival as alternatives to diversify the notion of state “by amplifying its social dimensions.” (127) – yet the implications are not strongly developed.

Ø  Defining the state as “a singularly-conceived capitalist mode of production” (127) (in reference to Althusser[1], Poulantzas[2])

Ø  Attention “away from state and class conflict to a motivational crisis in culture and ideology” (127) (in reference to Habermas[3])

ð  Yet, Limited Depth in the application of Marxism on IR: These approaches do not go “very far towards exploring the actual or historical differences among forms of state, or considering the implications of the differences for international behavior.” (127)

-          E.H. Carr and Eric Hobsbawm: social forces, the changing nature of the state and global relationships

-          Fernand Braudel: interrelationship between these forces in the 16th & 17th centuries

-          Immanuel Wallerstein (inspired by Braudel’s work): theory of world systems defined essentially in terms of social relations (exploitative exchange relations between a developed core and an underdeveloped periphery, different forms of labor control)

Ø  2 Main Weaknesses (Criticisms): state “as merely derivative from its position in the world system” and the “system-maintenance bias” – “Like structural-functional sociology, the approach is better at accounting for forces that maintain or restore a system’s equilibrium, than identifying contradictions which can lead to a system’s transformation.

 

 

2. “On Perspectives and Purposes”

(After the Overview of the ongoing tension against Neorealist assumptions, Cox goes on to illustrate his views on what theories are about. Here is where Cox distinguishes between the problem-solving and critical theories)

 

“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective… When any theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective” (128)

 

-          Two distinct purposes of theory

Ø  1) “problem-solving theory”:

n  “solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure” (128); “It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action” (128); 

n  The general aim: “to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly” (129);

n  “fragmented among a multiplicity of spheres… each of which assumes a certain stability in the other spheres” – “the institutional and relational parameters assumed” (129)

n  Toward “subdivision and limitation of the issue” (129) – narrowing down the scope

Ø  2) “critical theory”

n  “more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself: to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its relation to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world.” (128)

n  “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted”; the “parameters” problem-solving theory accept are questioned.

n  Towards “construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved.” (129)

n  “lack in precision” (129) in comparison to problem solving theory (ahistoric – fixed point): critical theory must continually adjust to changes (historic)

 

-          Limitations of problem solving theory:

Ø  The “assumption of fixity” = “a convenience of method” “ideological bias” “conservative” (129)

Ø  “value-bound” (unlike the proponents’ view that they are value free”) “by the virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework” (130)

Ø  Moreover, unlike problem-solving theory, Critical theory: clarifies range of “alternatives” – “contains utopianism” that “it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order” – thus can guide to “strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order.” (130)

 

Historic vs. Ahistoric

Critical (Changer) vs. Status-quo Parameters

Comprehensive vs. Precision

Utopianism vs. Conservatism..?

 

-   Note on World order and Critical Theory: “a condition of uncertainty in power relations beckons to critical theory as people seek to understand the opportunities and risks of change.” (130) ~ e.g. 1970s

 

“To reason about possible future world orders now,” critical theory is needed to broaden “our enquiry beyond conventional international relations, so as to encompass basic processes at work in the development of social forces and forms of state, and in the structure of global political economy” (130) – Neo-Marxist and political economy perspective as an alternative to realist theory driven field.

 

 

3. “Realism, Marxism and an Approach to a Critical Theory of World Order”

 

Marxism considered as a preliminary attempt to develop a critical approach to interstate relations and world orders

 

*Realism

-          Origin in a historical mode of thought: Friedrich Meinecke (1957), E.H Carr, Ludwig Dehio (delineating particular configuration of forces in different periods to understand within their historical contexts) – historic view that things are susceptible to change

-          However, Since WWII: Realism transformed into a form of problem-solving theory (Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz), “coinciding with the Cold War” – “imposing bipolarity” upon IR (131)

-          Characteristics by three levels in this new realism: fundamental and unchanging 1) nature of man; 2) the nature of states; 3) the nature of the state system

ð  These core assumptions lead to “variations on always recurrent themes”; conclusion that “the future will always be like the past.” (131)

ð  The idea of rationality and game theories in this tradition reinforce “the nonhistorical mode of thinking” (132)

 

Debate against Realism(Problem-solving theory)

-          Debate between the civil philosophy of Hobbes and the natural-law theory of Grotius in the 17th (based on different perspectives on the nature of man, the state and the interstate system)

-          Against the Realist view, Neapolitan Giambattista Vico argued for continuity (Critical Theory): Vico criticized the “conceit of scholars” (Vico) who will have it that “what they know is as old as the world” (Vico) “consists in taking a form of thought derived from a particular phase of history… and assuming it to be universally valid. This is an error of neorealism and more generally, the flawed foundation of all problem-solving theory.” (133)

 

*“How does Marxism relate to this method or approach to a theory of world order?”

 

-          Two divergent currents in Marxism:

1)       Historical approach to social relations: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (Marx, Eric Hobsbawm, Gramsci)

Ø  “a foremost source of critical theory and it corrects neorealism in four important aspects”(133):

i)                     Dialectic at two levels (logic and history): “exploration of contradictions” for truth seeking and “potential for alternative forms”… Neorealism sees conflict “as a recurrent consequence of a continuing structure, whereas historical materialism sees conflict as a possible cause of structural change” (134)

ii)                   Focus on Imperialism: Historical materialism gives a “vertical dimension of power” among the states. (134)

iii)                  Enlarging the realist perspective (the relationship between the state and civil society (134)

iv)                 Production process as a critical element

 

2)       Ahistorical approach – framework for the analysis of the capitalist state and society: STRUCTURAL MARXISM (Althusser and Poulantzas)

 

*Basic Premises of Critical Theory

 

1)       Embeddedness of our actions (Our actions within the shared paradigm)…? “an awareness that action is never absolutely free but takes place within a framework for action which constitutes its problematic” (135)

2)       Embeddeness of theory “a realization that not only action but also theory is shaped by the problematic” (135)

3)       Changes… “the framework for action changes over time and a principal goal of critical theory is to understand these changes” (135)

4)       “historical structure” – combination… “the context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within which action takes place” (135)

5)       “the framework or structure within which action takes place is to be viewed… from the bottom or from outside in terms of the conflicts which arise within it and open the possibility of its transformation” (135)

 

 

4. “Frameworks for Actions: Historical Structures”

 

= “a particular configuration of forces”

 

*Three categories of forces within a structure:

1) material capabilities: e.g. technological and organizational capabilities, accumulated forms of resources

2) ideas: 2 kinds – intersubjective(organized/commanded by states) or those shared notions (“collective images of social order held by different groups of people”) (136)

3) institutions: “means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations.” (136)

 

*The method of historical structures:

- “limited totalities”: it does not “represent the whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality; static is avoided by “juxtaposing and connecting historical structures in related spheres of action.” (137)

- “contrast models”: “a simplified representation of a complex reality and an expression of tendencies… rather than fully realized models.” (137)

 

*The method of historical structures applied to the three levels/spheres of activity (while these three levels are “interrelated”:

1) the organization of production (“the social forces engendered by the production process” (138))

2) “forms of state as derived from a study of state/society complexes” (138)

3) “world orders”

=> “Considered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions… Considered in relation to each other, and thus moving towards a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others.” (138)

 

Shortly after: how the configuration of the three categories of forces allows us to see and determine the changes in the world order (social forces shaped by production relations – between capital and labor).

 

Main assumption: social relations as the basis of World Order; States as institution as any other in history (State as a distinctive form of political community with its own particular functions, roles, and responsibilities that are socially and historically determined).

 

 

5. “Hegemony and World Orders”

(Towards Cox’s Critical Theory of International System Neorealist static explanation of hegemony and world orders vs. Historic view…)

 

> Neo-realism – material forces focused

 

> Viewed in historical structures:

Ø  Pax Britannica

1)       Material capabilities: sea power

2)       Ideas (norms): free trade, gold standard, free movement of K&L – neoliberal economics

3)       Institutions: None but the ideological separation between economics and politics -> presence of universal rules

Ø  In transition (late 19th ~WWII)

1)       Material capabilities: weakened

2)       Ideas (norms): faltered with the rise of protectionism, the new imperialisms, and ultimately the end of the gold standard

3)       Institutions: as result, collapsed into a world of rival power blocs

 

Ø  Pax Americana:

based on greater number of formal international institutions; increased role of state after WWII and the Great Depression. – “ideology is a determining sphere of action which has to be understood in its connections with material power relations”

 

6.Cox’s Redefinition of Hegemony: “Social Forces, Hegemony and Imperialism”

– often called as Cox’s Critical Theory of Hegemony

 

 

*Despite the explanatory power of using the configuration of material power, ideology and institutions, the theory still cannot explain why and how of a hegemony:

Ø  “hegemony may seem to lend itself to a cyclical theory of history; the three dimensions fitting together in certain times and places and coming apart in others… What is missing is some theory as to how and why the fit comes about and comes apart” (141)

ð  Cox’s Explanation here: by “social forces shaped by production relations” (Capital and Labor Relations) – Political Economy Perspective on IR – which he argues to be more fit as a critical and historic view, able to illustrate the processes of a hegemony:

By taking this perspective (political economy) “we move from identifying the structural characteristics of world orders as configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions… to explaining their origins, growth and demise in terms of the interrelationships of the three levels of structures” (141)

 

ð  (Example: Rise and fall of hegemonic order in terms of capitalism that mobilized social forces in specific directions (power seen as “emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities[(neorealists-power fetishism)], that is as the result of these processes [(Marx)] (141))

 

*Social Forces & Pax Britannica: Rise and Fall both explained by the development of social forces

- Ascendancy: class based social forces of manufacturing capitalism (bourgeoisie in Europe)

- Demise: emergence of industrial workers – industrialization and mobilization of social classes (liberal form of state “slowly replaced by the welfare nationalist form of state”) changed the international configuration of power

- Capitalist production & periphery: new social forces created in the periphery (liberal imperialism):

“imperial system is a world order structure drawing support from a particular configuration of social forces, national and transnational, and of core and periphery states… Actions are shaped either directly by pressures projected through the system or indirectly by the subjective awareness on the part of actors of the constraints imposed by the system”(144)

 

Two main questions to answer whether pax Americana come apart:

1)       “What are the mechanisms for maintaining hegemony in this particular historical structure” (144)

-          “internationalization of the state” (144)

-          “internationalization of production” (146)

-          Idea of FREE TRADE

 

2)       “What social forces and/or forms of state have been generated within it which could oppose and ultimately bring about a transformation of the structure?” (144)

-          “international production and class structure” (147) – “international production is mobilizing social forces, and it is through these forces that its major political consequences vis-à-vis the nature of states and future world orders may be anticipated.” (147)

-          But this idea of Free Trade is for a specific class structure (지배계급) – beneficial for hegemony, and not for the third world countries…

 

7. “Social forces, state structures, and future world order prospects”

 

Predictions of future world order (one of the functions of critical theories) – “social forces generated by changing production processes are the starting point for thinking about possible futures” (149)

 

i)                    New hegemony based upon the global structure of social power generated by the internationalizing of production (inter-state power configuration among US, Germany, Japan and other OECD countries, coopted third worlds, OPEC)

ii)                  Non-hegemonic world structure of conflicting power centers (neo-mercantilist coalitions…)

“more remotely possible outcome” (150): Development of a counter-hegemony based on a Third World coalition against core country dominance…

 

 

Overall,

*an attempt to sketch a method for understanding global power relations

*Cox’s critical international theory = a social approach; historicist mode of understanding world order (influenced by Vico, Gramsci, and Braudel); international system must consider the social and historical construction of both agents and structures that underlie economic and political interaction.

*theories are for someone and for some purpose. Therefore if the structures of the time changes, then the ideas and values change. Unlike the realist view on what they call fundamentals, Cox’s view is transformative. *Realism in this sense is a mere reflection of the current hegemon and 지배계급, which can be used to as a tool to maintain the status-quo power structure.

*Brief sketch of Neo-Marxist Approach to IR

 

Rather than problem-solving preoccupation with the maintenance of social power relationships, a critical theory of hegemony directs attention to questioning the prevailing order of the world. It ‘does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing” (p. 129) Thus, it is specifically critical in the sense of asking how existing social or world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order. As such, a critical theory develops a dialectical theory of history concerned not just with the past but with a continual process of historical change and with exploring the potential for alternative forms of development. Cox’s critical theory of hegemony thus focuses on interaction between particular processes, notably springing from the dialectical possibilities of change within the sphere of production and the exploitative character of social relations, not as unchanging ahistorical essences but as a continuing creation of new forms.[4]

 

 

 



[1] Structural Marxism

[2] (1936-79) Greek neo-Marxist – the concept of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the capitalist state –the ‘structural position’ of the state – the status of state as a servant of capitalism <Political Power and Social Classes> (1968) - despite its formal separation from the institutions of economic production, the state promotes accumulation by maintaining the cohesion of capitalist society and its characteristic class system. Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/nicos-poulantzas#ixzz3AEuQOSDu

[3] Theory of “cognitive interests”- all knowledge is constituted through one of the three generic domains of human interest: 1) technical knowledge (scientific research domains); 2) practical knowledge (social interaction realm – historical-hermeneutic disciplines); 3) Emancipatory knowledge (self-knowledge, self refelction)

[4] Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton “A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations,” Capital & Class, Vol. 82, pp. 85-114.

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[IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1954) Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 10. 18:23

(INCOMPLETE) 

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Man, the State, and War

저자
Waltz, Kenneth N. 지음
출판사
Columbia University Press | 2001-01-01 출간
카테고리
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책소개
-- American Political Science Revie...
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Kenneth N. Waltz

Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis

New York, Columbia University Press, 1954 (1959 edition)


RQ: Where are the major causes of war to be found?

-          3 Levels:

1)      “within man” (p. 12) – the first image

2)      “within the structure of the separate states” (p. 12) – the second image

3)      “within the state system” (p. 12) – the third image

-          “Within each image there are optimists and pessimists agreeing on definitions of causes and differing on what, if anything, can be done about them (p. 19)”


Chapter I. Introduction

 

1.      Fleeting moments of Peace

“fleeting moments of peace among states. There is an apparent disproportion between effort and product, between desire and result.” (p. 1)

 

“Can we have peace more often in the future than in the past?” (p. 1)

 

2.      Human nature?

Human Nature as Evil

“Our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war…”

St. Augustine, Luther, Malthus, Swift, Inge, and Niebuhr…

“In secular terms, with men defined as beings of intermixed reason and passion in whom passion repeatedly triumphs, the belief has informed the philosophy, including the political philosophy…(p. 3)”

 

Yet, “Does man make society in his image or does his society make him?” (p. 4)

-          Rousseau = society makes man:

Ø  “man being a social animal, one can explain his behavior in society by pointing to his animal passion and/or his human reason. Man is born and in his natural condition remains neither good nor bad. It is society that is the degrading force in men’s lives, but it is the moralizing agency as well,” although unwilling to surrender on the latter and “lamented the advent of society” (p. 3-4, Waltz)

Ø  Like Plato, “believes that a bad polity makes men bad, and a good polity makes them good” (Waltz, p. 4)

-          Thomas Malthus = man makes society

Ø  “though human institutions appear to be the obvious and obtrusive causes of much mischief to mankind; yet in reality, they are light and superficial, they are mere feathers that float on the surface, in comparison with those deeper seated causes of impurity that corrupt the springs, and render turbid the whole stream of human life”[1]

 

3.      System (Structure)

-          Origins – Rousseau, who found that the major causes of war neither in men nor states but in the state system itself – one man cannot begin to behave unless he has some assurance that others will not be able to ruin him (“The State of War” Essay) => basis for balance of power approaches to IR.

 

“Aggressive tendencies may be inherent, but is there misdirection inevitable? War begins in the minds and emotions of men, as all acts do; but can minds and feelings be changed?” (p. 9)

 

 

Chapter II. The First Image: International Conflict and Human Behavior

- by reviewing the below four figures’ works…

 

*First image of IR: “causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity. Other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors. If these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social re-adjustment. This estimate of causes and cures has been dominant in the writings of many serious students of human affairs from Confucius to present-day pacifists. It is the leitmotif of many modern behavioral scientists as well” (p. 16)

 

*Pessimists (Niebuhr, St. Augustine, Spinoza, Morgenthau)

-          Reinhold Niebuhr[2]:

Ø  “potentiality of evil in all human acts”, in every progress, there is the “potentiality of evil as well as of good” (p. 21, Waltz) – progress causing harm to the other…

Ø  “Man, a self-conscious being, senses his limits. They are inherent. Equally inherent is his desire to overcome them. Man is a finite being with infinite aspirations, a pigmy who thinks himself a giant. .. he is born and reared in insecurity and seeks to make himself absolutely secure; he is a man but thinks himself a god. The seat of evil is the self, and the quality of evil can be defined in terms of pride.” (p. 21, Waltz)

Ø  Niebuhr’s thoughts dates back to the Christian tradition – St. Augustine, and also to the philosophy of Spinoza, and then also in Morgenthau’s (20th century)

 

-          “These four writers, despite their numerous differences unite in basing their political conclusions upon an assumed nature of man” (p. 21)

-          St. Augustine[3]: the desire for self-preservation in the hierarchy of human motivations is “an observed fact” (p. 22)

Ø  “original sin” (p. 23) “Human reason and will are both defective” (“Each man does seek his own interest, but, unfortunately, not according to the dictates of reason”, (p. 23))

-          Spinoza: “the end of every act is the self-preservation of the actor” (p. 22)

Ø  “Reason can moderate the passions, but this is so difficult that those who think that men” (Waltz, p. 24) “can ever be induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.”[4]

-          Key similarities:

Ø  Niebuhr: War has its origin in “dark, unconscious source in the human psyche”[5] (p. 25)

Ø  Morgenthau: “the ubiquity of evil in human action” arising from man’s ineradicable lust for power and transforming “churches into political organizations… revolutions into dictatorships… love for country into imperialism.”[6]

Ø  St. Augustine: man’s “love of so many vain and hurtful things” a long list of human tribulations, ranging from quarrels.. wars[7]

Ø  Spinoza: although states are not never honorable but peaceful, passion often obscures the true interests of states as of men.

 

-          Important distinction here:

Ø  “Spinoza’s explanation of political and social ills is based on the conflict he detects between reason and passion.” (p. 24)

Ø  “St. Augustine, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau reject the dualism explicit in Spinoza’s thought: the whole man, his mind and his body, are, according to them, defective.” (p. 24)

 

*Optimists:

-          See a possibility of turning the wicked into the good and ending the wars that result from present balance-of-power politics.

 

*Critical Evaluation on attributing “political ills to a fixed nature of man” (p. 27)

- recurrent theme in Augustine, Spinoza, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau (that the nature of man has an inherent potentiality for evil as well as for good.

 

-          Evaluation: Incomplete… Hard to prove

Ø  “It is a statement that evidence cannot prove or disprove, for what we make of the evidence depends on the theory we hold.” (p. 28)

Ø  “To attempt to explain social forms on the basis of psychological data is to commit the error of psychologism: the analysis of individual behavior used uncritically to explain group phenomena” (p. 28)

Ø  Emile Durkheim: “the psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of social phenomena. Since it does not call for one social form rather than another, it cannot explain any of them”[8]

Ø  “Human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910. In the intervening years many things changed, but human nature did not” (p. 28)

Ø  “If human nature is the cause of war and if, as in the systems of the first-image pessimists, human nature is fixed, then we can never hope for peace. If human nature is but one of the causes of war, then, even on the assumption that human nature is fixed, we can properly carry on a search for the conditions of peace.” (p. 30)

Ø  Overall, both Durkheim and the pessimists(realists) such as Niebuhr and Augustine are half correct: “Human nature may not explain why in one state man is enslaved and in another comparatively free, why in one year there is war, in another comparative peace. It can, however, explain the necessary imperfections of all social and political forms” (p. 30)

 

* Pessimists vs. Optimists (Realists vs. Utopians)

 

*Conclusion:

> “The evilness of men, or their improper behavior, leads to war; individual goodness, if it could be universalized, would mean peace: this is a summary statement of the first image”

> “What first-image analysts, optimists and pessimists alike have done is: (1) to notice conflict, (2) to ask themselves why conflict occurs, and (3) to pin the blame on one or a small number of behavior traits” (p. 39)

> “The assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood, itself helps to shift attention away from human-nature – because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot be changed, whereas social-political institutions can be.” (p. 41)

 


Chapter III. Some Implications of the First Image: The Behavioral Sciences and the Reduction of Interstate Violence

 

“Nevertheless one can distinguish several different approaches within the behavioral sciences. It is widely held that increased understanding among peoples means increased peace.”

 

*Society as the patient.

 

*Lawrence Frank’s logic: War is a social institution, not a necessary product of man’s nature. This is proved by the fact that in some societies war is unknown. Since institutions are social inventions, if we want to get rid of one institution, we must invent another to take its place.[9] People engage in duels only so long as the custom of dueling exists in their society…. Warfare, like the duel and trial by combat, “is just an invention known to the majority of human societies by which they permit their young men either to accumulate prestige or avenge their honor.”[10]

 

*”considering a quality shared by pacifists and many behavioral scientists suggests the more general point that in the absence of an elaborated theory of international politics the causes one finds and the remedies one proposes are often more closely related to temper and training than to the objects and events of the world about us. The pacifist’s appeal, like that of Alexander Leighton, is for treatment of the deep-seated causes of war. The one approaches this from the realm of spirit, the other with the techniques of psychiatry. The pacifist waits and quietly hopes that men will behave as God intended they should,..” (p. 77)

 


Chapter IV. The Second Image: International Conflict and the Internal Structure of States

 

*First image imagery:

> “pot boils when we mean the water in it boils (p. 80)”

*The second image imagery:

> water from the “faucet is chemically the same as water in a container, but once the water is in a container, it can be made to “behave” in different ways… (p. 80)”

 

*Second Image: “the idea that defects in states cause wars among them” (p. 83)

 

*What is the definition of the “good” state?

> Karl Marx: in terms of ownership of the means of production

> Immanuel Kant: in terms of abstract principles of right

>Woodrow Wilson: in terms of national self-determination and modern democracy

=> Reforms as the sine qua non of world peace.

 

*Domestic Politics: Liberal View

-What makes it run smoothly? = Utilitarian-liberalists: liberty, small government (Decentralization), economy(laissez-faire)

> Adam Smith (market mechanism, unnatural inequalities = caused by governmental interference)

> Ricardo

>John Stuart Mill

>Jeremy Bentham

 

Yet… “The liberals’ insistence on economy, decentralization, and freedom from governmental regulation makes sense only if their assumption that society is self-regulating is valid. Because a self-regulating society is a necessary means, in effect it becomes part of the liberals’ ideal end. If a laissez-faire policy is possible only on the basis of conditions described as necessary, the laissez-faire ideal may itself require state action.” (p. 95)

 

*International Relations: Liberal View

 

 

Chapter V. Some Implications of the Second Image: International Socialism and the Coming of the First World War

 

Is it capitalism, or states, or both that must be abolished?

 

 

 

Chapter VI. The Third Image: International Conflict and International Anarchy

 

“everyone’s policy depends upon everyone else’s(p. 226)” – the third image - “there is a constant possibility of war in a world in which there are two or more states each seeking to promote a set of interests and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for protection (227)”

 

“The state of nature among men is a monstrous impossibility. Anarchy breeds war among them; government establishes the conditions for peace...” (p. 227)

 

“In each image a cause is identified in terms of which all others are to be understood.” (p. 228)



[1] Malthus, Thomas (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population, pp. 47-48.

[2] Niebuhr, Reinhold and Sherwood Eddy (1936) Doom and Dawn, Eddy and Page., p. 16: “It is the human effort to make our partial values absolute which is always the final sin in human life; and it always results in the most bloody of human conflicts.”

[3] Augustine, Saint (1948) The City of God

[4] Spinoza, Political Treatise

[5] Niebuhr, Reinhold (1938) Beyond Tragedy, p. 158

[6] Morgenthau, Hans (1946) Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 194-95

[7] Augustine, Saint (1948) The City of God

[8] Durkheim, Emile (1938) The Rules of Sociological Method, p. 108.

[9] Mead, Margaret (1942) And Keep Your Power Dry, pp. 182-83, 211-14, 242.

[10] Mead, Margaret (1940) “Warfare Is Only an Invention – Not a Biological Necessity,” Asia, XL, pp. 402-5

 

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[IRTheories-Level of Analysis] Jervis, Robert (1976) “Perceptions and the Level-of-Analysis Problem,”

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 10. 18:19



Perception and Misperception in International Politics

저자
Jervis, Robert, 지음
출판사
Princeton University Press | 1976-11-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
This book demonstrates that decisio...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  

Jervis, Robert (1976) “Perceptions and the Level-of-Analysis Problem,” ch. 1, in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press.


Overview (Jervis)

Jervis’s renowned work Perception and Misperception in International Politics

-          Contrast to rational-choice

-          Contrast to “the traditional approach” discussed by Wolfers – “State-as-the-sole-actors approach”

-          Equivalent/Similar to Waltz’s First Image – focus on individual actors and their decision-making process

-          Main points

1.        Weaknesses of non-decision making level analysis:

1) international environment (external factor): “The environment may influence the general outline of the state’s policy but not its specific responses” (pg. 17); to test how changes in international environment alter behaviors is near impossible.

2) national/domestic determinants (internal): “If states of the same type behave in the same way, then changes in a state’s leadership will not produce significant changes in foreign policy, and we need not examine the images, values, and calculations of individual decision-makers. Unfortunately, claims about continuity in a state’s foreign policy are notoriously difficult to judge…” (pg. 22);

3) bureaucratic

2.        Decision-making approach and the perceptions and misperceptions of the world and how they diverge from reality in detectable patterns.

3.        Psychological analysis incorporated to view how decision-makers process information, and form, maintain, and change their beliefs about international relations and other actors.

4.        Presence of misperception undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretical models

5.        (pg28) “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others.” “…even if we found that people in the same situation – be it international, domestic, or bureaucratic – behave in the same way, it is useful to examine decision-making if there are constant differences between the decision-makers’ perceptions and reality” (Wolfers’ house on fire – circular logic back to decision makers)

-          Critique:

1.        Limits of psychological analysis

2.        Focus on misperception

3.        Difficulty in patternization – Theoretical rigorousness debatable

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