'현실주의'에 해당되는 글 2건

  1. 2014.08.13 [IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Institutional Liberalism
  2. 2014.07.25 [IR-Power and Classical Realism]

[IR-Neorealism and its Competitors] Institutional Liberalism

[연구] Research 2014. 8. 13. 20:32

Keohane, Robert (2012) “Twenty Years of Institutionalism Liberalism,” International Relations, Vol. 26, pp. 125-138.


*A paper that clearly outlines the theoretical relevance of Realism on Institutional Liberalism

 

Purpose of this paper:

-          to use Carr’s perspective in The Twenty Years’ Crisis to interrogate Institutional Liberalism

-          identify three trends (legalization, increasing legalism and moralism, decline in the coherence of some international regimes) – reviewed in light of Realist critiques of liberalism

 

 

Introduction

 

1.       What is Institutional Liberalism (IL)?

 

Institutional Liberalism (IL): Cooperation in world politics can be enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions based on liberal principles.

-          (Keohane) originating from John Ruggie’s conception of international political authority (30yrs ago) – IL as one basis for the political authority – ‘fusion of power and legitimate social purpose’[1]

-          Institutions and rules can facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation within and among states

-          The social purpose: “to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of more peaceful, prosperous and free world.” (126)

-          Yet, realist assumptions are not negated (“[no belief] in a harmony of interests” – 126)

 

*Note on the difference between IL and Liberalism:

-          IL “very different” from what E.H Carr describes as “liberalism” (“which is the 19th century liberalism based on abstract rational principles” – “harmony of interests based on a ‘synthesis of morality and reason’”; “separated power from economics” (126)

 

2.       More on Ruggie (from which IL originates, according to Keohane) – “embedded liberalism”

 

Ruggie’s notion of “embedded liberalism compromise”[2]

-          emerged as “the result of the Depression and World War II” (126)

-          seeks to “foster pluralism in economics and politics and promotes international cooperation” (126) – like 19th century liberalism.

-          yet, difference from 19th century liberalism: Ruggie’s notion is “multilateral in character… and predicated upon domestic interventionism”[3]; like IL, “dependence of economics on politics” and no belief “in a harmony of interests” (126)

 

3.       IL – Pluralist conception of power and interests

 

“The people… should rule, but they have to rule through institutions”

“an antidote to fatalism and a source of hope”[4] – unlike Realism (127)

 

 

 

 

Questioning Institutional Liberalism

 

Purpose here: Evaluation of the last 20 years of liberal dominance (after the collapse of Soviet Union)

 

1.       Overview

 

-          Before 1991: Institutions – security justification (US and its allies against Soviet Union)

Ø  “to create economic prosperity and patterns of cooperation that would reinforce the position of the West in the struggle with the Soviet Union” (127)

Ø  American hegemony, esp the institutions created after WWII – “ ‘constructed on the basis of principles espoused by the United States, and American power was essential for their construction and maintenance’” (127)

Ø  Realist relative gain competition between the West and the Soviet bloc; Cooperation among the West (mutually beneficial cooperation)

Ø  Cooperation on the basis of “mutual self-interest and reciprocity, without much legalization

Ø  Towards many “robust international regimes”: monetary regimes (esp. 1958-1971, fixed EX), GATT (127)

Ø  1980s projection: “a continuation and gradual strengthening of international institutions grounded in domestic politics and achieving substantial cooperation on the basis largely of specific reciprocity” (128)

 

2.       Main Question

-          Since the early 1990s: the three trends noted above (legalization, increasing legalism and moralism, decline in the coherence of some international regimes)

=> Reassessement of IL in the light of the experience of the last 20 years

Ø  Does IL contain a hidden logic (explanation) for these three trends? Or has liberalism become inconsistent with the changes in power structures? (129)

 

3.       Definitions First:

-          Legalization: “property of institutions” where the rules are “precise and obligatory, and they provide arrangements for third-party adjudication” (128)

-          Coherence: “also a property of institutions, but refers more to the relationship among institutions than to the properties of any single institution” – Note on decline in the coherence of international regimes , becoming ‘regime complexes’ – “loosely coupled arrangements of rules, norms and institutions”\

-          Legalism and Moralism: “not properties of institutions but rather of the human mind” (130); Legalism: “the belief that moral and political progress can be made through the extension of law”; Moralism: “the belief that moral principles provide valuable, if not necessarily sufficient, guides to how political actors should behave….” (130)

 

4.       Critique

-          Keohane’s “ambibalen[ce]” on legalism (130):

Ø  Serves as a “veil” to the “hiding exercise of power” (130)

Ø  Stehen Krasner: “organized hypocrisy”[5] (130)

Ø  Overall, Keohane’s purpose to distinguish legalization from legalism.

 

-          E.H Carr also critical of moralism and legalism – calling them “utopian thinking”

 

 

 

Idealism and interests: the revival of moralism in world politics

 

1.       Since 1991: Language of moralism now “detached from great power struggles” (after 1991) (131)

-          Topics now: human rights, democracy, themes decried by ppl like Morgenthau and Kennan.

-          Unlike the realists view, Carr: Criticizes both realist (denial of values) and liberal (utopian) views “there is a world community for the reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community” – but this world community is thin – “the role of power is greater and that of morality less” and any “international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power”(131) – against the utopian view and also the realist denial on morality

-          Note on the potential danger of moralism:

“A concern for morality is therefore both essential and dangerous… a concern for morality is dangerous because in the hands of fools or demagogues it can become a pernicious form of moralism, serving not to check power but to justify its use in ways that are false and typically damaging” (131)

 

2.       Overall, moralism provides:

-          “impetus to social movements” (132)

-          “enhance the legitimacy of hegemonic states and the orders they seek to maintain” (132)

-          “moralism and also generate arrogance, facilitate the distortion of reality, and even conceal nefarious purposes” (132)

 



The revival of legalism and its penumbra (“increasing legalized”(133) IL since 1991)

 

1.       Four prominent examples of international legal institutions since 1991 (132):

-          The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993)

-          World trade law legalized in WTO (1995)

-          The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – permanent basis in 1998

-          The International Criminal Court (ICC) - 2002

* Efforts to “domesticate world politics” (133) – against Realist view of anarchy (vs. order of domestic politics)

 

2.       Yet, problematic of legalism:

-          “misattributed causality”: “law always rests on power and interests” (134)

Ø  E.H Carr: “‘the law is not an abstraction. It cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and of the political interests which it serves’[6]” (134)

-          “straitjacket for policy-makers” (134)

 

3.       Overall,

-           (+) “It can provide a rationale for smoothing the edges of rough order, motivating people to create more consistent legal arrangements that do, under the right conditions, have a positive impact” (134)

-           (-) “But legalism that ignores power and interests misattributes causality and limits adaptation to change.” (134)

 



Changes in structure and the decreasing coherence of international economic and environmental regimes

 

1.       Realist Scenarios of the past:

-           Gilpin: ‘recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy’[7]

-           Mearsheimer: Collapse of the USSR -> ‘back to the future’ to a world power politics in Europe’[8]

-           Waltz: dominance of US would generate a blocking coalition (balance of power theory; that “power generates attempts to counter it” – 134)

* above scenarios did not occur. Yet, the point is that “there is a counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative of Institutional Liberalism” (134)

 

2.       Striking Changes during the last 20 years:

-           Development of the Third World

-           Diversified interests -> “a progressive extension of international regimes… has been halted if not reversed” (134)

 

3.       Implications on Realism and IL (Mix of the Two) – Remaining relevance of Realism

-           Realism remains relevant: power and interest structures that lie below “the veil of rhetoric and law” (134) = “With the rise of China, India and other emerging economies, structures of power and interest have become more diverse; and as Structural Realism would have anticipated, the institutions that link major powers have been weakened, with more contention (134)

-           “As institutional theorists anticipated, many of these institutions persist despite changes in patterns of power and interests; but as Realists claimed, it has become increasingly difficult to construct strong new institutions” (135)

-           “We need to be careful, as E.H. Carr was, about the ways in which Realism remains relevant” (135)

 

4.       Is Realism then a good?

-           As E.H Carr, Keohane also views it as “not a good moral guide: it dodges many issues of ethical choice by unduly discounting how much choice leaders of great powers have. ‘Necessity’ is not a convincing justification for the very powerful.” (135)

-           Yet major lesson from Realism: “Institutions rest on power and changes in power generate changes in institutions.” (135)

-           Realism + the fact on domestic politics and learning

 

 

Conclusion

-           Overall, here, projection for the rise of “newly strong countries, as well as the obstacles that domestic politics places in the way of farsighted adaptation.” (136)

ð  Yet, this doesn’t mean a collapse of the existing system as “‘a set of networks, norms and institutions, once established will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange’[9]” (136)

-           Going back to Keohane’s first question: whether the changes of post-1991 are within the IL tradition:

Ø  His answer is “mixed”

Ø  Intrinsic features of liberalism: the first two trends (legalization, moralism and legalism)

Ø  Yet, decline in liberalism: the third trend (decline in the coherence of international regimes)

-           What to do now: Efforts less in legalism and moralism but to “form coalitions that will build and maintain coherent multilateral institutions to address the major challenges of our time” (136)

 

 

-           “Moralism, legalization and legalism reflect the fusion of power and social purpose represented by the dominance of liberalism since 1991” (136)

-           “decline in regime coherence stems from a divergence of interests, a diffusion of power, and the difficulties of persuading domestic democratic publics to bear the costs of adjustment” (136)

-           “Power continues to be important but institutions can help to tame it, and states whose leaders seek both to maintain and use power must be attentive, as E.H. Carr recognized, to issues of legitimacy. At the moment, legalism and moralism thrive, but the comprehensiveness and coherence of multilateral institutions are suffering. We need at this time less to profess and preach legalism and moralism than to figure out how to form coalitions that will build and maintain coherent multilateral institutions to address the major challenges of our time. The fact that these institutions are not foolproof is less a counsel of despair than a motivation to build them on as firm foundations as we can” (136)

-            

 

Comment/Critique points:

-           realist tenet on power + institutions, idea of legitimacy

-           Keohane’s proposal: “form coalitions that will build and maintain” the institutions

 



[1] John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36(2), 1982, pp. 379415, quotation on p. 382.

[2] Ruggie “International Regimes,” p.393

[3] Ruggie “International Regimes,” p.393

[4] Robert O. Keohane (2002) Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, p. 59

[5] Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[6] Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 179.

[7] Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15(1), 1990, pp. 5056; the quotation is on p. 8.

[9] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th edn (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012), p. 46.



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[IR-Power and Classical Realism]

[연구] Research 2014. 7. 25. 19:12



The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

저자
Mearsheimer, John J. 지음
출판사
W W Norton & Co Inc | 2003-01-01 출간
카테고리
인문/사회
책소개
A decade after the end of the Cold ...
가격비교 글쓴이 평점  

Overview (Mearsheimer)

Offensive Realism - Great Powers Behavior – Perpetual Rivalry

Ø  Main Cause: International System (Anarchy)  (d. Hobbesian, Morgenthau’s classical realism)

Ø  Goal: Survival

Ø  Best Strategy: Maximization of Power at the expense of other rivals (vs. Waltz’s defensive, structural realism)

Ø  Result: Zero-sum perpetual competition, offensive great powers

 

Mearsheimer’s pessimistic outlook on peace = firm neorealist outlook (Structural theory of international politics)

ð  State actors (Rational) – Structure (Anarchy) – Competition(Zero-Sum) – Maximization of power - Survival

“Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival (p. xi, Preface)”


Chapter I. Introduction

1.      Firm pessimism on the idea of “perpetual peace(p. 1)” among the great powers

-          Although without outright war, conflicts, competitions persist (e.g. US army bases around the globe, Germany, Japan, China-US on Taiwan) (p. 2)

2.      Great Power Behaviors:

-          Overriding goal = Power Maximization: “maximize its share of world power (p.2)” (power maximization)

-          Perpetual Competition: “rarely content with the current distribution of power”; “almost always have revisionist intentions”; “the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony”; and since “no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition” (p.2)

-          Offensive: “Simply put, great powers are primed for offense(p.3)”

3.      “Why do great powers behave this way” (His Main Question) = “the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (His Main Answer – via Structure) (p. 3) = anarchic structure

-          Critical comparison point to classical realism (human nature – Hobbes)

-          3 features of international system pinpointed – anarchy – fear - uncertainty:

1)      “absence of a central authority” above all states (p.3)

2)      “states always have some offensive military capability” (p.3)

3)      Uncertainty: “states can never be certain about other states’ intentions” (p.3)

 

4.      Offensive Realism (His Theory):

-          Main Task:

1)      Explaining the Great powers behaviors

2)      Explaining the history of politics: To address 8 “historical puzzles(p. 6)

Ø  What accounts for the three longest and bloodiest wars in modern history? The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, WWI, WWII

Ø  What accounts for the long periods of relative peace in Europe (1816-1852, 1871-1913, and esp. 1945-1990, during the Cold War)

Ø  Why did UK not build a powerful military and try to dominate Europe in the mid-19th

Ø  Why was Bismarckian Germany (1862-90) especially aggressive between 1862-1870, but hardly aggressive at all from 1871 until 1890

Ø  Why did the UK, France, Russia form a balancing coalition against Wilhelmine Germany before World War I, but fail to organize an effective alliance to contain Nazi Germany?

Ø  Why did Japan and the states of Western Europe join forces with US against the Soviet Union in the early years of Cold War, even though the US emerged from WWII with the most powerful economy in the world and a nuclear monopoly?

Ø  What explains the commitment of American troops to Europe and Northeast Asia during the 20th century? E.g.Why did the US wait until April 1917 to join WWI?

Ø  Why did the US and the Soviet Union continue building up their nuclear arsenals after each had acquired a secure second-strike capability against the other?

3) Make predictions about great-power politics in the 21st

 

5.      Liberalism vs. Realism (pp. 14 – 22) => His Theory

 

*Morgenthau’s classical realism (human nature)[1] and Waltz’s defensive realism (system, structure) – structural realism (mere aim is to survive, attention on the balance of power – “anarchy encourages states to behave defensively and to maintain rather than upset the balance of power(Mearsheimer, p. 20)” )[2] = human nature for competition vs. structure that drives the competition

 

6.      Important distinction between his theory of offensive realism:

-          Difference between Mearsheimer (offensive) and Waltz’s defensive/structural realism:

On the question of how much power states want: there are “powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system”

-          Difference between Mearsheimer and Morgenthau:

Competition-prone but not due to personalities/nature, but caused by the structure, which makes competition the best way for survival– “survival mandates aggressive behavior (p. 21)”

-          In between Morgenthau and Waltz.

 

Virtues and limits of his theory: 

-          abstraction (“broad-gauged” but “a powerful flashlight in a dark room” (p. 11) => supplementary theories, employ “more fine-grained theories such as deterrence theory” (p. 11)

-          descriptive and prescriptive

 

7.      Plan of the book = 6 questions on power

1)      Why do great powers want power?

2)      How much power do they want/ is enough? (= structure)

3)      What is power? (indicators?)

4)      What strategies do states pursue to gain power or to maintain status-quo (balancing and buck-passing)

5)      What are the causes of war?

6)      When do threatened great powers balance against and when do they do buckpassing?

 

Chapter 2. Anarchy and the Struggle for Power

 

His answer to why great powers vie each other = structure that makes it the best way of survival

 

1.      Bedrock Assumptions (Five):

1)      “anarchy” (international system) – “an ordering principle” not chaos (p. 30)

2)      Great powers’ “inherent offensive military capability”(p. 30)

3)      Uncertainty about other states’ intentions” (p. 31).

4)      “survival” as the primary goal (p. 31)

5)      States as “rational actors” (p. 31)

 

2.      State Behavior (pp. 32-36)

Anarchy – Uncertainty – Survival – Self-help – Self-interest – absolute vs relative power

 

3.      Calculated Aggression

4.      Hegemony’s Limits (pp. 40-42) (hegemonic world limited in reality => perpetual competition is inevitable)

5.      Power and Fear

6.      Hierarchy of State Goals

7.      Cooperation among states

 

“In sum, my argument is that the structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony. I do not adopt Morgenthau’s claim that states invariably behave aggressively because they have a will to power hardwired to them. Instead, I assume that the principal motive behind great-power behavior is survival. In anarchy, however, the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively. Nor does my theory classify states as more or less aggressive on the basis of their economic political systems. Offensive realism makes only a handful of assumptions about great powers, and these assumptions apply equally to all great powers. Except for differences in how much power each state controls, the theory treats all states alike.” (pp. 53-54).


CRITIQUE POINTS
-Rationality - Are we, are they so rational

-Competition(Zero-Sum)? Material capability based on what.


[1] Politics Among Nations (1973)

[2] Theory of International Politics 



George Orwell (1936) “Shooting an Elephant,” New Writing (Autumn).

Short Essay

-          Setting in Moulmein, Burma (Myanmar) in the 1920s when the country was a province of India (British empire)

-          Main character: Young Englishman police officer in Burma

 

Plot overview

-          Police officer of the British empire (Englishman) acknowledges and is troubled by the unjust practices of occupation in Burma

-          Yet, the Burmese always make mockery of him (offensive)

-          Then one day, a wild elephant roams around a village, killing one man.

-          The officer with rifle is called for by the Burmese, who expect him to shoot the elephant (high expectations, roars in the crowd)

-          But he knows that his small rifle is very weak for confronting the elephant (calculated aggression)

-          Fortunately, when the officer arrives at the scene, the wild elephant has already calmed down. And to his better judgment, the elephant should be kept on hold rather than shooting it (cost). Also, he knows that the rifle is not strong enough in case the elephant becomes violent again.

-          Despite his better judgment, the officer shoots the elephant to kill. Several shots (Gruesome imagery here)

 

Overall, three conflicts:

-          Unjust practices of occupation in Burma (external structure/conflict)

-          Burmese disregard/mockery on the main character (external structure/conflict)

-          Conflict within the character (self-image and conscience – internal conflict)

 

Good story to overview/question the key assumptions of realism, esp. Mearsheimer’s

-          Offensiveness is not the internal character but external structure imposed on the actor – system drives the offensiveness (Mearsheimer)

-          Calculated aggression

-          Yet, question on the rationality – despite calculated aggression, the main character shoot the elephant -> actors vie for the maximization of material capability or immaterial?

-          Rationality question -> internal question again? (something inherent in the actor that drives the offensiveness and competition?)

 


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