[일본-노트] 일본의 대외정책 - 외압(gaiatsu), 반응형 국가(reactive state)?

[연구] Research 2014. 10. 29. 12:03

Gaiatsu and Japanese Foreign Policy

Is Japan a Reactive State?

   

Definition

 n  Gaiatsu: Literally “foreign pressure” – Emphasis on the reactive, responsive nature of Japanese foreign policy to external pressure/stimulus[1]

 n  Kent Calder’s conceptualization of Gaiatsu = Japan as a “reactive state” – Japanese foreign policy is reactive to external pressure, especially in response to the American requests[2]

n  While the term “reactive state” remains in the academic discourse, the term gaiatsu hardly appears in the discussion

 

The Debate: Is Japan a Reactive State?

 

1.       Japan as a reactive state (Calder, 1988) – Gaiatsu as its nature

 

1)       2 characteristics of “reactive state”

        the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so

        it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely

 

2)       Actual cases during the late 1970s and the early 1980s

-        access to the Japanese market for beef and oranges(1978)

-        macroeconomic stimulation(1978)

-        market access for American telecommunications equipment(1980)

-        restraints on automobile export to the United States(1981)

-        Yen-Dollar Agreement(1984)

-        pressures for policy change in Japan by G-5 Plaza(1985)

                    

“Responded positively to U.S. pressures for liberalization of outward capital flow”

 

3)       Explanations

       Considerations of state strategy

-        Dictated avoiding broad international commitments or a pro-active global role, so as to devote maximum attention to economic growth, allying with the US

       Domestic constraints on international initiatives

-        the fragmented character(nawabari) of state authority in Japan makes decisive action difficult, and creates “a hierarchy, or complex of overlapping hierarchies, without a top”

       Intermittent Japanese Flexibility

-        In the orange negotiations with the US, “while the Japanese political system was not prepared to fully liberalize, it was prepared to compensate”

-        “all relevant actors in the negotiation were given a lucrative piece of what they wanted(customers unrepresented in the arena failed to reap major benefits)”

       Sense of vulnerability – “hypersensitivity to any form of anti-Japanese sentiment abroad”[3]

 

2.       Japan as a proactive state – Gaiatsu as a strategy

 

1)       “The myth of Gaiatsu” argument (Cooney, 2006)[4]

-        Re-interpreting Gaiatsu as a strategic tool for normalizing Japan

“Japanese elites want Japan to be a normal nation… Article 9 prevents this outcome…Gaiatsu is a tool for normalizing Japan without risking public displeasure over the reaction of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Japanese elites are using foreign pressure to their own ends”

-        “a strong, face-saving device to which [domestic] vested interest groups were persuaded to give in” by a government pretending to be their champion; frustration with the “country’s dithering passivity on all but trade.”[5]

 

2)       Japan as an aggressive and mercantilist nation[6]

 

3)       And with the recent developments in Abe’s diplomacy: “Strategic Diplomacy, Value-Oriented Diplomacy, and Claiming Diplomacy”[7]

-       Prof. Park finds distinctive values in Abe’s diplomacy where it is much more strategic—he sets up certain set of national goals and according to the priorities of the goals, he acts accordingly. For example, for the first time in Japanese diplomatic history, they set up National Security Committee (NSC) like America and began to disclose their strategy which is unprecedented. The two main pillars of Japanese national security is the Peace Constitution and the other is US-Japan Alliance. Whenever Japan wants to change diplomatic stance, they upgrade US-Japan Alliance and on the basis of the upgraded alliance system, they try to revise the self-defense forces law and revise the US-Japan security guideline.

-       Value-oriented Diplomacy emphasizes the ‘universal values’ such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Abe believes that Japan should take more responsibility in the international society and is especially cautious of the public space and maritime security against Chinese expansion.

-       Claiming diplomacy is a counter-reaction against DPJ’s passive diplomacy. Abe strongly believes that claiming diplomacy on territorial dispute and history perspective is important in setting up Japan’s national identity and territorial sovereignty. 

 

Continued Debate: Other Explanations

 

1.       Reactive-Proactive Hybrid model

 

1)       From reactive to a proactive, “a rising state”[8]

-        “Japan’s recent diplomatic behavior reveals considerable reactivity and equivocation, but there are also concurrent indications of greater activism and even hints of leadership, especially since the last half of the 1980s.”[9]

 

2)       Japan towards a normal country

-        The early 1990s emergence of the normal country debate[10]

-        Ishihara’s The Japan That Can Say No (1989)[11]

 

3)       “Coping strategy” (Curtis 1993)[12]

-        Reading the trend of the times and responding strategically = “reactive” is only a partial description.

 

4)       The Goldilocks Strategy (Samuels 2007)[13]

 

2.       Reactive only to certain countries (United States)

 

3.       Other countries are also reactive = “reactive” nature is not unique to Japanese foreign policy

 

Robert Putnam’s two-level games

-        Domestic and international politics are unavoidably intertwined (hence two-level-games) in the decision making processes underlying international relations

-        The 1978 Bonn Summit and Japan: “without the external pressure, it is even more unlikely that the expansionists could have overridden the powerful MOF”

-        Examples of openness for foreign pressure in every country; Japan no more a reactive than most other states of similar size and power (e.g. U.S., Germany)[14]

 

Policy Examples

 

1.       Japan’s Defense Policy in 2000s - : “Coping” and increasing “proactive” than reactive

 1)       Major Findings based on a Survey of Japanese Defense White Papers (2005-2014)

n  Security discourse as a key example of gaiatsu as strategy (2005 War on Terror -> 2007 Chindia, regional environment, territorial issues 2013): increasing emphasis on SDF, from passive to proactive

n  Mid-late 2000s: More coping than reactive (U.S.’s QDR, increasingly to China’s rise since 2007 report, North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities)

n  Early 2010s: More proactive than coping

 

Key findings of a Survey on Japan’s Defense White Papers (2005-2014)[15]

 

n  Overall, Japan, like other countries cannot but be reactive to changes in the external environment, triggering its strategic coping measures as responses; and these decisions resonate in terms of other countries responses, interacting/mutually reinforcing Japan’s strategic environment (Reactive-Proactive); indeed the 2014 is markedly strong in terms of proactive approach to national security.

 

2.       Japan’s ODA Policy – Case of Gaiatsu?

 

1)       Earlier Criticisms on Japan’s ODA Policy

-        “predominantly regional orientation with its assistance”; “heavy skewing toward bilateral assistance”

-        Absence of principle-based guideline until 1992

2)       Reactive: “To redress criticisms, Japan wrote its first ODA Charter in 1992 and revised it in 2002.”[16]

3)       Nevertheless, while reactive in terms of criticisms, yet increasingly proactive in its policy direction (regional orientation)

-        While the first ODA charter addressed the need for Japan’s more global role, with the revision of 2002 ODA charter refocuses on Japan’s regional orientation (proactive)- “With Focus on Asia”(2002) based on the “new challenges of the era”

-        ODA Charter Revision – “not only as a contribution to the international community, but also as a help to promote security and prosperity of Japan”;

 

Survey of Japan’s ODA White Papers (1994-2014)[17]

Year

Findings

Main Characteristic

2013

“rapid change of the political and security environment surrounding Japan” => “it is important to support countries which share strategic interests and fundamental values”; “investment”

“Growth of Southeast Asia and the role of Japan”, “Dynamic Africa”

Focus on Asia,
Strategic ODA

2011

The Earthquake

2009

Global financial crisis

“East Asian Community” (Hatoyama)

2003-2002

ODA Charter Revision – “not only as a contribution to the international community, but also as a help to promote security and prosperity of Japan”; “With Focus on Asia”(2002)

“Meeting the Challenges of a New Era”

1997

ODA budget cuts, begins with “why is ODA necessary” (changed from “popular support”)

“Substantial Policy and Philosophy Shaping Period (Original ODA Charter Period)” (1992-2002)

1994

1989, 1991-1993: Largest donor country ($11,474 bil in 1993)

- End of the Cold War (ODA Charter in June 1992)

 


Conclusion

 

-        “Coping” and increasingly proactive than reactive

-        Abe (Feb 22, 2013): “Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am here to make. And I reiterate this by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be.”[18]



 

[Appendix 1] Survey of Japanese Defense White Papers (2005-2014)[19]

 

Year

Gaiatsu / External factors

Key Responses

Result

2014

-     U.S.’s 2014 QDR – Emphasis on the sequestration cuts in defense spending

-     North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities

-     China’s military modernization, naval forces, maritime interests, presence in the South China Sea (Southeast Asia)

-     Russia’s increased activities in the “vicinity of Japan”

-     Middle East and Africa = appropriate responses are needed as “international community”

-     2014 July 1: The Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People

-     2013 Dec: The National Security Council Created

-     2013 Dec: Japan’s first NSS – Japan’s stance as a “Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation” – “Japan will contribute more”

 

Gaiatsu
=> National security and defense policies to “protect Japan”

2013

-     Territorial rights, China’s military capacity, North Korea: “security environment in the vicinity of Japan has increasingly grown severe”

-     “the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in the Asia-Pacific region”

Peace, security, and independence cannot be ensured by aspirations alone”

2012

-     U.S.’s rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific, reduction in defense spending

-     North Korea

-     “China’s maritime activities in waters near Japan”

-     2010 NDPG (developing Dynamic Defense Force)

-     “For the Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance”

2011

-     Earthquake

-     U.S’s war on terror (Osama bin Laden killed)

-     North Korea, China, Russia

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe

-     New National Defense Program Guidelines for 2011 and Beyond (new NDPG) drafted

-     “Dynamic Defense Forces”

-     Reform, reorganization of SDF

2010

-     “Complicated and Uncertain International Security Environment”

-     Cheonan incident, WMD, China’s rise

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe (Same structure upto 2014)

-     Feb 2010 “Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era”

-     SDF, US-Japan Security Alliance

2009-2006

-     Terrorism, WMD, Iran, North Korea

-     “Changes to “traditional relationships”(Rise of China and India) – (2007)

*List of countries overviewed: U.S., Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, Europe, U.N.

-     Similar to 2005 response: SDF, U.S.-Japan security alliance, PKO activities

-     MoD Reform (2008)

2005

-     War on terror (Non-state actors) – “new threats”

-     Transfer and proliferation of WMDs

-     Situations in Iraq

-     (Korean peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, Malacca and Singapore)

*List of countries overviewed (defense policies): U.S., Russia, Europe, U.N.

- U.S.-Japan alliance

- Self-sufficient defense posture against the new threats (emphasis on the right of self-defense)

- 2004 New National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG)

- 2004 “Mid-Term Defense Program” (new MTDP) for FY 2005-2009 – “establishing multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces”

“New” threats => Self-defense, U.S.-Japan alliance for “maintenance of regional order” and “global cooperation”



[1] The New York Times, “The Great Game of ‘Gai-atsu’,” (May 1, 1991) Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/01/opinion/the-great-game-of-gai-atsu.html (Accessed Oct 26, 2014).

[2] Calder, Kent (1988) “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics, Vol. 40(1). PP. 517-541.

[3] Blacker, Michael “Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,” in Curtis, Gerald L., ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 1-42.; Pyle, Kenneth B. “The Burden of Japanese History and the Politics of Burden Sharing,” in Makin, John H. and David C. Hellmann, eds., Sharing World Leadership: A New Era for America and Japan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989).

[4] Cooney, Kevin (2007) Japan's Foreign Policy Since 1945. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[5] The New York Times, “The Great Game of ‘Gai-atsu’,” (May 1, 1991). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/01/opinion/the-great-game-of-gai-atsu.html (Accessed Oct 26, 2014).

[6] Hirata, Keiko (2001): “Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Indochina in Y. Sato and A. Miyashita (eds.), Japan’s Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration. London: St. Martin’s Press.

[7] Park, Cheol Hee, “Basic Directions of Abe’s External Strategy,” in Cheol Hee Park Ed. Power Shift in East Asia and Changes in Japan’s External Strategy (2014) (in Korean).

[8] Hirata (2001).

[9] Yasutomo, Dennis (1986) The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy. London: Lexington Books.

[10] Soeya, Yoshihide & Masayuki, Tadokoro, and David Welch (2011) Japan as a Normal Country?, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

[11] Ishihara, Shintaro and Morita, Akio (1989): The Japan that Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster

[12] Curtis, Gerald (1993): Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

[13] Samuels, Richard (2007): Securing Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[14] Putnam, Robert D. (1988): Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. In: International Organization, 42(3). PP. 427-460. P. 429.

[15] Japan’s Annual White Paper (2005-2014), Ministry of Defense. Available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ (Accessed Oct 29, 2014).

[16] Otopalik, Cameron M. (2010) “Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance: Assessing Conformance with Shifting Priorities,” International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, Vol 1, No. 1.1.

[17] Japan’s ODA White Papers (1994-2014) are available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000017.html (Accessed Oct 29th, 2014).

[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan is Back” by Shinzo Abe (Feb 22, 2013), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html (Accessed Oct 29, 2014).

[19] Japan’s Annual White Paper (2005-2014), Ministry of Defense, available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ (Accessed Oct 29th, 2014)

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